Bhuneshwar Singh v. State Of Bihar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.526 of 2003 ====================================================== Bhuneshwar Singh son of late Hira Nand Singh, resident of village-Kasap, PS-Udwant Nagar, District-Bhojpur ... ... Appellant/s

Versus

The State of Bihar ... ... Respondent/s ====================================================== Appearance :

For the Appellant/s :

Mr.Sumit Shekhar Pandey, Amicus Curiae For the Respondent/s :

Ms.Anita Kumari Singh (APP) ====================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE JUSTICE SMT. G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY ORAL JUDGMENT Date : 04-12-2024

1. The appeal is arising out of the judgment and order of sentence in Sessions Trial No. 793 of 1992/Trial No. 1044 of 1992 dated 22.11.2003, on the file of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Bhojpur at Ara, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code. It is relevant to mention that the appellant was initially enlarged on provisional bail by the trial court to enable him to file an appeal and later, this Court enlarged the

2/29 appellant/Bhuneshwar Singh on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) with two sureties to the like amount each, to the satisfaction of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Bhojpur at Ara in Sessions Trial No. 793/92/Trial No. 1044/92 vide order dated 15.12.2003.

2. The appeal has come up for hearing and as none appeared for the appellant, this Court appointed Mr. Sumit Shekhar Pandey as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court, vide order dated 03.07.2024.

3. Heard Shri Sumit Shekhar Pandey, the Learned Amicus Curiae and Ms. Anita Kumari Singh, the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the record.

4. The brief facts culled out of the fardbeyan is that on 28.08.1990 at 4.00 pm (evening) the informant, Rana Pratap Singh along with his nephew, Manoj Singh/PW-1 were irrigating paddy field situated at Jagir Badhar by using water from State Boring. In the meantime, the appellants Bhuneshwar Singh, Ramesh

3/29 Singh and Sachita Singh came to the place of occurrence, abused the informant and PW-1, for using the water for irrigation that turned into verbal altercation during which the appellant/Bhuneshwar Singh, assaulted PW-1 with a Baishakhi. As a result, PW-1 sustained head injury and when the informant attempted to intervene, the accused Ramesh Singh instigated others to assault him. On that Bhuneshwar Singh (appellant) along with Ramesh Singh and Sachita Singh assaulted the informant with a Baishakhi and a lathi.

5. Basing on the fardbeyan of the informant Rana Pratap Singh, a case was registered against the appellant/Bhuneshwar Singh, Ramesh Singh and Sachita Singh vide Udwant Nagar, PS Case No. 87 of 1990 dated 28.08.1990, for the offences punishable under Section 307, 324 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After due investigation, the police submitted a chargesheet against the appellants and others for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 324, 323 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

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6. The trial court framed charges against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 307 r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, read over and explained to the accused, for which the appellant and the other accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

7. During the course of trial, the prosecution has examined total of four witnesses ie. P.Ws. 1 to 4 and got marked Exhibits 1, 2, 2/1 and the details are given as follows:- PW-1 Manoj Kumar Singh PW-2 Nanku Singh PW-3 Bipin Singh PW-4 Dr. Sushil Kumar Rungta Exhibit-1 Signature of Manoj Kumar Singh identified on the fardbeyan Exhibit-2 to 2/1 Injury report of Manoj Kumar Singh and Rana Pratap Singh

8. Later, the appellant and other two coaccused were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C and after considering the entire material on record

5/29 including both oral and documentary evidence, the trial court acquitted Ramesh Singh and Sachita Singh. However, the appellant/Bhuneshwar Singh was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code as stated supra.

9. The points for determination in this appeal are as follows:-

(1) Whether the trial court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and convicted the appellant, and whether there is any irregularity in the orders passed by the trial court?

(2.) Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt?

10. It is necessary to reappreciate the evidence (oral and documentary) on record to come to a conclusion in order to determine the points framed in the appeal.

11. In precise, the case of the prosecution is

6/29 that verbal altercation took place between the informant and the appellant and two others while drawing water from the State borewell. All the accused persons abused informant and his nephew/PW-1 and they both sustained injuries in the hands of the accused.

