Sri Venkata Satya Balasubrahmanyam Pidathala v. The Ministry Of Corporate Affairs And Another

HIGH COURT FOR THE r "'r'

b l[;, :,'i1." 3:,LiA N G A N A r s n ;

"

TUESDAY, THE TWENTY I\ rw o *r o*u d n - ilTl.?r'*,Y.?irD E c E rv B E R PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM WRIT PETITION No 2410s oF 2020 Between:

Sri Venkata S-atya Barasubrahmanyam pidathara. s/o. Krishna r\,4urthv pidathara. ased about 57 vears. occ Busindsi, ru,i"iiJi rvo"Eoil w"i"rriJ.i ;ririfiiiifii!: Timbertake Cotony, Raidurgr, oicr.,lrb*ii"_ sci6bol),t.runs"n, ...PETITIONER AND The lVinistry_of Corporate Affairs, A'Wing. Shastri Bhawan, Rajendra prasad Road. New Delhi - 1 10 001, Representedby its Secretary. The Regis_lrar of Companies, (For State of Telangana), 2nd Floor, Corporate Bhawan, GSI Post, Tattiannaram Nagole, Bandlagudd, Hyderabad - 500 068.

RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to pass an order or direction or any other proceedings one in the nature of Writ of [,4andamus declaring the action of respondents in deactivating the peiitioner Director ldentification Number DIN 01645015 and restricting the petitioners from filing statutory returns, i.e.

, the annual returns and financial statements of the Companies in which they are Directors as arbitrary, illegal, without jurisdiction, contrary of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 1 1 of the Companies (Appointment of Directors) Rules, 2014, violative of the principles of natural justice besides violating the petitioners' rights guaranteed under Adicle 14 and Article 19 (t ) (g) of the Constitution of lndia. lA NO: 1 OF 2020 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances staled in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, ihe High court may be pleased to dtrect the 1st Respondent to restore the petitioner Dlrector ldentification Number (DlN) 01645015 respectively so as to enable him to submit pending annual returns and financial statements for the company in which he is appointed as director.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Ms.

THE HON,BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM WRIT PETlTION No.241OS of 2020 ORDER:

The petltioner challenges his disqualilication lron: Directorship under Section 16412) ol the Companies Act' 20 i 3' for the alleged default in filing financial staterment/ Annual Returns' and consequently seel{ Icstoratiorl ol his Direcror lclcnrilicatior: Number (DlN) viz., 0164501 5'

Learned counsel for the petitioner submils that the issr-rt raised in the present Writ Pctitron is squrarely covered by the' common order dated 78.O7.2AP in W.P.No 5422 of 2Ol8 and batch.

Learned Assistant Solicrtor Gcneral i:ppearing fo. tht 2"" respondent - Registrar of Companies does not dispr-rte the aforesaicl submission Operative portion ol the aloresard order reads as under: "For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders in the writ petitious to the extent of disqualifying the petitioners under Section l6al2llal of the Act and deactivatiofl of their DINS, are set aside, and the 2"d respondent is directed to activate the DINS of the petitioners, enabling them to function as Directors other than in strike off companies.

It is made clear that this order will not preelude the 2"d respondent from taking appropriate action in accordance with law for violations as envisaged under Section :I6+l2J of the Act, giving the said provision prospective effect from OI,O4.2OL4 and for necessary action against DIN in case of violations of Rule 11 of the Rules.

It is also made clear that if the petitionets are aggrieved by the action of the respondents in stf,iking off their companies under Section 248 of the Act, they are at

liberty to avail alternatlve remedy under Section 252 of tlte Act.

All the u'rit petitions are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.', In view of rhe said Order dated lg.O7.2olg and lor the reasons recorded therein, this Writ petition is also allowed in terms thereof, No costs.

Miscellaneous Petltions, ii any pending, shall stand closed, SD/-M,MANJULA ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY'

sEcfloN'cirrtcen To, 1 The N/inistrv of Corporate Affairs, 'A'Wing, Shastri Bhawan' Raiendra Prasad noiO, Ne*'Oerfri - r r O 001, Represented by its Secretary'

2. The Reqistrar of Companies, (For State of Telangana) 2nd Floor' Corporate Bhawan, GSt post. rattiai"nir'i,i ru-jit]", sundtr"grod, Hyderabad - 500 068

3. One CC to Ms. G, Sumathi, Advocate IOPUC]

4. One CC to Sri, Namavarapu Raieshwar Rao' Assistant Solicitor General toPUCl (along with a copy of Order dated: 18tO7l2o1g in WP No' 5422 of 2Q18 and batch)

5. Two C.D. CoPies Prk

I HIGH COURT DATED:2911212020

ORDER

WP. No. 24105 of 2020 s 11 utl-zrizt * Allowing the Wp.

without costs.

