M.Sidda Reddy v. Singari Reddaiah

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY CRIMINAL PETITION NO.6866 OF 2014 ORDER:

This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against the petitioner/A-2 in Crime No.280 of 2012 of M.R. Palli Police Station, Tirupati, Chittoor District, for the offences punishable under Sections 420,465 & 468 r/w 34 IPC. The first respondent filed a private complaint before the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupati against A-1 to A-3, wherein, the petitioner herein is arrayed as A-2, for the offences punishable under Sections 420,465 & 468 r/w 34 IPC, with a request to refer the case to police to investigate and file charge-sheet by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The main allegations made in the complaint are relevant for the purpose of deciding the main issue.

It is alleged in the complaint that, one B. Ramanjaneyulu (A-1) was the absolute owner of land of an extent of 1692 sq.ft and 324 sq.ft situated at Sy.No.333/2A of Avilala Village, having purchased by registered sale deed on 28.09.2005 vide Doc.No.6619 of from B.

Prasanna Lakshmi Kumari and P.

Dhanalakshmamma, since then, A-1 was in possession of the same. It is submitted that, A-1 offered to sell the same and made the complainant to believe that there were no disputes in respect of the complainant to believe that there were no disputes in respect of the above said property and he has got clear marketable title. Hence, the complainant being a public servant obtained prior sanction from the competent authority in his department as per CCS Rules and purchased the property on 07.10.2005 for valuable

consideration vide Doc.No.6778 of 2005 through registered sale deed. Due to urgent necessities and personal economic needs, the first respondent decided to sell the property and in the meanwhile, A-2 and others approached the first respondent/complainant and agreed to purchase the said property and after negotiations, the first respondent received valuable consideration from A-2 and sold the property to him.

On request of A-2, the first respondent/complainant executed an Agreement of Sale-cumirrevocable General Power of Attorney (GPA) vide Doc.No.2728 of 2007 on 21.04.2007 instead of executing sale deed and delivered possession to A-2. Accordingly, the complainant has submitted the sale transaction to his department, being a bonafide purchaser.

Further, the first respondent/complainant came to know the real fact that while obtaining registration copy of the sale deed, A-2 & A-3 colluded together and they have created sham, nominal and collusive sale deed by forging his signature and thumb impression for wrongful gain from the first respondent/complainant in favour of A-3 through Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney (GPA) vide Doc.No.1412 of 2008, as if A-2 is the General Power of Attorney Agent of the first respondent/ complainant only. But, the first respondent/complainant did not receive further amount from anybody and never signed before the sub-registrar office and executed sale deed in favour of Jayarami Reddy (A-3) on 10.04.2008. On coming to know about the said information, the first respondent/complainant got issued a legal notice on 14.04.2011 through his counsel to A-1 demanding to clear the litigation or to pay the amount of Rs.6,47,000/- with

interest at 24% per annum which was paid by him. The first respondent/complainant has received legal notice on 01.01.2011 from the counsel for A-3 with all false allegations, for which suitable reply was got issued by the first respondent/complainant on 30.03.2011.

It is submitted that, there was a civil suit O.S.No.657 of 2005 on the file of V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati between Smt. Noothi Sathya Prasoonamba and Gundrathi Harinatha Prasad and 4 others regarding the property to which A-1 was a party as defendant No.4. Though the civil suit was pending regarding the alleged property, all the three accused conspired together only with an intention to get wrongful gain from the complainant and they have succeeded in implementing their plan and sold the property to him for valuable consideration. As part of their plan, A-3 has filed a criminal case vide Crime No.203 of 2011 on the file of Tiruchanur Police Station under Section 420, 423 r/w 34 of I.P.C r/w 156 (3) of Cr.P.C in which the complainant was shown as A-1.

The first respondent/complainant is a bonafide purchaser, having purchased the property from A-1 through registered sale deed for valuable consideration. The first respondent/complainant being a public servant completed all departmental formalities at the time of purchase and sale and sold away the same. To show his bonafide, the first respondent/complainant submitted a copy of employee identity card in the sale deed for identification proof. Therefore, the petitioner did commit no offence, muchless, offences punishable under Sections 420,465 & 468 r/w 34 IPC. However, it is contended that A-1 is responsible for the entire incident and

requested to try the accused for the offences referred supra and to refer the matter to the police for investigation by exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

The III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupati while exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C referred the matter to police to investigate and file report. Accordingly, the Station House Officer, M.R. Palli Police Station registered a crime against the petitioner and two others in Crime No.280 of 2012 and issued F.I.R against the petitioner and other accused. The present petitioner/A-2 filed this petition on the ground that the petitioner originally purchased the property from the first respondent/ complainant by entering into an Agreement of Sale-cumirrevocable General Power of Attorney (GPA) and paid the entire amount to the 1st respondent. Thereafter, the same was sold to one Ramanaiah and entered into an agreement of sale. Thereafter, the said Ramanaiah sold the property to A-3 and the same was admitted in C.C.No.