12. It is relevant to mention that the informant was not examined before the Court. The trial court extended the benefit of doubt to the other accused, Ramesh Singh and Sachita Singh including the appellant. However, the appellant was convicted for committing assault against PW-1 alone, considering the evidence of the prosecution as against appellant alone, but not the entire incident.

13. Shri Sumit Shekhar Pandey, the Learned Amicus Curiae, contended that non-examination of the informant is fatal to the case of the prosecution as the FIR was registered basing on the fardbeyan of the informant which itself becomes doubtful. It is further contended by the Learned Amicus Curiae that the evidence of PW-2, who is none other than the father of

7/29 PW-1 and the brother of the informant, cannot be considered by the trial court, as he was not the eyewitness to the incident and a hearsay witness. It is further contended by the Learned Amicus Curiae that the evidence of PW-3 also cannot be considered by the trial court in any manner as PW-3 was not arrayed in list of witnesses appended to the chargesheet and further statement of PW-3 under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. was also not recorded. Lastly, it is contended by the Learned Amicus Curiae that the documentary evidence i.e. the medical report (Exhibit-P/2) coupled with the oral evidence of the PW-4 clearly disclose that PW-1 sustained one incised wound and a blunt wound which contradicts with the oral evidence of the witnesses, especially the evidence of PW-1. Therefore, the genesis of the prosecution story has to be discarded. It is also contended by the Learned Amicus Curiae that the Investigating Officer was not examined by the prosecution for reasons best known to them. In spite of contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the

8/29 witnesses the defence lost the opportunity to establish these points before the Court, as they could not be put to the Investigating Officer. Thus, the Amicus Curiae prayed to acquit the appellant.

14. On the other hand, Smt. Anita Kumari Singh, the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State contended that the evidence of doctor i.e. PW-4 clearly disclose that the injured PW-1 sustained multiple injuries and she urged that the non-examination of the informant and the Investigating Officer cannot be the basis for setting aside the order of the sentence and conviction passed by the trial court.

15. On perusal of the oral evidence of PW-1, it is evident that PW-1 testified that the appellant/Bhuneshwar Singh, assaulted him with Rami on his head which clearly contradicts the contents of the fardbeyan. As per the fardbeyan of the informant, i.e. Rana Pratap Singh, the appellant assaulted PW-1 with Baishakhi. However, the injured, PW-1 comes up with a new version stating that the weapon used against him

9/29 was Rami and not Baishakhi. It is also testified by PW-1 that he was assaulted by the accused persons only once, but did not specify the name of the person who assaulted him. However, the medical report of the doctor i.e. Exhibit-2 and the oral evidence of the doctor/PW-4 clearly disclose that the informant sustained two injuries which are as follows:- (1.) Incised wound 3 1⁄2" X 3/4" X skin muscle deep exposing bone on left parietal area of skull. (2.) Abrasion 3/4" X 3/4" on posterior aspect of lower part of right arm near elbow surrounded by soft tissue swelling 1" X 1" size.

16. It is opined by PW-4 that the injuries sustained by PW-1 were simple in nature and Injury no. 1 was caused by sharp-edged object and Injury no. 2 was caused by hard blunt object. As per the fardbeyan, the weapon allegedly used by the appellant was Baishakhi/crutch. If a crutch was used by the appellant against PW-1 the question of an incised wound would not arise and if at all a Rami was used for assault it

10/29 would support the incised wound as it is made up of a rod.

17. It is pertinent to mention that the fardbeyan is silent as to the usage of weapon i.e. Rami as contended by the Learned Amicus Curiae. The prosecution has miserably failed to examine the informant. However, this Court is of the considerable view that PW-1 improved his versions during course of trial, by changing the nature of weapon in order to align it with the medical report i.e. Exhibit-2. The medical report i.e. Exhibit-2 also contradicts with the evidence of the PW-1 with respect to Injury no. 2.