,o le>l

P 7073, 71 05 7432, 7454 757 8 4. 7 7 1 350, 2417. t2 432 1247 498.

25o6. l2 74. t259 1 62 L.

COMMON ORDER since, the issue invorved in aI the writ petitions is one and the same, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. The petitioners are the directors of the private companies, registered under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) (for short.the Act,). Some of the such companies are active, and some of them have been struck off from the register of companies under Section 248(1)( c ) of the Act, for not carrying on any business operation for the specified period mentloned in the said provision, and for not making any application within the specified period, for obtaining the status of a dormant company under Section 455 of the Act.

3. The petitioners, who were directors of the struck off companies, and who are presently directors of active companies, during the relevant perlod in question, failed to file financial statements or annual returns for a continuous period of three years. Therefore, the 2nd respondent passed the impugned order under Section L64(2) of the Act, disqualifying them as directors, and further making them ineligible to be re-appointed as directors of that company, or any other company, for a period of five years from the date on which the respective companies failed to do so. The Director Identification Numbers (DINs) of the petitioners were also deactivated. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petitions have been filed.

This court granted interim orders ln the writ petitions directing the 2nd respondent to activate DINs of the petitioners, to enabre them to function other than in strike off comPantes;'

5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the Writpetitions,SriK.Lakshman,learnedAssistantSolicitorGeneralappearing for the respondents - Union of India'

6.Learnedcounselforthepetitioners,contendthatbeforepassing the impugned order, notices have not been issued, giving them opportunity, and this amounts to violation of principles of natural justice, and on this ground alone, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside.

7. Learned counsel submits that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act empowers the authority to disqualify a person to be a director, provided he has not filed financial statements or annual returns of the company to which he is director, for any continuous period of three financial years. Learned counsel further submits that this provision came into force with effect from 1.4.2014, and prior thereto i.e., under Section 2l +(t)(g) of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), which is the analogous provision, there was no such requirement for the directors of the private companies. They contend that this provision under Act 18 of 2013, will have prospective operation and hence, if the directors of company fail to comply with the requirements mentioned in the said provision subsequent to the said date, the authority under the Act, is within its jurisdiction to disqualify them. But in the present cases, the 2nd respondent, taking the period prior to 1.4.2074, i.e., giving the provision retrospective effect, disqualified the petitioners as directors, which is illega I and arbitrary.

8. With regard to deactivation of DINs, learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the DINs, as contemplated under Rule 2(d) of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors), Rules, 2014 {for

J short'the Rures), are granted for rife time to the appricants under Rure 10(6) of the said Rures, and canceration of the DIN can be made onry for the grounds mentioned in crauses (a) to (f) under Rure 11 0f the Rures, and the said grounds does not provide for deactivation for having become inerigibre for appointment as Directors of the company under Section 164 0f the Act. Learned counsel further submits that as against the deactivation, no appeal is provided under the Rules, and appeal to the Tribunal under Section 252 of the Act is provided only against the dissolution of the company under Section 248 of the Act.

9' Learned counser further submits that 1sr respondent - Government of India represented by the Ministry of corporate Affairs, has froated a scheme dated 29.1,2.2077 viz., Condonation of Delay Scheme _ 201g, wherein the directors, whose DINs have been deactivated by the 2nd respondent, allows the DINs of the Directors to be activated. However, such scheme is not applicable to the companies which are struck off under Section 248(5) of the Act. In case of active companies, they can make application to National Company Law Tribunal under Section 252 of the Act, seeking for restoration, and the Tribunal can order for reactivation of DIN of such directors, whose DIN are deactivated. However, under Section 252 only the companies, which are carrying on the business, can approach the Tribunal and the companies, which have no business, cannot approach the Tribunal for restoration. They submlt that since the penal provision is given retrospective operation, de hors the above scheme, they are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of Ind ia.

10. With the above contentions, learned counsel sought to set aside the impugned orders and to allow the writ petitions.

11. on the other hand learned Assistant Solicitor General submits that failure to file financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period

of three financial years, automatically entail their disqualification under Section f64(2)(a) of the Act and the statute does not provide for issuance of to comPlY with the any notice. Hence, the petitioners' who have failed cannot complain of statutory requirement under Section 164 of the Act' violation of principles of natural justice' as it is a deeming provision' Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners have alternative remedy of appeal under Section 252 of the Act, and hence writ petitions may not be entertained.

