The State Of Telangana v. Komirelly Pradeep Reddy

[ 3431 I

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND ANO TWENTY FOUR PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HONOURAALE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO:793 OF 2024 Appeal filed under Section 419 of BNSS against the Order dated 15.02.2024 passed in S.C. No. 526 ol 2017 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge for Trial of Offences Under the SCs and STs (POA) Act-cum-Vl Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad. .J Bet\&een:

'The State of Telangana, rep. by The Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana, Hyderabad - 500066.

.AppellanUComplainant AND

1. Komirelly Pradeep Reddy, S/o. K.Ram Reddy, Aged about 3O years, Occ. Free Lancer, R/o. H.No. l2-1-1509/1 , 3rd Floor, Shanti Nagar, Lalapet, Secunderabad, N/o. Dasireddygudern (V), Valigonda (m), Nalgonda District.

2. Kunapuri Nageshwara Rao, S/o. T.Laxrnaiah, Aged about 36 years, Occ. Agriculture, N/o. Dasireddygudem (V), Valigonda (m), Nalgonda District. ;

i I I I I .Respondents/Accused I I I I I I Counsel for the Appellant : Mr. M. Ramachandra Reddy Additional Public Prosecutor r I Ii Counsel for the Respondent No. 1: Mr. Praveen Kumar Challa i Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 : ilr. T. Dhanalatshmi representing Mr. A. Chandra Shaker i i The Court delivered the following: ORDER

-7 i THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HON'BI,E SRIJUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL No.793 of 2024 JUDGMENT:a) j{on'bte Sri Justice P.SAM KOSHY) The present is an appeal filed under Section 419 of Bharatia Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short .BNSS') by the State challenging the judgment of acquiual, dated 15.02.2024 in S.C.No.526 of 20 l7 by the Special Judge for Trial of Offences Under the S.Cs and S'Is (pOA) Actcum-Vl Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad (for short 'the trial court').

2. Heard Mr.M.Ramachandra Reddy, leamed Additional public Prosecutor appearing of the appellant/State. Mr.praveen Kumar Challa, leamed counsel appearing for respondent No. I and N,tr.'l'. f)hana laksh m i, leamed counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.A.chandra Shaker, learned counsel lor the respondent No.2. Perused the material available on record. i. The two accused persons the respondents herein u,erc prosecuted for the offence punishable under section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal code (for short'IPC'). Finally, after the evidence was concruded, the trial court has 'ide the impugned judgment acquitted the two accused persons holding the respondents/accused not quiltr of the said orrence.

4. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant/State contended that the trial court has committed an error of facts as also on law while passing the impugned judgment. According to the leamed counsel for the appellant it is a case where the two respondent/accused after committing the offence on 19.01.2016 assaulting and murdering the deceased Uday Kiran had telephoned the PW-10 confessed to him about the commission of offence. Thereafter, the two accused persons is said to have reached the police station Lalaguda, surrendered themselves and based on the confessional statement, the F.l.R. was lodged and investigation commenced. This evidence of PW-10 before whom the confession was made has not been properly appreciated by the trial court. Acconding to the leamed counsel for the appellant the trial court also lailed in not relying upon the official witnesses all ofwhom have deposed supporting the case of the prosecution and prayed for the setting aside of the impugned judgment.

5. However, upon perusal of the rnaterials available on record and also upon going t}rough the depositions of the witnesses, certain facts which needs consideration is the so called conlession based upon which the entire prosecution started was infact made in the police station and in the presence of the police offrcials. The admissibility of such a confession made within the premises of the police station and in the presence of the police officials itself gives rise to great element ol doubt. The independent witness PW-6

J befbre whom it is said to have been recorded also has not supported the case olthe prosecution and he has gone to the extent of deposing before the I trial courl, after the two accused persons having reached the police station I i I I and have confessed before the police authorities, PW-6 was called and I i !

rnade to sign certain documents prepared by the police authorities. He has I I iurther gone to state that since he intended to oblige the police authorities I i he has not refused in signing the confessional statement given by the two accused persons. In the process, the very recording of the confession cannot be accepted and is hit by the provisions of Section 25 ol the lndian Er. idence Act. So far as recording made at the instance of respondent/accused. Again none of these materials, the investigating agencies to collect the finger prints of the respondentsiaccused so as to reaclr to the conclusion of the respondents/accused having used the objects i seized tiom the scene of offence or from the custody ofthe accused persons I I I I or to have been used for the commission of the offence.

[:ven the so called I [;S[- rcport also only proves the case to the extent of blood stains like marks I i i I I or hunran blood lbund on the object, but, it was not matched u'ith the blood I uroup o1'the deceased. Neither would there be any other materials collected I I durins the coLrrse ol the seizer linked enough to conclusively reach to the i i I!

conclusion ol'the olfence to have been committed by none other than the I i rrvo res;rondents/accu sed persons. In the absence of the albrementioned :

a materials in the investigation as also in the course of the evidence being recorded by the trial court, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment of ac4uittal passed by the trial court cannot be found fault with nor can it be said to have been an erroneous conclusion arrived at

6. So far as interfering with the judgment of acquittal in an appeal by the trial Court, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions that unless there is substantial strong evidence rvhich is not been appreciated by the trial Court and where the commission ol oflence by the accused is glaringly established, the judgment of acquittal is not be interfered as a matter of routine. The Hon'ble Suprcme Court in the case of Ballu and Another v. State of Madhya Pradeshr in paragraph Nos.6 to 9 observed as under:

