Nijam Beg v. State Of Chhattisgarh

NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR WRIT PETITION (S) NO.1505 OF 2019 Nijam Beg S/o Late Mirza Adam Beg Aged About 27 Years R/o Village And Post Office - Jarve (B), Tahsil - Baloda, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. Pin 495668.

...Petitioner(s)

Versus

1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Forest Department, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur Chhattisgarh.

2. The Chief Conservator Of Forest Bilaspur Circle, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.

3. Divisional Forest Officer Forest Division, Marwahi, Pendra Road, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.

4. Sub Division Officer (Forest) Pendra Road, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner :

Shri SB Pandey, Advocate.

For Respondent-State :

Shri Sameer Behar, Panel Lawyer.

Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy Order on Board 05.03.2019 1.

The relief sought for by the petitioner is for a direction to the respondents to consider his claim for compassionate appointment. However, perusal of records would show that the present writ petition has been filed after about 28 years years from the date of death of the deceased employee.

2.

The facts of the case is that, the father of the petitioner died in harness on 09.10.1991. The present writ petition has been filed on 18.02.2019 i.e. after about 28 years. Though the contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner was minor at the time of death of the deceased, but even otherwise the claim of the petitioner on an earlier occasion had been rejected vide order dated 12.01.2011 even then there is a delay of more than 8-9 years in the filing of the present writ petition from the date of earlier rejection order.

3. It is settled position of law that any consideration of a claim for

compassionate appointment has to be strictly in accordance with the policy regulating the same keeping in mind that it has to be made with a sense of urgency due to the sudden death of the bread winner leaving the family of the deceased in destituteness and penury. There can be no sustained urgency over the year. The object of the appointment is to provide immediate succor to the family of the deceased. The very fact that the petitioner has been able to sustain himself for about 28 years from the date of death of the deceased employee is sufficient to draw an inference that there is sufficient means in the family to sustain themselves.

4. The question of delay and laches came to be considered by the Supreme Court in case of State of Uttaranchal and Another v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others1 in which the court has declined to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction in case the petitioner invokes jurisdiction of court with inordinate delay, and held as under :

"In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam[8], this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: - ...filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant."

5. Further, in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others2, the Supreme Court reiterating the principles relating to 1 2013 (12) SCC 179 2(2007) 9 SCC 278

interference in cases where petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay as below:

"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)"

6. Recently in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage Board and Others v. T.T. Murali Babu3, the Supreme Court has clearly held that delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation, and expressed their opinion as under- "16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction.

As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.

Delay doesbring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondentemployee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality.

A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold."

7. Bearing in mind the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred cases with regard to entertainment of petition filed with inordinate delay and laches, if the facts of present case is examined, it would appear that the petitioner has filed this petition in the month of February, 2019 claiming his candidatures whereas, cause of action arose in the year, 1991, and as such there is delay of about 28 years in filing the petition. The very purpose and object to grant compassionate appointment gets defeated in case if a stale claim application of more than two decades are entertained by this court after such a long duration.

8. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and laches only.

Sd/- (P. Sam Koshy) Judge inder