L2, To consider the contention of the learned Assistant Solicitor General with regard to alternative remedy of appeal under Section 252 of the Act, the said provision is required to be considered, i:nd the same is extracted as under for better appreciation:

252, Appeal to Tribunal:

(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Registrar, notifying a company as dissolved under Section 248, may file an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of three years from the date of the order of the Registrar and if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the removal of the name of the company from the register of companies is not justified an view of the absence of any of the grounds on which the order was passed by the Registrar, it may order restoration of the name of the company in the register of companies;

Provided that before passing an order under this section, the Tribunal shall give a reasonable opportunity of making representations and of being heard to the Registrar, the company and all the persons concerned: Provided further that if the Registrar is satisfied, that the name of the company has been struck off from the register of companies either inadvertently or on basis of incorrect information furnished by the company or its directors, which requires restoration in the register of companies, he may within a period of three years from the date of passing of the order dissolving the company under Section 248, file an application before the Tribunal seeking restoration of name of such company,

(2) A copy of the order passed by the Tribunal shall be filed by the company with the Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order and on receipt of the order, the Registrar shall cause the name of the company to be restored in the register of companies and shail issue a fresh certificate of incorporation.

(3) If a company, or any member or creditor or worker thereof Feels aggrieved by the company having its name struck off from the register of companies, the Tribunal or an applic:ation made by the company, rnember, creditor or workman before the expiry of twenty years from the publication in the Official Gazette of the notice under sub-section (5) of Section 248, if satisfied that the company was, at the time of its name being struck off, carrying on business or in operataon or otherwise it is just that the name of the company be resto.ed to the register of companies, order the name of the company to be restored to the register of companies, and the Tribunal may, by the order, give such other directions and make such provisions as deemed just for placing the company and all other persons in the same position as nearly as may be as if the name of the company has not been struck off from the register of companies.

_) A reading of above provision goes to show that if the company is dissolved under section 248 of the Act, any person aggrieved by the same, can fire an appear' Thus the said provision provides the forum for redressar against the dissolution and striking off the company from the register of companies. It does not dear with the d isqua rification of the directors, and deactivation of their DIN.. In the present case, the petitioners are only aggrieved by their d isq ua rification as directors and deactivation of DINs, but not about striking off companies as such. Hence, Section 252 of the Act, cannot be an alternative remedy for seeking that rerief, and the contention of the rearned Assistant Solicitor General, in this regard, merits for rejection.

13. Under Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act, if the Director of a company fails to file financiar statements or annuar returns for any continuous period of three financial years, he shall not be erigible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or appointed in other company for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so. The said provision under the Act 18 of 2013, came into force with effect from 07.04.2014, and the petitioners are disqualified as directors under the said provision. At this stage, the issue that arises for consideration is - whether the disq ua lification envisaged under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, which provision came into force with effect from 0t.04.20L4, can be made applicable with prospective effect, or has to be given retrospective operation?

In other words, the issue would be, from which financial year, the default envisaged under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, has to be calculated, to hold the director of the company liable? In this regard, the learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court, the General Circular No.08/14 dated 4.4.2074 issued by the Ministry of Corporation affairs, which clarifies the applicability of the relevant financial years.

"A number of provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 including those relating to maintenance of books of account, preparation, adoption and filing of financial statements(anddocumentsrequiredtobeattachedthereto),Auditorsreportsand ine aoard oi Directors report (Board's report) have been brought into force with

effect from l't April, 2014, --Provisions of schedule il-!T:ll tives to compute deDreciatron) and schedule ,r''ii;;;;i Jr rinanciat statements) have also been brouoht into force from,nu, ou,"l'in"'r"levant Rules q:rtgilins to these provisions have also been notified, ptactoin ir'" *"utit" of the Ministry and have come rnro force from the same date'

The Ministry has received requests for clarification with.reqard to the relevant financial vears with effect tr-ot"i'i'in iutt' piou'tiont of the new Act relating to marntenance of books ot u..o, ni,'-p r"pa raiio n, adoption,and filing of financial statements (and attachments in"'JtJl'"!'ol*;' report and Board's report will be applicable.