469 of 2012 and re-numbered as C.C.No.397 of 2013 on the file of V Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate Tirupati. Therefore, the petitioner being the Agreement of Salecum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney (GPA) holder executed the document and thereby, the petitioner cannot be proceeded for the offences punishable under Sections 420,465 & 468 r/w 34 IPC. One Noothi Sathya Prasoonamba filed O.S.No.657 of 2015 against one Gundrathi Harinatha Prasad and 4 others on the file of V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati for declaration of title of the plaintiff's for the schedule property. The said suit was decreed on 29.04.2010 in favour of the plaintiff where the suit against 3rd defendant therein was dismissed.

A-3 also filed O.S.No.53 of 2013 on the file of V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati against the first respondent therein and two others to direct the defendants jointly and severally to pay sum of Rs.18,66,525/- with interest at 12% per annum for Rs.12,30,000/- from the date of plaint till the date of realization. In the said suit, the first respondent and the petitioner filed written statement and the same is pending. Therefore, the real dispute is purely civil in nature, which was given colour of criminal wrong. Hence, it is prayed that the proceedings against this petitioner/A-2 in Crime No.280 of 2012 of M.R. Palli Police Station, Tirupathi, Chittoor District, for the offences punishable under Sections 420,465 & 468 r/w 34 IPC cannot be continued and prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioner.

During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri T. Pradyumna Kumar Reddy contended that the petitioner being Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney (GPA) was authorized to execute sale deed on behalf of the first respondent/complainant and therefore, execution of sale deed in favour of the third respondent by this petitioner would not constitute offences punishable under Sections 420,465 & 468 r/w IPC.

At best, the person from whom the first respondent/complainant purchased the property might have defrauded him without disclosing pendency of suit in O.S.No.657 of 2005. In such a case, proceedings against this petitioner/A-2 would amount to abuse of process of the Court and requested this Court to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C and quash the proceedings against this petitioner.

Whereas, Sri V. Nitesh, learned counsel for the first respondent/complainant contended that, execution of a document by this petitioner by forging the signature of the first respondent/complainant is a serious crime and it is punishable under Section 468 IPC. Therefore, the allegations made in the complaint, if accepted on its face value would constitute an offence punishable under Section 468 IPC and prayed to dismiss the petition.

Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the point that arose for consideration is as follows:

"Whether Crime No.280 of 2012 on the file of M.R. Palli Police Station, Tirupathi, Chittoor District is liable to be quashed against this petitioner/A-2?'"

P O I N T:

It is an undisputed fact that the first respondent/ complainant being a government servant, after completing necessary formalities in terms of CCA Rules, purchased the property from A-1 under registered sale deed. This petitioner is only a purchaser of the property from the first respondent/ complainant, who in-turn sold the property to A-3. But, the contention of the first respondent/complainant before the Magistrate in private complaint was that, this petitioner forged the signature of the first respondent/complainant and executed the document as if the first respondent executed the document. More curiously, the document which was allegedly executed by this petitioner in favour of A-3 is not placed on record for perusal of this Court which is the trump card in this case, in view of the

specific contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Since, the petitioner is contending that he executed the document in favour of A-3, being an Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney holder executed by the first respondent/complainant in his favour, which authorized him to execute the registered sale deed on behalf of the principal i.e. the first respondent/complainant. In the absence of placing the alleged Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney and the sale deed executed in favour of A-3 by this petitioner, it is difficult to find out whether this petitioner executed a document forging the signature of the first respondent/complainant and whether he was authorized to sell and execute or deal with the land on behalf of the first respondent/complainant.

However, the first respondent/complainant himself admitted about execution of Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney in favour of this petitioner specifically in paragraph no.6 of the private complaint. The specific allegation is extracted hereunder: ".... On the request of the accused No.2 only the complainant has executed an agreement of salecum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney (GPA) vide Doc.No.2728 of 2007 on 21-04-2007 instead of sale deed and delivered possession to the accused No.2, accordingly the complainant has submitted the sale transaction to this department being a bonafide purchaser."

