Ramhau Ram Sahu And ANR. v. Jot Kunwar Bai
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Civil Revision No. 162 of 2012
1. Ramhau Ram Sahu, S/o Jagannath Sahu,
2. Laxmibai Sahu, W/o Ramhau Ram Sahu, aged about 56 years, R/o Choukhadiya Para, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) ---- Petitioners
Versus
Jot Kunwar Bai Sahu, W/o Late Samarulal Sahu, R/o Near Firantin Temple, Ward No. 45, Nandai, Rajnandgaon ---- Respondent For Petitioners : Mr. S.C. Verma, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Abhishek Sharma, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal CAV Order /06/2016
(1) This is tenants' revision filed under Section 23-E of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'Act, 1961) questioning the order of Rent Controlling Authority, Rajnandgaon dated 21.09.2012 granting application filed under Section 23-A of the Act, 1961.
(2) Respondent/landlady filed an application under Section 23-A of the Act, 1961 for eviction of petitioners/tenant from the suit accommodation on the ground of her bonafide requirement
stating inter alia that the suit accommodation, which was let out to tenant for residential purpose, is required bonafidely by her as residence for herself, as she has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of her own at Rajnandgaon city and she is residing with her neighbour; and on notice for eviction being served upon petitioner on 22.6.1999, tenant -Ramhau Ram Sahu has neither vacated the suit accommodation nor made payment of rent and, as such, landlady is entitled for eviction of the tenant and vacant possession of the suit accommodation under Section 23-A of the Act, 1961. (3) Tenant- Ramhau Ram Sahu and his wife- Laxmibai Sahu have filed their written statement stating that suit accommodation was given on partition to his wife -Laxmibai Sahu on 18.1.1995 and thus she has become the owner of the suit accommodation and, as such, they are not the tenants of landlady- Jot Kunwar Bai Sahu and therefore, the application deserves to be rejected.
(4) During the course of trial, landlady examined herself and two witnesses namely Jotkunwar Bai & Rajju and filed documents as Exhibit P-1 to Exhibit P-5 in support of her case whereas tenant examined three witnesses namely Ramhau Ram Sahu, Laxmi Bai Sahu & Tirath Siongh Deshmukh and filed one document as Ex. D/1 (copy of Ikrarnama dated 18.1.1995) in support of his case.
(5) The Rent Controlling Authority, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by order dated 21.09.2012, allowed the application finding inter alia that Ramhau Ram Sahu is tenant of Jot Kunwar Bai Sahu and she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation in her possession for her own in the city of Rajnandgaon and, therefore, she is entitled for recovery of possession of the suit accommodation.
(6) Feeling aggrieved & dissatisfied with the order of RCA, tenant-Ramhau Ram Sahu & his wife Laxmibai Sahu have preferred this revision under Section 23-E of the Act, 1961 challenging the impugned order as unsustainable and bad in law.
(7) Shri S.C. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that Laxmibai Sahu is the daughter of landlady and Ramhau Ram Sahu is her husband; and the suit accommodation was given on partition by landlady to the Laxmibai Sahu vide Ex.D-1 and the civil suit has been preferred for declaration of title and injunction by Smt. Laxmi Sahu, petitioner No. 2 herein. He would further submit that the order impugned passed by the learned RCA is bad in law as the RCA has dealt with question of title which does not fall within the jurisdiction and domain of the RCA, as question of title is pending consideration before the Civil Court and, as such,
finding recorded by the RCA being perverse, liable to be rejected.
(8) Per contra, Shri Abhishek Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that suit filed by Laxmibai Sahu- wife of petitioner No.1-Ramhau Ram Sahu was dismissed by the trial Court and the first appeal has also been dismissed holding that Laxmi Bai, petitioner No. 2 herein has no title over the suit accommodation. He would further submit that learned RCA has rightly recorded a finding that Ramhau Ram Sahu is the tenant of landlady and respondent/landlady has no alternative reasonably suitable accommodation in her possession at Rajnandgaon City and rightly granted the application for eviction and, as such, the revision petition deserves to be dismissed. (9) I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, following question would arise for consideration in this revision. (i) Whether finding of fact arrived at by the RCA & granting application for eviction is perverse and contrary to the record ?