Although the position in this behalf is quite clear'.to I1k: tlrinss absolutely clear it is hereby notified that tn" rni"iiuilitt"ments'(and documents required to be attached thereto), auditors l."po't una Board's report in respect of financial years ;h;;-.-;.;;"*;'

earlier ttrin 1't April shall be -go-verned bv the relevant ir"riri""!)lii"Jrreslrules or the-companies Act, 19E6 and that in respect of financial years commenclng on or after i* April, 2014, the provisions of the new Act shall apply. "

A reading of the above circular makes it clear the financial statements and the documents required to be attached thereto, auditors report and Board's report in respect of financial years that commenced earlier than 01.O4.2OL4, shall be governed by the provisions under the Companies Act, 1956 and in respect of financial years commencing on or after 01.04.20t4, the provisions of the new Act shall apply.

74. At this stage it is required to be noticed that the analogous provision to Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act 18 of 2013, is Section 27aG)G) ot Act 1 of 1956. The said provision under Act 1 of 1956 is extracted as under for ready reference:

Section 274f11 A person shall not be capable of being appointed director of a company, if -

(9) such person is already a director of a public company which, - (A) has not filed the annual accounts and annual returns for any continuous three financial years commencing on and after the first day of April, 1999; or (B) Provided that such person shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director of any other public company for a period of five years from the date on which such publil company, in which he is a director, failed to file annual accounts and annual retllTns under sub-clause (A) or has failed to repay its deposits or interest or redeem its debentures on due date or pay dividend referred to in clause (B). A reading of the above provision under Act 1 of 1956, makes it clear that if a person capable of being appointed director of a company and such person is already a director of a public company, which has not filed annual accounts and annual returns for any continuous three financial years commencing on

and after the first day of Aprir 1999, shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director of any other public company for a period of five years from the date on which such pubiic company, in which he is a director, faired to fire annuar accounts and annuar returns, so the statutory requirement of firing annual accounts and annual returns, is placed on the directors of a .public company'. There is no provision under the Act 1of 1956, which places similar obrigations on the directors of a 'private company,. Therefore. nonfiling of annuar accounts and annuar returns by the directors of the private company/ wirr not disquarify them as directors under the provisions of Act 1 of 1956.

15. Under Section 76ae) of the new legislation i.e., Act 18 of 2013, no such distinction between a 'private company, or a ,public company, is made and as per the said provision goes to show that no person who is or has been a director of a 'company', fails to file financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years, will not be eligible for appointment as a director of a company. As already noted above, the said provision, came into force with effect from 07.04.2074.

16. Coming to the facts on hand, the 2nd respondent has disqualified the petitioners under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act 18 of 2013, for not filing financial statements or annual returns, for period prior to 01.04.2014. The action of the 2nd respondent runs contrary to the circular issued by the Ministry of the Corporate Affairs, and he has given the provisions of Act 18 of 2013, retrospective effect, which is impermissible. 77, The Apex Court in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL)-L NEW DELHI v' VATIKA TOWNSHIP PRIVATE LIMITEDI has dealt with the general principles concerning retrospectiv ity. The relevant portlon of the judgment is thus:

27. A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory Rule or a statutory Notification, may physically consists of words printed on papers However, '(20i5)t scc I

conceptuary it is a sreat deal,Tl,l,",,tl,il"il""[ii',I]r!ii.l5; TlJiii.lliii:i i,?:"J:YJl ji:,:Ui,"":[J"ff:;:';;;;i;; in a work or riction/non riction or even in a judgment of a court o' 'u* i'hl'J i' '

iecnnique requlred to draft a legrslation as well as to understano u "gi=r;iio"

'-ioi'"t t"tnnio*- it^k nown as legislative draftrng and latter one ia to o.'ioi,nJ in the various principles of Interpretation of statutes'. vis-a-vis ordrnarv p':";'"" i;;i=l"i;n- Jirfers in rts provenance' lay-out and features as also in tne impricl't'ion aJio it= rn"uninq that arises by presumptions ai to tne intent of the maker rt'ereof

28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted' one established rule is that unr"r. u tlniiutv intenti6n appears' a Iegislation is presunled not to be intended to f,ure u,Jotp"ttive operation The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities Law passed today cannot applyi; th;;;;"it ofthe past. -rr wl ao something todav, we do it keeping in the law of ioaiv una in force and not tomorrow's backwlrd adjustment of it our belief in the natuie of the law is founded on the bed rock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans r,uuu "0""n retrospeciively u[set. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit : law loois forward not llackward.

