Mohammed Azeemuddin v. State Of Andhra Pradesh,

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K.JAISWAL Crl.P.M.P Nos.10840 and 10839 of 2016 in Crl.P.Nos.8932 and 9017 of 20162014 & Crl.P Nos.8932 and 9017 of 2016 COMMON ORDER:

These two Criminal Petitions are filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the proceedings in C.C No.144 of 2016 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court, Kurnool and D.V.C No.16 of 2015 on the file of Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Prohibition and Excise, Kurnool, registered for the offence punishable under section 498-A read with 34 IPC, Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Sections 18 and 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

2. The 2nd respondent/de facto complainant and her counsel are present. The petitioners/A1 to A6 and their counsel are also present.

3. Heard both sides and perused the record.

4. On the report of the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant, the Women Police Station, Kurnool, registered a case in Cr.No.30/2014 against the petitioners/A1 to A6 for the offences alleged, and after completion of investigation, filed the charge sheet.

5. It is submitted by both parties that at the intervention of the elders, the parties have amicably settled their disputes concerning to the present case and hence compromise may be recorded and criminal proceedings in the above cases may be quashed.

6. In Yogendra Yadav and others v. the State of Jharkhand[1] the Supreme Court, in the matter of compromise of a noncompoundable offence, held as under: "The question before this Court is whether this Court

can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC, which are non-compoundable.

Needless to say that offences which are noncompoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab {(2012) 10 SCC 303}). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are noncompoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings depending on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences, which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc.

cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace."

7. Having regard to the above submission and considering the fact that the parties have amicably settled the disputes among themselves out of Court and no useful purpose will be served even if the parties are driven to the trial as they compromised, and following the decision reported in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another[2] the criminal miscellaneous petitions are allowed and compromise is

recorded, and consequently, proceedings in C.C No.144 of 2016 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court, Kurnool and D.V.C No.16 of 2015 on the file of Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Prohibition and Excise, Kurnool, against the petitioners/A1 to A6 are hereby quashed.

8. The Crl.P.M.P.Nos.10840 and 10839 of 2016 and Crl.P.Nos.8932 and 9017 of 2016 are accordingly allowed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed. ___________________ M.S.K.JAISWAL, J Date:11.07.2016 YVL

[1] 2015 (1) ALD (Crl.) 240 (Supreme Court) [2] (2012) 10 SCC 303