Sanjay Ram v. The State Govt Of NCT Of Delhi & ORS

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ W.P.(CRL) 2752/2015 SANJAY RAM ..... Petitioner Through Mr.Kuldeep Kumar, Adv.

versus THE STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS ..... Respondents Through Ms.Kamna Vohra, ASC.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR

O R D E R

% 08.01.2016 1.

The petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 764/15 (PS Lajpat Nagar) instituted for the offences under sections 279/304A of the IPC, on the strength of an amicable settlement having been arrived at with the respondent no.2 and respondent no.3 i.e. parents of the deceased. 2.

As per the FIR, On 14.09.2015, the deceased Rahul along with his friends was going to see a procession (Shobha- Yatra) on Krishna Market Road, Lajpat Nagar. The petitioner was also a part of the procession and was driving a tractor carrying a water tanker to supply water to the general public at the gathering. It is submitted, that owing to huge crowd and restricted space, the deceased was hit by the tanker on his head which made him to fall on the path of the tanker and come under its wheels. The deceased was taken to AIIMS Trauma Centre by one Rakesh, a friend of the deceased, and

complainant of the subject FIR. However, during treatment, the deceased succumbed the injuries. The subject FIR, thereafter, was registered as PS Lajpat Nagar under sections 279/304A of the IPC. 3.

It is submitted that during the pendency of the investigation, due to intervention of well wishers, the parties have agreed to amicably settle all their disputes and differences and have even entered into a compromisecum-settlement agreement in the month of November, 2015. 4.

In terms of the said settlement it was, inter alia, agreed between the parties that the petitioner would pay Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Only) to the respondents, towards full and final settlement of all their claims against the petitioner. It was agreed that out of the said agreed amount Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) shall be paid at the time of signing the settlement agreement and Rs. 4,50,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only) shall be paid subsequently, by way of demand drafts, at the time of quashing of the subject FIR. It was further agreed that out of the said amount the demand draft of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only) shall be in the name of respondent no.3 and the demand draft of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Only) shall be in the name of respondent no.2. It was on these terms that the parties agreed that the petitioner shall approach this Court seeking permission to quash the subject FIR and the respondents shall fully cooperate towards the same. 5.

The petitioner also agreed to give two security cheques of Rs. 2 Lakhs and Rs. 2.50 Lakhs in the name of the respondent no.3 and respondent no.2 respectively, in order to secure payment in terms of the

agreement at the time of quashing, which would be subsequently returned. It was also agreed that the respondents shall not file any further criminal case or any compensation case before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal or any civil proceedings pursuant to receiving the said settlement amount. 6.

The parties are present in court.

7.

The investigation in the matter is still pending and the charge-sheet has not yet been filed.

8.

It is submitted by the counsel of the petitioner that Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) had already been paid to the respondents and the demand drafts for Rs. 2 Lakhs and Rs. 2.50 Lakhs, as per the agreement, have been brought in court today. The said demand drafts have been handed over to the respondents, who have accepted the same without any caveat towards full and final settlement of all their claims against the petitioner. It submitted by the respondents that in view of foregoing, all their grievances against the petitioner stand completely redressed and that they do not wish to pursue the present case any further. The respondents have no objection to quashing of the subject FIR.

9.

It is needles to mention that offences punishable under Sections 279/304A IPC are not compoundable. However, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances and the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, this Court is empowered to accept the said settlement to secure the ends of justice. In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreme Court has held that cases which are not compoundable under Section 320 of

the Cr.P.C. could also be quashed, when continuation of any criminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility and where justice demands that the dispute between the parties should be put to an end and peace is restored. But ending of such criminal proceedings could only be ordered for securing the ends of justice.

10.

The Supreme Court has further observed in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another (Supra):

"58............................ No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all.

However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.

above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed." [Refer to B.S. Joshi, (2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma, (2008) 16 SCC 1.] 11.

In Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC 466, the pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While

exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4.

On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely

because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak.

In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is

because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.

Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

12.

Thus, the inherent powers of the High Court, having a wide plenitude could be used for quashing the present FIR in order to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.

13.

The subject FIR (FIR No. 764/15, PS Lajpat Nagar) and the emanating proceedings thereof are, for the reasons aforestated, quashed. 14.

The petition is disposed of in terms of the aforesaid. ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J JANUARY 08, 2016 ab