As was observed in Phillips vs Eyre [(1b70) LR 6 QB 1], a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle inat teqistation by whlcn tne conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.

29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of 'fairness', which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in the decision reported in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yanrashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [{1994) 1 Ac 486]. Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give lhe enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note that cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later.

30. We would also like to point out, for the sake oi completeness, that where a benefit js conferred by a legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving lt a purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective. In Government of India & Ors. v.

indian Tobacco Associatjon, [(2005) 7 SCC 396], the doctrine of fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in the case of Vijay v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [(2006) 6 SCC 289]. It was held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature. However, we are (slc not) confronted with any such situation here.

31. In such cases, retrospectivity is attached to benefit the persons in contra d istinction to the provisioti imposing some burden or liability where the presumption attached towards prospectivity. In the instant case, the proviso added to Section 113 ofthe Act is not beneficial to the assessee. On the contrary. it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this, we have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption agajnst retrospective operation. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by out weighing factors.

43. There is yet another very interesting piece of evidence that clarifies that provision beyond any pale of doubt viz., the understanding of CBDT itself regarding this provislon. It is contained in CBDT Circular No"8 of 2OO2 dated 27.8.2002, with the subject "Finance Act, 2002 - Explanatory Notes on provision relatinq to Direct Taxes". This circular has been issued after the passing of the Finance Act, 2002, by which amendment to section 113 was made. In this circular, various amendments to the Income tax Act are discussed amply demonstrating as to which amendments are clarificatory/retrospective in operation and which amendments are prospective.

For example, Explanatlon to s€ .*:{ i:r j: ;:,h ;;: "S ffi #} i. r!:!i,i * : "", ff fl ;:,[.0",,"il.,l.i"1,y,S; would take "rr"" ."i.#.i.,i".?]: .::-l'9:l assessments ,r .ua" .ru#."i".", 'u# amendment . s".t,"" "ii:' J; I" ti"I 'l', 9uv ot Julv, 199s. wn"" ,i.lr'"J i] amendment urong ;iih ;;";.:1-ltl'

this- verv circular provides tn"t -ul""iuij r.e., wrl take efie:,;;;; 1...;;;To.ments in Section 1s8_BE; woutd be prospective

18. Thus, the Apex Court in the above judgment, has made it clear that unless a contrary intention appears, a regisration has to be presumed to have prospective effect. A reading of section 164 of the Act does not show that the regisration has any intention, to make the said provision appricabre to past transactions. Further, the Apex Court in the above judgment at paragraph No.43, found that the circurar issued by the authority after passing of the legislation, crarifying the position with regard to appricabirity of the provisions, has to be construed as an important piece of evidence, as it would clarify the provision beyond any pale of doubt. In the present case, as already noted above, the Ministry of Corporation affairs has issued the circular No.08/2014 dated 4.4.2014 clarifying that financial statements commencing after 01.04.

2014, shall be governed by Act 18 of 2013 i.e., new Act and in respect of financial years commencing earlier to 01.04.2014, shall be governed by Act 1 of 1956. At the cost of repetition, since in the present cases, as the 2"d respondent / competent authority, has disqualified the petitioners as directors under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act 18 of 2013, by considering the period prior to 0L.04.20L4, the same is contrary to the circular, and also contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court in the above referred judgment.

19. If the said provision is given prospective effect, as per the circular dated 4.4.2014 and the law laid down by the Apex Court, as stated in the writ affidavits, the first financial year would be from 01-04-2014 to 31.03.2015 and the second and third years financial years would be for the years ending 31.03.2016 and 31.03.2017. The annual returns and financial statements are to be filed with Registrar of Companies only after the conclusion of the annual general meeting of the company, and as per the first

proviso to section 96(1) of the Act, annual general meeting for the year ending 31'03.20t7, can be held within six months from the closing of financial year i.e., by 30'09'2017 Further' the time limit for filing annual returnsundersectiong2(4)ottheAct,is60daysfromannualgeneral meeting, or the last date on which annual general meeting ought to have been held with normal fee, and within 270 days with additional fee as per the proviso to Section 403 of the Act' Learned counsel submit that if the said dates are calculated, the last date for filing the annual returns would be 30.tL.2017 , and the balance sheet was to be filed on 30' 10'2017 with normal fee and with additional fee, the last date for filing annual returns is 27.O7.2018. In other words, the d isqua lification could get triggered only on or after 27.O7.2078.

