R. Vidyadhar Reddy, v. The State Of Telangana,

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K.JAISWAL Crl.P.M.P.No.7317 of 2016 and CRIMINAL PETITION No.6248 of 2016 COMMON ORDER:

The criminal petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.355 of 2011 on the file of XIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Nampally, Hyderabad, registered for the offences punishable under sections 498-A, 406 r/w 34 IPC and u/s.4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2.

The averments in the charge sheet would disclose that the marriage of de facto complainant with A1 was performed on 05.11.2008 at Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam. After two months of their marriage, all the accused used to harass the de facto complainant physically and mentally by demanding additional dowry and articles and also threaten her with dire consequences. 3.

Today, when the matter came up for hearing, the second respondent/de facto complainant and the petitioners/A1 and A2 are present and are identified by their respective counsel. They filed a petition seeking to compound the offences alleged against them and to quash the proceedings against them. They also produced the xerox copies of their Identity Cards. It is submitted by both parties that at the intervention of the elders, the parties have amicably settled their disputes concerning the present case and hence compromise may be recorded and criminal proceedings in the above case may be quashed.

4. In Yogendra Yadav and others v. the State of Jharkhan[1] the Supreme Court, in the matter of compromise of a noncompoundable offence, held as under: "The question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC, which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that

offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab {(2012) 10 SCC 303}). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are noncompoundable.

In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings depending on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences, which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace."

5. Having regard to the above submission and considering the fact that the parties have amicably settled the disputes among themselves out of Court and no useful purpose will be served even if the parties are driven to the trial as they compromised, and following the decision reported in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another[2] the criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed and compromise is recorded.

6.

Accordingly, the Crl.M.P.No.7317 of 2016 and the Criminal Petition are allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No.355 of 2011 on the file of XIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Nampally, Hyderabad, are quashed against the petitioners/A1 and A2.

Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this criminal petition shall stand closed.

________________ M.S.K.JAISWAL,J 7th June, 2016 sj [1] 2015 (1) ALD (Crl.) 240 (Supreme Court) [2] (2012) 10 SCC 303