18. It was not the case of the prosecution before the trial court that PW-1 sustained two injuries in the alleged assault by the appellant. Furthermore, the prosecution did not claim that the appellant was handicapped and using crutch/Baishakhi at the time of incident or that due to anger he inflicted injuries on PW-1. Further, the evidence of PWs-1 and 2 also contradicts the place of occurrence. The prosecution has

11/29 miserably failed to establish the place of occurrence. The evidence of PW-3 need not be considered, as he turned hostile. Other than the evidence of PW-1 and 4, there is no substantial material on record to prove the guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code.

19. At this juncture, the Learned Amicus Curiae contended that a conviction under Section 324 of IPC could only be sustained against the appellant, if the prosecution is able to prove that the appellant has inflicted hurt against PW-1 which fall under Section 319 of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 319 defines "Hurt" as follows:- whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.

20. Admittedly, the evidence of PW-1 coupled with Exhibit-2 and the evidence of PW-4 establishes that PW-1 sustained injuries.

21. The cardinal principles of criminal law is that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of

12/29 the accused beyond reasonable doubt and till then the accused shall be presumed to be innocent. It is also the duty of the prosecution to connect the crime with that of the accused. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the appellant along with two others, assaulted PW-1 and the informant/Rana Pratap Singh with a Baishakhi and a lathi on 22.08.1990 at 04.00 pm while PW-1 and the informant were drawing water from the State borewell for the purpose of irrigation. As per the prosecution, the incident was witnessed by many other co-villagers, but no independent witnesses were examined by the prosecution to corroborate the evidence of PW-1 and no material objects were placed before the Court to prove the nature of weapon which was alleged to have been used against PW-1.

22. Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:-

324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.-Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by

13/29 means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

23. As per the above section, it is for the prosecution to prove that hurt was caused by a specific means of instrument which can be used as dangerous weapon. The prosecution must prove the basic ingredients of the offence including the intention of the appellant to prove him guilty.

24. On perusal of the record, it is evident that only a single question was asked from the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. examination which reads

14/29 as follows:- "Question:-There is evidence against you that on 28.08.1990, under village-Kasap, PS-Udwant Nagar, District-Bhojpur, you along with the other accused persons hit and severely injured the informant of this case, Rana Pratap Singh and the nephew of the informant, Manoj Singh with crutches and lathis with a common intention to kill. What do you have to say? Answer:- No."

As discussed above, the fardbeyan disclose that appellant/Bhuneshwar Singh, assaulted PW-1 with Baishakhi. Subsequently, the appellant/Bhuneshwar Singh along with Ramesh Singh and Sachita Singh, assaulted the informant Rana Pratap Singh. However, PW-1 testified that the appellant assaulted him with a weapon called Rami. The examination of appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is very much silent about the overt acts or incriminating material found against the appellant from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

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25. At this juncture, it is necessary to rely on the citations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Indrakunwar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364 wherein their Lordships have held that:-

34. Keeping in view the understanding of the principles of privacy and the propositions of law in regard thereto, we now travel to what, by law, may be required of the convict-appellant in her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

35. A perusal of various judgments rendered by this Court reveals the following principles, as evolved over time when considering such statements.

35.1 The object, evident from the Section itself, is to enable the accused to themselves explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against them. 35.2 The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused. This process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict.

35.3 The process enshrined is not a matter of procedural formality but is based on the cardinal principle of natural justice, i.e., audi alterum partem. 35.4 The ultimate test when concerned with the

16/29 compliance of the Section is to enquire and ensure whether the accused got the opportunity to say his piece.

35.5 In such a statement, the accused may or may not admit involvement or any incriminating circumstance or may even offer an alternative version of events or interpretation. The accused may not be put to prejudice by any omission or inadequate questioning. 35.6 The right to remain silent or any answer to a question which may be false shall not be used to his detriment, being the sole reason.

35.7 This statement cannot form the sole basis of conviction and is neither a substantive nor a substitute piece of evidence. It does not discharge but reduces the prosecution's burden of leading evidence to prove its case. They are to be used to examine the veracity of the prosecution's case.