But the period considered by the 2nd respondent in the present writ petitions for clothing the petitioners with disqualification, pertains prior to 07.04.2074. Therefore, when the omission, which is now pointed out, was not envisaged as a ground for disq ua lification prior to 7.4.2014, the petitioners cannot be disqualified on the said ground. This analogy is traceable to Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, which states that "/Vo person shall be convicted of any offence except far violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been infticted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence,,.

In view of the same, the ground on which the petitioners were disqualified, cannot stand to legal scrutiny, and the same is liable to be set aside.

20. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in YA,SHODHARA SHROFF vs, IINION OF INDIAZ considering Section 164(2)(a) of the Act and other provisions of the Act, and various judgments, passed an elaborate order and held that the said provision has no retrospective operation. The observations of the learned Judge, pertaining to 2 w,P.No.529I I o12017 and batch dated 12.06.2019

t1 pflvate companies, which are relevant for the present purpose, are as under:

extracted

208. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have arrived at the Fo,owing conclusions: (a) It js held that Section ,ro!?!:r,_"!the Act is not uttra vtrus Article 14 oF rhe constitutron The sard provrsron rs not maniFestry arbitrary and arso does not fa, wrthin the scope of the doctrine- of proportionarity. *eiiner'ooes the said provision violate Arricre 19(1)(q) of *re constitutLn iiii .""a"1" ine interest of generar public and a reasonable restriction on tt" erei.is" Jiine,uio right. The object and purpose oF the said-provisjon ,. to ,t,pufute -thl consequence of a disqualification on account of ihe circumsianfu, ,i"r"iir,,il"," and the same is in :ld:r to achieve probity, accountabitity, un; -;;;;;;."n.y in corporare governance.

(b) That Article fslc) Section 164(2) of the Act applies by operation of law on the basis of the circumstances stated -therein, the said pl.oririon Jo"a not envisage any hearing, neither pre-disqualification nor post-disqualification and this is not in violation of the principles of natural justice, is nol ultra ylres Article 14 of the Constitution.

(c) That Section 164(2) of the Act does not have retrospective operation and is therefore, neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, in view of the interpretation placed on the same.

(d) (e) lnsofar as the private companies are concerned, disqualification on account of the circumstances stated under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has been brought into force for the first time under the Act and the consequences of disqualification could not have been imposed on directors of private companies by taking into consideration any period prior to 01.04.2014 for the purpose of reckoning continuous period of three financial years under the said provision. The said conclusion is based on the principal drawn by way of analogy from Article 20(1) of the Constitution, as at no point of time prior to the enforcement of the Act, a disqualification based on the circumstances under Section t64(2) of the Act was ever envisaged under the 1956 Act vis-A-vis directors of private companies. Such a disqualification could visit a director of only a public company under Section 2l4O)G) of 1956 Act and never a director of a private company Such disqualification of the petitioners who are directors of private companies is hence q u a shed.

(0...

(9) Consequently, where the disqualafication under Section 164(2) of the Act is based on a continuous period of three financial years commencing from 01.04.2014, wherein financial statements or annual returns have not been filed by a public or private company, the directors of such a company stand disqualified and the consequences of the said disqualification would apply to them under the Act'

21. A learned Single of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in GAIIRANG BALVANTLAL SHAH S/O BALVANTLAL SHAH VS. UNION OF INDIA3 expressed similar view as that of the leaned single Judge of High Court of Karnataka (1 supra), and held that Section t64(2) of the Act of 2013, which had come into force with effect from L'4.2074 would have prospective, and not retrospective effect and that the defaults contemplated under section 164(2)(a) with regard to non-filing of financial statements or r r/Special Civil Application N o.22435 of 201'/ and batch dated 18 12.201 I

l2 annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years would be the default to be counted from the financial year 2014'15 only and not 2013- 14.

22. A learned single Judge of the High Court of Madras in BHAGAVAN DAS DHANANJAIA DAS vs. TJNION OF INDIA4 also expressed similar view. The relevant portion is as under:

29. In fine, (a) When the New Act 2013 came into effect from 1.4.2014, the second respondent herein has wrongly given retrospective effect and erroneously disqualified the petitioner - directors from 1.1.2016 itself before the deadline commenced wrongly fixing the first financial year from 7.4.2013 to 31.3.2014. By virtue of the new Section 164(2)(a) of the 2013 Act using the expression 'for any continuous period of three financial year" and in the light of section 2(41) defining "financial year" as well as thei!- own General circular No.08/14 dated 4.4.20L4, the first financial year would be from 7.4.2014 to 31.3.2015, the second financial year would be from 1.4.2015 to 31.3.2016 and the third financial year would be from 1.4,2OL6 to 37.3.

