Amrendra Singh v. The State Of Bihar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1203 of 2026 ====================================================== 1.

Amrendra Singh Son of Anirudh Singh, Resident of Village- Rampur Khajuriya, Post Office- Rampur, Police Station- Dumariya Ghat, District- East Champaran at Motihari.

2.

Satyendra Singh, Son of Anirudh Singh, Resident of Village- Rampur Khajuriya, Post Office- Rampur, Police Station- Dumariya Ghat, District- East Champaran at Motihari.

... ... Petitioner/s

Versus

1.

The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna. 2.

The District Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari. 3.

The District Land Acquisition Officer, East Champaran at Motihari. 4.

The Additional District Land Acquisition Officer, East Champaran at Motihari. 5.

The Circle Officer, Kesariya, District- East Champaran at Motihari. 6.

Amit Kumar Singh, Son of Anirudh Singh, Resident of Village- Rampur Khajuriya, P.O.- Rampur, P.S.-Dumariya Ghat, District- East Champaran at Motihari.

... ... Respondent/s ====================================================== Appearance :

For the Petitioner/s :

Mr.Sanjay Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent/s :

Standing Counsel (16) ====================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH ORAL JUDGMENT Date : 29-01-2026 Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and the learned SC 16 for the State.

2. The petitioners in paragraph no. 1 of the present writ petition have sought, inter alia, following relief(s), which is reproduced hereinafter:- "(i) That the present writ petition has been filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent authorities to pay compensation

2/11 amount in respect of acquisition of the petitioners' land appertaining to Khata No.73, Khesara No.962, measuring 4.35 decimals in the name of petitioner no.1 and 4.35 decimals in the name of the petitioner no.2 along with admissible interest, and/order to pass any other appropriate order or direction to which the petitioners may be found legally entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case."

3. Brief facts of the case is that the petitioners claim lawful ownership and peaceful possession over the land bearing Khata No.73, Khesara No.962, measuring 4.35 decimal in the name of petitioner no.1 and 4.35 decimals in the name of petitioner no.2. The grievance of the petitioners is that the land belonging to them has been acquired by the District Administration for construction of NH 139 (W) from Sahebganj to Areraj, however, no payment of compensation has been made to them till date.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners informs that for the relief(s) as prayed for in the present writ petition, the petitioners have already filed representation before the Additional Land Acquisition Officer on 09.12.2025, however, no action has been taken on the same till date.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the petitioners themselves are

3/11 responsible for not receiving due compensation. Petitioners have not denied the fact that other persons in the vicinity have not been paid the due compensation. Petitioners have themselves delayed and have directly approached this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, the writ petition is not maintainable.

6. Heard the parties.

7. It is commonly seen that the Officers having quasi judicial power in its administrative side often delay in considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into circumstances of the present case where fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8. It is also well settled principle of law that every administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.

4/11 The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow: "47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasijudicial and even by administrative bodies.

(e) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is

5/11 the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasijudicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasijudicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decisionmaking process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.

Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decisionmakers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor32).

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was

6/11 considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs.

Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions."

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process".

9. The law in this regard has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495, Paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard, which is as under:- "19. While a High Court would normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This principle has been crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and Harbanslal Sahni v.

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Recently, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors a two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in

7/11 the presence of an alternate remedy. This Court has observed:

"28. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition.

One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.

This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with."

10. Now question arises whether this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in

8/11 the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents have acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021), State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499. The Apex Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. It has observed as under:

"23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355: AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition."

11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A of

9/11 the Constitution of India, which tends to safeguard the invaluable right to property.

"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."

12. The State cannot disposes a citizen of his property except in accordance with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay compensation is not expressively included in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in 2020(2) SCC 569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and 12.2 of the said judgment, which are inter alia reproduced hereinafter; "12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property [State of W.B. v.

Subodh Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.

12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of

10/11 the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1"

13. The above proposition of law has again been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases 605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:- " 16. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Fortyfourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1."

14. When the question of right to property as per the provision of Article 300A of the Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court that due process of law has not been

11/11 complied the Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

15. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector, East Champaran at Motihari before whom the petitioners have already filed their representation is directed to call for the entire records from the Circle Officer, Kesariya, relating to the land in question and after affording due opportunity of hearing to both the parties, pass a reasoned order and dispose of the representation filed on behalf of the petitioners well within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of this order, otherwise, this Court will take action against all the authorities.

16. In case, the land of the petitioners are acquired, then in that case, the petitioners are required to be paid due compensation as per MVR determined at the rate of commercial value of the land.

17. Accordingly, the present application stands disposed of.

(Purnendu Singh, J) chn/- AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE NA Uploading Date 06.02.2026 Transmission Date NA