35.8 This statement is to be read as a whole. One part cannot be read in isolation.

35.9 Such a statement, as not on oath, does not qualify as a piece of evidence under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; however, the inculpatory aspect as may be borne from the statement may be used to lend credence to the case of the prosecution. 35.10 The circumstances not put to the accused while rendering his statement under the Section are to

17/29 be excluded from consideration as no opportunity has been afforded to him to explain them.

35.11 The Court is obligated to put, in the form of questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. The defence so articulated must be carefully scrutinized and considered.

35.12 Non-compliance with the Section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Kalicharan & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 2 SCC 583 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:-

24. At this stage, we must refer to the requirement of the examination of the accused under Section 313 of CrPC. Section 313 of CrPC reads thus:- "313. Power to examine the accused. -

(1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court- (a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary;

(b) shall, after the witnesses for the

18/29 prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case: Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b).

(2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1).

(3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them.

(4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.

[(5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section.]" (emphasis supplied) In Naval Kishore Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2004) 7 SCC 502 their Lordships have held as follows:-

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5. Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the Sessions Court committed serious error in not properly examining the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Our attention was drawn to the statement taken from the present appellant. Only three questions were put to the appellant. The first question was whether he heard the statement of the witnesses and the second question was that the evidence given by the witnesses showed that he committed the murder of the deceased and whether he had to say anything in defence. The questioning of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C was done in the most unsatisfactory manner. Under Section 313 Cr.P.C the accused should have been given opportunity to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.

At least, the various items of evidence, which had been produced by the prosecution, should have been put to the accused in the form of questions and he should have been given opportunity to give his explanation. No such opportunity was given to the accused in the instant case. We deprecate the practice of putting the entire evidence against the accused put together in a single question and giving an opportunity to explain the same, as the accused may not be in a position to give a rational and intelligent explanation.

20/29 opportunity to the accused to explain the adverse circumstances in the evidence and the Section 313 examination shall not be carried out as an empty formality. It is only after the entire evidence is unfurled the accused would be in a position to articulate his defence and to give explanation to the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. Such an opportunity being given to the accused is part of a fair trial and if it is done in a slipshod manner, it may result in imperfect appreciation of evidence. In various decisions of this Court, the importance of questioning the accused under Section 313 CrPC was given due emphasis, e.g. Rama Shankar Singh v. State of W.B. [AIR 1962 SC 1239 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 296], Bhalinder Singh v.State of Punjab [(1994) 1 SCC 726 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 462], State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705] and Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand [(2003) 2 SCC 401 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 544].

6. In the present case, the appellant had not raised any contention in the High Court that he was seriously prejudiced by the way in which the Section 313 questioning was done. If this defect in procedure under Section 313 CrPC had been pointed out, the High Court could have very well remitted the case to the Sessions Court for a proper examination. At this stage, we are not inclined to accept this contention of the

21/29 appellant especially when the accused was not able to show that he was in any way prejudiced by such irregular procedure.

In case of Sanatan Naskar and Another Vs.

State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 8 SCC 249, the Lordships of Apex Court have held:-

22. As already noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. The court has been empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the court and, besides ensuring the compliance therewith, the court has to keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain silence coupled with simpliciter denial or, in the alternative, to explain his version and reasons for his alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or

22/29 right of the other party to cross-examine him. However, if the statements made are false, the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences and pass consequential orders as may be called for in accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the court is to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over the period of time, the courts have explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field of criminal jurisprudence.

23. The statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313(4) CrPC explicitly provide that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against the accused in any other enquiry into or trial for any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible

23/29 as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution.

24. Another important caution that Courts have declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under Section 313 CrPC as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of evidence. In Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay the Court held as under: (AIR p. 248, para 3) "3. ... As the appellant admitted that he was in charge of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point. The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of the godown. The contention that the Magistrate made use of the inculpatory part of the accused's statement and excluded the exculpatory part does not seem to be correct. The statement under Section 342 did not consist of two portions, part inculpatory and part exculpatory. It concerned itself with two facts. The accused admitted

24/29 that he was in charge of the godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was found in that godown. He alleged that the rectified spirit was found outside it. This part of his statement was proved untrue by the prosecution evidence and had no intimate connection with the statement concerning the possession of the godown."