(10) In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions contained in Section 23-A(b) and Section 23-D(3) of the Act, which read as under:- "Section 23-A. Special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bonafide requirement. - Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or contract to the contrary, a landlord may submit an application, signed and verified in a manner provided in Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if it were a plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority one or more of the following grounds for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation, namely :- (a) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required "bonafide" by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.
Explanation.
(c) xxx xxx xxx Section 23-D. Procedure to be followed by Rent Controlling Authority or grant of leave to tenant to contest.-
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) In respect of an application by a landlord, it shall be presumed; unless the contrary is proved, the requirement by the landlord with reference to clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be of Section 23-A is bonafide."
(11) From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act, it is clear that once it is prima facie found as a fact that the requirements of the person as contemplated by law exists, it shall be presumed unless contrary is proved that the requirement of the landlady with reference to Clause A or Clause B as the case may be of Section 23-A is bonafide.
(12) It is well settled that the revisional power conferred by Section 23-E of the Act is larger than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC but lesser than appellate power. Indication is that an attempt should be made to keep as nearly as possible to the limits of power of revision under Section 115 of the CPC exceeding the same only to the extent necessary for preventing miscarriage of justice. The finding of fact arrived at by the RCA regarding the bonafide requirement of the landlady
can be disturbed in revision if it is perverse and not simply on the ground that another view is possible on re-appreciation of evidence.
(13) The Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of B. Johnson Bernard Vs. C.S. Naidu1, has held as under:- "The first part of sub-section (2) of Section 23-E of the M.P. Act has,therefore, to be construed similarly, as conferring a power of revision wider than that given by Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, but narrower than the power of appeal, which permits interference where there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice."
(14) Again the Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Mahendra Kumar Jain Vs. Dharamchand Jain 2 , has held as under:
"6. The serious submission, however, appears to be regarding the correctness of finding about the bonafide need. Before this Court can appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel, it must ascertain its own jurisdiction in the matter. A revisional jurisdiction, particularly under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code is a limited jurisdiction and does not extend to examining the correctness or otherwise of the finding. The present 1985 MPLJ 675 1986 MPLJ 80
revision, however, is filed under Section 23-E of the Act, which authorities the High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality, propriety or correctiness of an order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority. These words are apparently of wider magnitude and scope. In Kewal Singh Vs. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161, the Supreme Court has considered a similar provision in Delhi Rent Control Act and has held that 'the Highest Court of the State has been given a wider power of revision where the said Court can examine the case of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order passed by the Controller'. In Delhi Rent Control Act, the powers of the High Court are limited to examining if an order passed by the Controller is according to law.
The wordings of our law are not only different but wider than Delhi Act and hence it must be held that this Court's power of revision do not suffer from limitations under Section 115, CPC. This view is also supported by an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar Vs. Girdharilal Chowdhary, AIR 1963 SC 698. Clearly, therefore, this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction has the power to look into the correctness of the finding regarding bonafide need of the landlord.
the finding this Court would Act as a Court of appeal and reappreciate evidence to come to its own conclusion. That is how the present provision will have to be distinguished from appellate powers."
(15) The Supreme Court in the case of Chaman Prakash Puri Vs. Ishwar Das Rajput and another3 has held as under:- "3. The Rent Controller on appreciation of the evidence found that the appellant-landlord was in bonafide need of the premises in question and his application for eviction of the tenant under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was allowed. The tenant approached the High Court in revision. The High Court, reappreciating the evidence, held that the landlord was not in requirement of the premises in question. This is the High Court was not entitled to do in revision proceedings."
(16) The Supreme Court in the case of Fatima Bee (Smt.) Vs. Mahamood Siddiqui4 , has held as under:- "7. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court committed not only an eror of law, but went beond ts jurisdiciton in re-appreciating the evidence and reversing the finding regarding the bonafide 1995 Supp (4) SCC 445 (1996) 9 SCC 450
requirement of the landlady. The High Court also committed a grave error in doubting correctness of the finding recorded by the Courts below that she is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling bangles along with her family members. In our opinion, this contention raised on behalf of the appellant deserves to be accepted. We are also of the opinion that the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the finding that the claim of permanent tenancy was malafide. The Rent Controller after appreciating the evidence led on behalf of the landlady and that of the tenants had recorded the finding that the landlady requires the suit premises bonafide for carrying on her business.
