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High Court Of ChhattisgarhSA/11/2001allowed

Smt. Savitri Bai v. Visheshar Singh And ORS.

2018-09-17Hon'Ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal4 pages

AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Second Appeal No.11 of 2001 Smt. Savitribai, aged about 45 yrs., wife of Matadeen, R/o Kotgarh, Tahsil and District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) (Defendant)/ ---- Appellant

Versus

1. Visheshar Singh, S/o Madan Singh, aged about 50 years.

2. Arajbai, aged about years, D/o Madansingh. Both residents of Kotgarh, Tahsil and District Janjgir-Champa (C.G)

3. State of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ---- Respondents For Appellant:

Mr. Sourabh Sharma and Mr. Tarkeshwar Nande, Advocates.

For Respondent No.1: Mr. Manoj Paranjpe and Mr. Anurag Singh, Advocates.

For Respondent No.3 / State: - Mr. Arun Sao, Deputy Advocate General.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Judgment On Board 17/09/2018

1. The substantial question of law involved, formulated and to be answered in the defendant's second appeal is as under: - "Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in determining the share of the parties in a mere suit for declaration of title and injunction?"

(For sake of convenience, parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the trial Court.)

2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that the plaintiff and the defendants are members of aboriginal tribe and the Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to them and the plaintiff & defendant No.2 are title

holders and defendants No.1 & 3 have no title over the suit land and also prayed for permanent injunction. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court finding no merit against which first appeal was preferred. The first appellate Court allowed the appeal and converted the suit for declaration of title into suit for partition and granted decree for partition as per Schedule-1 of the decree against which the instant second appeal has been preferred and substantial question of law has been framed which has been set-out in the opening paragraph of this judgment.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant herein / defendant No.3 submits that in a suit for declaration of title and injunction, no decree for partition can be granted which has been opposed by learned counsel for the plaintiff / respondent No.1 herein.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

5. It is true that suit was filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction which was dismissed by the trial Court and the first appellate Court converted the suit for title into suit for partition and granted the decree of partition as under: - (20) उक्त सबसध म ववादद, प्रततिववादद क. 2 एवस प्रततिववादद कस. 1 एवस 3 कवा ववादगति भूतम म तकस सदमवा तिक तहिस्सवा हिहै कवा तनिधवार्धारण करनिवा हिहोगवा जहैसवा तक पभूवर्धागवामद तनिष्कर्धा तदयवा गयवा तक पहैतितृक सपतत्ति और उत्तिरवातधकवार कके सबसध म सवामवान्य-तहिन्दभू तवतध सके शवातसति हिहोंगके, उक्त पररसस्स्थिततियहों म मतृतिक मदनि तसहि कक मतृत्य सनि 1956 कके पश्चवाति हिहई हिहै, यतद स्व० मदनि तसहि कके जदवनिकवाल म हिद

पहैतितृक सपतत्ति कवा कवाल्पतनिक बसटववारवा तकयवा गयवा हिहोतिवा तिहो स्व० मदनि तसहि कहो ववादगति भूतम कवा 1/3 तहिस्सवा, ववादद तवशकेरर कहो 1/3 तहिस्सवा एवस तवधववा जवामबवाई कहो 1/3 तहिस्सवा प्रवाप्त हिहोतिवा । इस प्रकवार मतृतिक मदनि तसहि कक मतृत्य कके पश्चवाति ववादगति भूतम कवा 1/3 तहिस्सके कहो उसकके पयत्र तवशकेरर तसहि एवस तवधववा कहो 1/3 तहिस्सवा कके पश्चवाति मतृतिक मदनि तसहि कके 1/3 तहिस्सके कवा -1/4 1⁄4 तहिस्सवा अस्थिवार्धाति ववादद तवशकेरर तसहि कहो 1/3+1/12, प्रततिववादद कस. 2 तवधववा जवामबवाई कहो 1/3+1/12 एवस पयतत्रयहों प्रततिववादद कस. 1 अरजबवाई कहो 1/12 एवस प्रततिववादद कस. 3 सवातवत्रदबवाई कहो 1/12, चभूसतक मदनि तसहि कक तवधववा प्रतति. कस. 2 जवामबवाई कक मतृत्य तदनिवासक 27.8.99 कहो हिहो गयद हिहै इसतलए मतृतिक मदनि तसहि कक तवधववा जवामबवाई कहो ववादगति भूतम सके प्रवाप्त तहिस्सके 1/3+1/12 कवा 1/3 तहिस्सवा अस्थिवार्धाति 5/36 ववादद तवशकेरर तसहि प्रवाप्त करकेगवा एवस प्रततिववादद कस. 1 एवस 3 भद 5/365/36 प्रवाप्त करमगके ।

6. The Supreme Court in the matter of Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and another1 has clearly held that without pleading and opportunity of hearing to the defendant, no decree can be granted. It has been observed as under: - "23.

It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings. That apart, in civil suits, grant of relief is circumscribed by various factors like court fee, limitation, parties to the suits, as also grounds barring relief, like res judicata, estoppel, acquiescence, non-joinder of causes of action or parties, etc., which require pleading and proof. Therefore, it would be hazardous to hold that in a civil suit whatever be the relief that is prayed, the court can on examination of facts grant any relief as it thinks fit. In a suit for recovery of rupees one lakh, the court cannot grant a decree for rupees ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property `A', court cannot grant possession of property `B'. In a suit praying for permanent injunction, court grant a relief of declaration or possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, (2008) 17 SCC 491

etc."

7. In view of the above, the first appellate is absolutely unjustified in granting decree for partition in a suit for title converting into suit for partition. Following the principle of law in Bachhaj Nahar (supra), the judgment & decree of the first appellate Court are set aside. However, the plaintiff is entitled to file suit for partition, if so advised. Consequently, the substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

8. The second appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No order as to cost(s).

9.

Decree be drawn-up accordingly.

Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge Soma