3762- Pravin Joshi Security Agency v. Director General Resettlement

NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR WPC No. 838 of 2018 • 3762- Pravin Joshi Security Agency Through Its Proprietor Brig. Pravin Joshi (Retired), S/o Shri Bhupal Dutt Joshi, Aged About 61 Years, R/o House No.403, Gajendra Vihar, AWHO Colony, District Dehradun (UKI), District : Dehradun, Uttaranchal ---- Petitioner

Versus

1. Director General Resettlement, Directorate General Resettlement Government Of India, Ministry of Defence, West Block IV, RK Puram, New Delhi 110066

2. Joint Director (Employment), Directorate General Resettlement, Ministry Of Defence, West Block IV, RK Puram, New Delhi 110066

3. Power Grid Corporation Of Ltd, Raigarh, Through Its ChairmanCum-Managing Director, Power Grid Corporation Of Ltd. Nandeli Road Village and PO Kotra, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh

4. Controlling Authority/Additional Director General Of Police, Private Security Agency, Police Head Quarters, Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondents For Petitioner Shri Chandresh Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent Nos.1 & 2 Shri Vaibhav P. Shukla, Advocate on behalf of Shri B. Gopa Kumar, ASG For Respondent No.3 Shri Prasoon Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.4 Shri U. N. S. Deo, GA For Intervenor Shri Kishore Bhaduri, Advocate Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mr. Ajay Kumar Tripathi Hon'ble Justice Mr. Prashant Kumar Mishra Order On Board

07/08/2018 1.

Petitioner, a proprietorship firm, runs a security agency. They had a valid licence under the Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2005). 2.

Since the petitioner is an ex army man, he is also empaneled with the Director General of Resettlement, which has its own advantages when it comes down to award of contract in Public Sector undertaking, because sponsorships are provided by the Director General of Resettlement and based on these sponsorships and successful bidding, contract is awarded for providing private security.

3.

The petitioner was one of the sponsored agency and based on the sponsorship, they have been awarded contract for a period of 2 years by Power Grid Corporation of India Limited. The contract was to subsist till 14.01.2019.

4.

The licence of the petitioner, obtained under the Act, expired on 28.08.2017. It is his case that he applied for renewal of the licence. There was delay of almost 3 months in such renewal, which according to him was ultimately renewed but in the mean time because of the communication dated 24.10.2017, contained in Annexure-P/1 to the writ petition, the Power Grid Corporation terminated the contract and so the writ petition. 5.

In terms of the guidelines issued by the Director General of Rehabilitation, empanelment of a security agency will be valid and subsist only till an individual ex serviceman agency has

attained the age of 60 years. Thereafter, the Director General of Rehabilitation will not sponsor such agencies for any contract for Public Sector Undertaking. However, in the clause dealing with such disempanelment, it does envisage for a situation when a subsisting contract is not co-terminus of an ex serviceman attaining 60 years of age. In such a situation, it allows the existing contracts to run its course.

6.

Argument on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner is that even if he had become 60 years of age but since the contract was still subsisting till 14.01.2019, the contract should not have been terminated and he should have been allowed to complete the period of contract keeping in mind that the licence of the petitioner was renewed before the termination order came to be passed.

7.

The argument made on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner was rather convincing, but a deeper examination reveals another facet as to the factual position. We found after examining the so called renewed licence, which is at page 60 of the writ petition and is part of Annexure-P/7, that it is a new licence which has been issued to the petitioner in exercise of power by the Licencing Authority under Section 7 (5) of the Act and this licence is valid for a period of 5 years from the date of its issuance and the date of issuance recorded on the licence is 24.01.2018. 8.

The story therefore that it was a case of renewal where the subsisting licence should be treated to be valid in view of its renewal, vanishes. The licence in question is not a licence after

renewal under Section 8 of the Act but a new licence altogether, which permits the petitioner to run the private security agency in the State of Chhattisgarh for a period of 5 years. 9.

If this be the fact, then the argument or the story that the petitioner had a subsisting valid licence, which came to be renewed by the Authority after its expiry, cannot be accepted on the face of the licence, which has been brought on record by the petitioner himself.

10.

Since no person or agency can engage or provide private security guard without a licence, as provided under Section 4 of the Act, therefore the subsisting contract cannot be allowed to operate overlooking the requirement of Section 4, which is a mandatory requirement.

11.

The agreement or the contract can only subsist provided the agency had all the valid authorizations including a licence to carry on with his activity under the Act. Since after expiry, there was no subsisting licence in his favour and such a licence, if at all issued, was a fresh licence and not a case of renewal, therefore, the Public Sector Undertaking cannot be compelled to honor the contract when the person is in default himself. 12.

In this case, two things stood in the way of continuation with the contract, one that the ex serviceman had attained the age of 60 years and another that he did not have a valid licence after the expiry of the first and even if there was one, it was a fresh licence issued to him after more than a gap of 3 months if not more.

13.

If in these circumstances, the respondent Public Sector Undertaking decided to terminate the contract or the Director General of Rehabilitation informed the concerned Authorities of such developments, it cannot be said to be an arbitrary exercise of power or malafide exercise of power.

14.

The writ petition therefore has no merit. It deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.

Sd/- Sd/- (Ajay Kumar Tripathi) (Prashant Kumar Mishra) Chief Justice Judge Nirala