This specific admission in writing i.e. judicial admission is suffice to conclude that the first respondent/complainant sold the property to this petitioner by Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney referred supra. But the terms of such Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney are not known, since the document was not placed. Even assuming for a moment that the petitioner was authorized to sell and execute

the registered sale deed on behalf of the principal i.e. first respondent, he is competent to deal, sell and execute the registered sale deed in favour of the third party, in view of authorization, if any, granted under the above referred power of attorney. But, execution of a sale deed by A-2 in favour of A-3 by forging the signature of the first respondent/complainant is a serious offence which would attract Section 468 IPC.

Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri T. Pradyumna Kumar Reddy contended that the petitioner executed sale deed only as a power of attorney holder of the first respondent/complainant. But, this fact is not substantiated by the petitioner by producing atleast the certified copy of the document which he executed in favour of A-3 in the main case. In the absence of such document, it is difficult to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against this petitioner.

The power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C is inherent and notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of Cr.P.C be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under Cr.P.C, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1 this Court considered in detail the provisions of Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. This Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: 1 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

In (Mrs.) Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and others2, the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C and it reads as under:

"Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole.

If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court.

In Mukesh and others v. State for NCT of Delhi and others3, the Supreme Court opined that it is settled legal proposition that FIR is not an encyclopedia of the entire case. It may not and need not contain all the details. Naming of the accused therein may be important but not naming of the accused in FIR may not be a ground to doubt the contents thereof in case the statement of the witness is found to be trustworthy. The court has to determine after examining the entire factual scenario whether a person has participated in the crime or has been falsely implicated. The informant fully acquainted with the facts may lack necessary skill or ability to reproduce details of the entire incident without anything missing from the same. Some people may miss even the most important details in narration. Therefore, in case the 2 AIR 1990 SC 494 3 (2017) 6 SCC 1

informant fails to name a particular accused in the FIR, this ground alone cannot tilt the balance of the case in favour of the accused.

In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal4 this Court considered in detail the scope of provisions of Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint which are mentioned supra.

In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Ors.5, the Supreme Court while considering scope and jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C, has held as under: "In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution.

In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."

4 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 5 AIR 1977 SC 1489

In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab6, the Apex Court held as follows:

(i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice;

(ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction;

(iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

In view of the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments referred supra, if the facts on its face value are taken into consideration, it constitutes an offence, prima facie if proved. The Court cannot interfere, except when the Court comes to a conclusion that it is an out come of abuse of process of law. Therefore, when the allegations made in the charge sheet or F.I.R disclosed commission of an offence punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, this Court cannot exercise its inherent power to quash the proceedings.

In fact, along with the private complaint, the first respondent/complainant filed extract of registered sale deed executed by petitioner/A-2 in favour of A-3 bearing Doc.No. 1412 of 2008 dated 10.04.2008 along with the other documents. But, obviously, for the reasons best known to the petitioner, he did not place on record the document for verification and to find out whether the document was executed by the petitioner/A-2 as a 6 AIR 1960 SC 866

power of attorney holder of the first respondent/complainant or forging the signature of the first respondent/complainant. Therefore, without verifying such document, I am unable to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C against this petitioner. Though, learned counsel for the petitioner placed on record various documents, including plaint copy in O.S.No.53 of 2013 on the file of V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati, written statement filed by the first respondent/complainant, even the allegations made in the written statement does not disclose the details as to the execution of registered sale deed in the capacity of Agreement of Sale-cum-irrevocable General Power of Attorney holder.

In paragraph 12 of the written statement, the first respondent/complainant admitted as follows:

".....that the sale deed alleged to have been executed by the 2nd defendant who is a purchaser from this defendant in favour of the plaintiff, the document is highly suspicious. This defendant never signed in the document, dated 10.04.2008, it was executed by the 2nd defendant. This defendant is not the executant, but curiously his name finds a place n one of the columns describing him as a principal. The photograph of this defendant was not given by this defendant and the signature and thumb impression in the relevant column do not belong to him and they have been manipulated and forged....."

This allegation, at best, would show that he was described as the Principal of the petitioner herein/A-2 in the said document. When the document was executed by the petitioner in favour of A-3, as an agent, describing the first respondent/complainant as a Principal, such act would not constitute offence. If, for any reason, photograph of the first respondent/complainant and his signature are found on the document, such act would constitute an offence prima facie, in the absence of production of document, in view of the specific allegations made in the written statement made by the

first respondent/complainant or forged the signature of the first respondent/complainant. Therefore, I am unable to exercise my inherent jurisdiction by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C vested on this Court. In view of the circumstances stated above, by applying the principles laid down in the above judgments, the criminal petition is liable to be dismissed.

In the result, the criminal petition is dismissed. However, this order will not preclude the petitioner from renewing his request by placing entire material on record before this Court or before any other Court, at appropriate stage. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed. No costs.

_________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY Date:18.06.2018 SP