25. In the light of the abovestated principles it was expected of the accused to provide some reasonable explanation in regard to various circumstances leading to the commission of the crime. He was known to the family along with other accused and by giving just a bare denial or lack of knowledge he cannot tilt the case in his favour. Rather their answers either support the case of the prosecution or reflect the element of falsehood in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In both these circumstances the Court would be entitled to draw adverse inference against the accused.

29. So, the first and the foremost question that this Court has to examine in the present case is, whether the prosecution has been able to establish the chain of event and circumstances which certainly points out towards the involvement and guilt of the accused. Even, before we enter upon adjudicating this aspect of the case, it will be appropriate to narrow down the controversy keeping in view the admissions, if any, made by the appellants. The accused, after having

25/29 known the entire case of the prosecution, is required to be examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. All the material evidence has to be put to the accused and he has to be awarded the fair opportunity of answering the case of the prosecution, as well as to explain his version to the court without being subjected to any cross-examination. As already noticed, the answers given by the accused can be used against him in the trial insofar as they support the case of the prosecution.

In Premchand Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2023) 5 SCC 522 the Lordships of Apex Court held as under:

15. What follows from these authorities may briefly be summarised thus:

15.1. Section 313 CrPC [clause (b) of subsection (1)] is a valuable safeguard in the trial process for the accused to establish his innocence.

15.2. Section 313, which is intended to ensure a direct dialogue between the court and the accused, casts a mandatory duty on the court to question the accused generally on the case for the purpose of enabling him to personally explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.

15.3. When questioned, the accused may not admit his involvement at all and choose to flatly deny or

26/29 outrightly repudiate whatever is put to him by the court. 15.4. The accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him to adopt legally recognised defences.

15.5. An accused can make a statement without fear of being cross-examined by the prosecution or the latter having any right to cross-examine him. 15.6. The explanations that an accused may furnish cannot be considered in isolation but have to be considered in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution and, therefore, no conviction can be premised solely on the basis of the Section 313 statement(s).

15.7. Statements of the accused in course of examination under Section 313, since not on oath, do not constitute evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, yet, the answers given are relevant for finding the truth and examining the veracity of the prosecution case.

15.8. Statement(s) of the accused cannot be dissected to rely on the inculpatory part and ignore the exculpatory part and has/have to be read in the whole, inter alia, to test the authenticity of the exculpatory nature of admission.

15.9. If the accused takes a defence and proffers any alternate version of events or

27/29 interpretation, the court has to carefully analyse and consider his statements.

15.10. Any failure to consider the accused's explanation of incriminating circumstances, in a given case, may vitiate the trial and/or endanger the conviction.

26. All the above citations squarely applies to the present facts and circumstances of the case. It is pertinent to mention that the Hon'ble Apex Court has time and again reiterated the significance of Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. Every criminal court proceeding under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C has to shoulder onerous responsibility of the scanning the evidence after the prosecution closes its case, to trace the incriminating circumstances from the evidence against the accused and to prepare relevant question to extend opportunity to the accused to explain any such circumstances in the evidence that can be used against him.

27. In the present case, the trial court erred by not asking the incriminating material to the accused from the evidence of prosecution. Furthermore, the trial

28/29 court convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code only on the basis of assumptions and presumptions, but basing on the assumptions alone, appellant cannot be convicted for the said offence, when on the basis of same evidence, the other accused persons were given the benefit of doubt. In the present case other co-accused, Ramesh Singh and Sachita Singh were accorded the benefit of doubt and since Bhuneshwar Singh also stands on the same footing, he shall also be entitled to the similar benefit and should thus, be accorded benefit of doubt. Therefore, it is just necessary to set aside the judgment and order of sentence of the trial court.

28. In result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and order of sentence dated 22.11.2003 passed in Sessions Trial No. 793 of 1992/Trial No. 1044 of 1992 on the file of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-III, Bhojpur at Ara, acquitting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC.

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29. The bail bond of the appellant shall stand cancelled.

(G. Anupama Chakravarthy, J) vinita/- AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE NA Uploading Date 22.01.2025 Transmission Date 22.01.2025