The Rent Controller had also recorded the finding after appreciating the rival evidence that she was carrying on business as averred by her along with other family members. These were the findings of facts recorded after appreciation of evidence. These findings were confirmed by the Appellate Court again after appreciating the evidence. No part of the evidence was misread by the Courts below. Therefore, there was no justification for the High Court to reverse the said findings of facts."
(17) Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Prativa Devi
(Smt.) Vs. T.V. Krishnan 5 , has held as under:- "4. In the premises, the judgment of the High Court disallowing the appellant's claim cannot be supported. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bonafide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1) (e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances."
(18) Likewise, the Supreme Court in case of Ram Dass Vs. Ishwar Chander and others6 has held as under :- "12.
On the first contention that the revisional powers do not extend to interference with and upsetting of findings of fact, it needs to be observed that, subject to the wellknown limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions, the matter essentially turns on the language of the statute investing the jurisdiction."
(19) Having examined the scope of interference in the revisional jurisdiction, turning back to the facts of the case, it appears that the application was filed by the (1996) 5 SCC 353 6(1988) 3 SCC 131= AIR 1988 SC 1422
respondent/landlady under Section 23-A(b) of the Act claiming that the suit accommodation is required bonafidely for her residential purpose as she has no other alternative reasonable suitable accommodation of her own in the city of Rajnandgaon.
(20) Section 23-D(2) of the Act of 1961 runs as under:- "23-D. Procedure to be followed by Rent Controlling Authority or grant of leave to tenant to contest.-
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) In respect of an application by a landlord it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, the requirement by the landlord with reference to clause(a) or clause(b), as the case may be of Section 23-A is bonafide."
(21) The Rent Controlling Authority, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, has recorded a finding that the landlady is owner of the suit accommodation, there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the landlady has no other reasonably suitable accommodation in the township of Rajnandgaon and the said finding are neither shown to be perverse or contrary to the record.
(22) The landlady/respondent has discharged her initial burden. The landlady has purchased the suit-land by sale-deed Ex.P-4C
from Shri Jaffar Iqbal dated 9.7.1981 and became the owner of suit land. Ex.P-3C is copy of legal notice served by landlady to Shri Ramhauram Sahu (tenant) to vacate the suit premises. Ex.P-2C is copy of acknowledgment and Ex.P-1(C) is copy of postal acknowledgment after receipt of notice. When tenant Ramhauram did not vacate the suit premises, the application was filed by landlady for eviction. The landlady (AW-1), who is aged about 80 years, has clearly stated about her ownership of the suit accommodation, and her bonafide need and further that she has no other alternative accommodation and at present she is staying with her neighbour, which is duly supported by her witness Rajja (AW-2). Laxmi Bai -petitioner No. 2 and wife of petitioner No.
1, in her cross examination, has admitted the fact of legal notice by landlady to her husband and further admitted that her husband/non-applicant No.1 is the tenant of respondent/landlady. Ikrarnanam (Ex. D-1) dated 18.1.1995 is unregistered document and confers no title to the petitioner No.2. The suit filed by petitioner No. 2/ Laxmi Bai claiming title over the suit property being Civil Suit No.38-A/2009 (Laxmibai Vs. Jot Kumar Bai Sahu) on the basis of Ikrarnama (Ex.D-1) was dismissed by trial Court on 28.01.2010 and affirmed by the First Appellate Court on 12-7-2012 and thereby title of the landlady Jot Kumar Bai Sahu has been upheld by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate Court. The tenant/ petitioner No.
failed to discharge his burden by proving his case as there is presumption under Section 23-D(3) of the Act with regard to bonafide need. Thus, the finding of the fact recorded by the RCA that suit accommodation is bonafidely required by the landlady for her residential purpose and she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation in the township of Rajnandgaon is a finding based on material available on record and the same is neither perverse nor contrary to record. I do not find any illegality in the aforesaid finding.
(23) In view of above discussion, the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge D/-