2077, whereas the second respondent clearly admitted in paras 75 and 22 of the counter affidavit that the default oF filing statutory returns for tl.re final years commences from 2A73-14, 2074-15 ancl 2015-lG i.e, one year before the Act 2013 came into force. This is the basic incurable legal infirmity that vitiates the entire impugned proceed ings.

(b)

23. ln view of the above facts and circumstances and the judgments referred to supra, as the impugned orders in present writ petitions disqualifying the petitioners as directors under Section 16 (2)(a) of the Act, have been passed considering the period prior to 01.04.2014, the same cannot be sustained, and are liable to be set aside to that extent.

24. As far as the contention regarding issuance of prior notice before disqualifying the petitioners as directors is concerned, Section 16a(2)(a) is required to be noticed/ and the same is extracted as under for ready reference:

164. Disqualification for appointment of director: 4 w.1,.No.25455 ()f 2017 and batch dared 2'7 .o'7.201s

IJ

(2) No person who js or 0".,"0"[?nlT,.,il',.,,ru:u.,:i""ffi ::"::::;:::.;;*,,,,,o,. (b)...

Shall be e,igib,e to be appointed in off,e.lJmp"ar,"er? -'-"-upPoiltu-d as a director of that said company r.iL t" lIr".-' 'or a period of five years from the date company or on which the A reading of the above provision makes it clear that it provides disq ua lification on happening of an event i,e., if a person who is or has been a director of a company has not fired financiar statements or annuar returns for any continuous period of three financiar years, shaI be inerigibre to be reappointed as a director of that company or appointed in any other company for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fairs to do so. The provision does not provide for issuance of any prior notice or hearing. A learned single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in yashodara Shroff v.

Union of India (1 supra), as well as the learned single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Gaurang Balvantlal Shah s/o Balvantlal Shah vs. Union of India (2 supra), after analyzing various provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder, and by relying on various judgments of the Apex Court, held that Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act applies by operation of law on the basis of the circumstances stated therein, the said provision does not envisage any hearing, neither pre-disq u a lificatio n nor post-disqualification and this is not in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence, is not ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. I concur with the said reasoning.

25, Thus, from the above, it is clear that Section 16+(2)(a) of the Act is a deeming provision and the disqualification envisaged under the said provision comes into force automatically by operation of law on default and Legislature did not provide for issuance of any prior notice, but the respondents notified disqualification even before it incurred, and deactivated DINs, which is illegal arbitrary and against provisions contained in Section 16aQ)@) of the Act.

t4

26. The next grievance of the petitioners is with regard to deactivatlon of their DINs. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that except for the grounds mentioned under Rule 11 (a) to (f) of the Rules' the DINS cannot be cancelled or deactivated, and the violation mentioned under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, is not one of the grounds mentioned under clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11, and hence for the alleged violation under Section rcaQ)@) of the Act, DIN cannot be cancelled'

27. Rule 10 of the Rules provide for allotment of DIN and under sub rule (6) of Rule 10, it is allotted for life time. Rule 11 provides for cancellation or deactivation. Rule 11, which is relevant for the present purpose, is extracted as under for ready reference:

11. Cancellation or surrender or deactivation of DIN: .The Centrai Government or Regional Director (Northern Region), Noida or any officer authorized by the Regional Director may, upon being satisfied on verification of particulars or documentary proof attached with the application received from any person, cancel or deactivate the DIN in case - (a) the DIN is found to be duplicated in respect of the same person provided the data related to both the DIN shall be merged with the validly retained number;

the DIN was obtained in a wrongful manner or by fraudulent means; of the death of the concerned individual;

the concerned individual has been declared as a person of unsound mind by a competent Court;

if the concerned individual has been adjudicated an insolvent; (b) (c) (d) (e) Provided that before cancellation or deactivation of DIN pursuant to clause (b), an opportunity of being heard shall be given to the concerned individual; (0 on an application made in Form DIR-5 by the DIN holder to surrender his or her DIN along with declaration that he has never been appointed as director in any company and the said DIN has never been used for filing of any document with any authority/ the Central Government may deactivate such DIN; Provided that before deactivation of any DIN in such case, the Central Government shall verify e-records.

