Saroj Dahre v. State Of Chhattisgarh

NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2102 of 2021 Saroj Dahre W/o Lokshwar Kumar Dahre Aged About 39 Years R/o H. No. 21/a Sector 3 Balco Nagar District Korba, Chhattisgarh. ---- Petitioner

Versus

1.

State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of School Education, Chhattisgarh, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2.

Office Of Chief Executive Officer, District Panchayat Korba, Rampur, Korba, Chhattisgarh 495683 3.

Secretary, Office Of District Education Officer Korba, Irrigation Colony Korba Chhattisgarh 4.

Assistant Project Officer, Education Establishment, District Panchayat, Korba C.G.

5.

General Administration Committee, District Panchayat, Korba, Chhattisgarh.

---- Respondents For Petitioner :

Mr. Sourabh Dangi, Advocate along with Mr. Chiranjiv Kaushil, Advocate For State :

Ms. Sunita Jain, G.A.

Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy Order on Board 10/06/2021 1.

The present writ petition has been filed assailing the alleged order of termination dated 15.05.2015. The present writ petition has been filed on 15.03.2021 i.e. almost after more than 6 years time. 2.

At the outset this court is of the opinion that 6 years period for agitating an order of termination is a considerable long period, for availing the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Perusal of the record would show that the petitioner stood

absent from duties way back from 2012 onwards and since then it is said that he has not reported for duties.

3.

Counsel for the petitioner submits that for a period of around 2 years the petitioner was totally in his house on account of his health condition and thereafter he has been making regular correspondences with the authorities and it is only recently that he came to know that the services of the petitioner has been terminated. If the pleadings of the petitioner are to be accepted, he went on leave in the year 2012 and remain absent for a period of roughly two years because of his health conditions i.e. till 2014. Thereafter, there is no pleading on the part of the petitioner, nor is their any documentary proof to show that the petitioner had made effort to join his duties in the year 2014 or any time subsequently, except for the pleadings that he has been making representation with the authorities in this regard. 4.

One cannot lose sight of the fact that the appointment of the petitioner was as a Shiksha Karmi Grade-II, which is a teaching post and which cannot be kept vacant for a considerable long period of time, as it would hamper the education of the institution, wherever the petitioner was posted. If at all if the petitioner was not well and was suffering with any serious ailment, the Rules provide for approaching the authorities in accordance with the Rules and avail appropriate leaves as is otherwise permissible under the Rules. No such step seems to have been availed by the petitioner all along and challenging of the termination order therefore after a period of about 6 years cannot be entertained by the High Court at this juncture. As a result of the inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court

or in approaching the authorities with regard to his joining, much developments must have transpired in between by filling up of the vacant post, which were lying vacant for all this period. Entertaining a writ petition of such person and in the event of the petition getting allowed would require unsettling of all those developments that have transpired in between, by which the post which fell vacant on the termination of the petitioner must have been filled, which again would not be either equitable or justifiable at this belated stage. 5.

So far as the delay and latches are concerned, the law in this regard is by now well settled by a series of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The question of delay and laches came to be considered recently by the Supreme Court in case of "State of Uttaranchal and Another v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others", reported in 2013 (12) SCC 179 in which the court has declined to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction in case the petitioner invokes jurisdiction of Court with inordinate delay, and held as under : "In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam [8], this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: - ...filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation.

Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant."

6.

Likewise, in the case of "Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. And another v. Jabar Singh and others" reported in (2007) 2 SCC 112, it was observed as under:

"43. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay

of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches."

7.

Further, in the case of "New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others" reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278, the Supreme Court reiterating the principles relating to interference in cases where the petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay, held as under: "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay.

After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)"

8.

In the case of "P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu" reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152, it has been held as under:- "It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal."

9.

Very recently in the matter of "Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage Board and Others v. T.T. Murali Babu" reported in 2014 (4) SCC 108, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the delay

may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation, and expressed their opinion as under- "16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.

In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay doesbring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others.

Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold." 10.

Given the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the legal positions as it stand, the writ petition since it suffers from delay laches deserves to be and is accordingly rejected only on the ground of delay and latches.

Sd/- (P. Sam Koshy) Judge Ved