"6. Undoubtedly, the prosecution casc rests on circumgantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on th€ basis of circumstantial evidencc has vcry wcll been crystalized in tbe judgment of this Court in the casc of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtrar. wherein this Court held thus:

"152. Before discussing the cases relicd upon b1 thctligh Court nre would like to cite a few decisions on the nature. character and essential proof required in a crimtnal casc which rests on circumstantial evidencc alonc. I hc most frrndamental and basic decision ol' this Coun is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [( 1952) ] SCC '2024 scc oNLINE sc 48r t l tsa+; 4 scc l 16 : 1984 INSC 12 r

7l nIIt 1952 SC 343:1952 SCR 1091 :1953 Cri LJ 1291. 'l'his case has been uniformly followed and applied by rhis C'oun in a large number of later decisions up-to{ate, lbr instance. the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1969) 3 SCC 198: 1970 SCC (Cri) 551 and Ramgopal \.State of Maharashtra (1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 6561. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan. J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 7l AIR le52 SC 343:1952 SCR l09l:1953 Cri LJ l2el:

"lt rs rvcll to remember that in cases where the evidence is ol'a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the corrclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first insrancc hc lully establishcd, and all the facts so established shorrlcl bc consistcnt only with the hy,pothesis of the guilt of thc accuscd. Again. the circumstances should be of a conclLrsir c naturc and tendency and they should be such as Io crclutlc everv hvpothesis but the one proposed to be prrrreJ ln other ',rords. there must be a chain of evidence so lir conrplete as lrot to leave any reasonable giound for a correlrrsiorr consislen( wilh the innocence of the accused .rnJ it rrrusr bc- such as to show that within all human plrl.lrbilrt_r lhe act must have been done by the accused."

7. lr can ihLrs clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prrrscctrtitrr thiit thc circumstances from which the crrncltrsirrn ol' thc guilt is to be drawn should be fully est:rbli'hcti Thc Court holds that it is a primary principle thlr rlrc accused 'nrust be' and not merely'may be'proved suilrr hctirre a courl can convict the accused. It has been hcld rhar rhcre is not only a grammatical but a legal .li'rincrion bctrre-,--n -may be proved' and 'must be or sltrrLrl.l [.re Dr()\ L-d lt has been held that the facts so \

estabtished should be cutsistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible h1'pothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a c.hain of evidence so complete as not to leav€ any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of thc accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused.

8. [t is se*led law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground ol suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

9. Apart lrom that, it is to be noted that the prcscnt case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interferencc by the Appellate Court is very rvell crystallized. Unless ttre finding of acquittal is found to bc pervcrse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, tJrcrc are a catena ofjudgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the I{igh Court iself has reproduced in the inrpLrgned j udgment, which are as reproduced belou':

" 13. In case ofSadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.l'. t2016) 4 SCC 357, the Supreme Court has held that:- "[n an appeal against acquittal where the presumpti()n ol' innocence in favour of the accused is reinlirrced. thc' appcllate Court would interfere with the order o1' acquittal onll'when therc is perversity offact and lavr. Ilou.-r.cr. uc belicve that the paramount consideration of the f'oun is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage ol iuiiicc which can arise by acquitting the accused u'ho is guiltr ol'

an olIcncc. r\ miscarriage ofjustice that may occur by the acquittal of the guiltv is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court, while enunciating the principles riilh rcgard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidcnce on which the order of acquittal is founded."

14. Similar. In case of Harljan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat (1016) ll SCC 665, the Supreme Court has held that:

"No douht- where, on appreciation of evidence on recorcl. trro r iervs arc possible, and the trial court has taken a vics ol'acquitlal. rhe appellate court should not interfere u,ith the sanre. Iftrucver. this does not mean that in all the cases rvhere thc rrial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be intcrlcrcd with, even if the view is perverse. Where rhc r.ier.r raken by the trial court is against the u,cieht ol'cr idcnce on record. or perverse, it is always open far the appellate e()url to express the right conclusion after re-appreciating thc cvidence If the charge i5 proved beyond rcasonablc doubt on record. and convict the accused.""

7. In the light ol the.iudicial precedents referred to in the precedent paragraph and also taking note of nature of evidence collected during the course ofthe trral. $c' are ol'the considered opinion that the prosecution has not been ablc to nrake out a case for interfering with the judgment ol acquittal. 'l'he appeal Iails and is, accordingly, rejected. As a sequel, miscellaneous ap1.rlic31i1,'rt pending, if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs Sd/. K. SAILESHI DEPUTY REGISTRAR \I //TRUE COPY// ECTION OFFICER To, The Specral Judge for Trial of Offences Under the SCs and STs (pOA) Actcum-Vl Additionat Metropolitan Sessions .luAge, SecunOerabad.(With records) Two CCs to Publtc prosecutor. High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad (OUT) One CC to Mr Praveen Kumar Challa, Advocate [OPUC] One CC to [\ilr A Chandra Shaker, Advocate tOpiJCl Two CD Copres ( L\\r'

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HIGH COURT OATEO:1811212024 ---'.- t ( i-:r , '.Iil 28 rEa ?a5 t * SPATCHEO o

JUDGMENT

CRLA.No.793 of 2024 I REJECTING THE CRIMINAL APPEAL I .,. \ \+'

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