Explanation: for the purposes of clause (b) - The terms "wrongful manner" means if the DIN is obtained on the strength of documents which are not legally valid or incomplete documents are furnished or on suppression of material jnformation or on the basis of wrong certification or by making misleading or false information or by m isre p resentation; (ii) the term "fraudulent means" means if the DIN is obtained with an intent to deceive any other person or any authority including the Central Govern ment.

(i)

28. Clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11, extracted above, provides for the circumstances under which the DIN can be cancelled or deactivated. The said grounds, are different from the ground envisaged under

TJ Section 164(2)(a) of the Act. Therefore, for the a eged violation under Section 164 of the Act, DINs cannot be cance,led or deactivated. except in accordance with Rule 11 of the Ruies.

29.

Learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the decision cited 2 supra, held as under:

"29. This takes the Court to the next question as to whether the respondents coutd have deactivated the DrNsd rhe- p-etir'i;;;;;; ;i;;r;;;:"." or the impusned list? In this regard, rt wourd be appropriate to rerer to-iii rerevant provrsions contained in the Act and the said nuies. Section rsif :ipr"i,,ou, rhat no person shall be appointed as a Director of a company, untess'ni nas been alrotted the Director Identification Nurnber under section'isc. -s".iL"-r53 requires every ldlydy3l intending to be appointed as Director oii-il.puny to make an application for alotment of DIN to the centrar Governmeni in ir.n form and manner as may be prescribed. Section 154 states that the Central Government shall within one.month from the recelpt of the application under Section 153 allot a DIN to an applicant in such manner as may be prescribed.

Section 155 prohibits any individual, who has already been allotted a DIN under Section 154 from applying for or obtaining or possessing another DIN. Rures 9 and 1o of the said Rures of ,014 prescribe the procedure for making apprication for a otment and for the allotment of DIN, and further provide that the DIN allotted by the Central Government under the said Rules would be valid for the life time of the applicant and shal not be a otted to any other person.

30, Rule 11 provides for cancellation or suTrender or deactivation of DIN. Accordingly, the Central Government or Regional Director or any authorized officer of Regional Director may, on being satisfied on verification of particulars of documentary proof attached with an application from any person, cancel or deactivate the DIN on any of the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) to (f) thereof. The said Rule 11 does not contemplate any suo motu powers either with the Central Government or with the authorized officer or Regional Director to cancel or deactivate the DIN allotted to the Director, nor any of the clauses mentioned in the said Rules contemplates cancellation or deactivation of DIN of the Director of the "struck off company" or of the Director having become ineligible under Section 164 of the said Act.

The reason appears to be that once an individual, who is intending to be the Director of a particular company is allotted DIN by the Central Government, such DIN would be valid for the life time of the applicant and on the basis of such DIN he could become Director in other companies also. Hence, if one of the companies in which he was Director, is "struck off", his DIN could not be cancelled or deactivated as that would TUn counteT to the provisions contained in the Rule 11, which specifically provides for the circumstances under which the DIN could be cancelled or deactivated.

31. ln that view of the matter, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the respondents in deactivating the DINS of the petitioners - Directors along with the publication of the impugned list of Directors of "struck off" companies under 6ection 248, also was not legally tenable Of course, as per Rule 12 of the said Rules, the individual who has been allotted the DIN, in the event of any change in his particulars stated in Form DIR -3 has to intimate such change to the Central Government within the prescribed time in Form DIR-6, however, if that is not done, the DIN could not be cancelled or deactivated. The cancellation or deactivation of the DIN could be resorted to by the concerned respondents only as per the provisions contained in the said Rules."

30. In view of the above facts and circumstances and the judgment referred to supra, the deactivation of the DINs of the petitioners for alleged violations under Section 164 of the Act, cannot be sustained.

t6

31. For the foregoing reasons' the impugned orders in the writ petitionstotheextent'ofdisqualifyingthepetitionersunder Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act and deactivation of their DINs' are set aside' and the 2nd respondent is directed to activate the DINS of the petitioners' enabling them to function as Directors other than in strike off companies'

32. It is made clear that this order will not preclude the 2nd respondent from taking appropriate action in accordance with law for violations as envisaged under Section L64(2) of the Act, giving the said provision prospective effect from 01.04.2014 and for necessary action against DIN in case of violations of Rule 11 of the Rules.

33. It is also made clear that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the action of the respondents in striking off their companies under Section 248 of the Act, they are at liberty to avail alternative remedy under Section 252 of the Act.

34. AII the writ petitions are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.

35. Interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs.

A.RAJASHEKER REDDY,J DATE: 1B-07-201q AVS