Devendra Kumar Thakur v. State Of Chhattisgarh

-1AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 7600 of 2018 Devendra Kumar Thakur S/o Late Sube Singh Aged About 33 Years Terminated Ex. G D Force At District Force Rajnandgaon, R/o Ghutaku Navapara, Tahsil And District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh. ---- Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Home (Police), Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

2. Director Inspector General Of Police Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

3. Superintendent Of Police Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh.

4. Police Inspector Rakshit Kendra, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh.

---Respondents For Petitioner :

Mr. Manoj Kumar Jaiswal, Advocate For State :

Mr. Dheeraj Wankhede, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy Order on Board 06/12/2018 1.

The counsel for the petitioner submits that the defaults have been removed.

2.

With the consent of the parties the matter was heard and finally disposed of at the motion stage itself.

3.

Challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 26.04.2011, whereby the services of the petitioner has been terminated. 4.

At the outset, this Court is of the opinion that writ petition suffers from delay and laches, in as much as the impugned order is of 26.04.2011

-2and the present writ petition has been filed on 25.10.2018 i.e. after a period of more than 7 1⁄2 years.

5.

From the perusal of the record, it also appears that the petitioner has also not availed any departmental appeal before the authorities. He only submits that he has perhaps made some mercy appeals to the higher authorities in the department. The fact that the petitioner has not approached the Court within a reasonable time from the date the cause of action arose, this Court finds it difficult to entertain the writ petition. 6.

So far as the law in respect of approaching the Court at a belated stage is concerned, the issue is no longer res integra, as it has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the High Court that for availing the writ remedy by way of a writ petition, the petitioner or the aggrieved person should approach the Court within a reasonable time.

7.

In the instant case, there is a delay of more than 7 1⁄2 years. No plausible explanation has been provided for the inordinate delay, which has been lapsed in the filing of the writ petition. This Court is of the firmed view that the writ petition suffers from the delay and laches. 8.

So far as the delay and laches are concerned, the law in this regard is by now well settled by a series of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The question of delay and laches came to be considered recently by the Supreme Court in case of State of Uttaranchal and Another v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others1 in which the court has 1 2013 (12) SCC 179

-3declined to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction in case the petitioner invokes jurisdiction of court with inordinate delay, and held as under : "In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam[8], this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: - ...filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant." 9.

Likewise, in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. and another v. Jabar Singh and others2, it was observed as under: "43. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches."

10.

Further, in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others3, the Supreme Court reiterating the principles relating to 2(2007) 2 SCC 112 3(2007) 9 SCC 278

-4interference in cases where the petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay, held as under:

"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)"

11.

In the case of P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu4, it has been held as under:- "It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief 4(1975) 1 SCC 152

-5and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal." 12.

In the case of Bhoop Singh v. Union of India5, it was held as under: "8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed."

13.

Very recently in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage Board and Others v. T.T. Murali Babu6, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation, and expressed their opinion as under5(1992) 3 SCC 136 6 2014 (4) SCC 108

-6- "16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.

In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay doesbring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

14.

In the case at hand, though there has been 71⁄2 years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondentemployee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not

-7foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold." 15.

In view of the aforementioned authoritative decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court does not find any good ground for entertaining the present writ petition and the same thus is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

16.

The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. 17.

Dismissal of the writ petition would not preclude the petitioner from availing other remedies on the administrative side, if permissible. Sd/- (P. Sam Koshy) Judge Ved