Gayam Mahender Reddy v. The State Of Telangana

134231

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

AT HYDERABAD MONDAY,THE NINTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 987 OF 2024 Appeal filed under Section 419(4) of BNSS, against the Judgment dated 07.10.2022 passed in S.C.No. 189 of 2017 on the file of the Court of the Principal Sessions Judge, at Bhongir.

Betlveen:

Gayam Mahender Reddy, S/o. Late Krishna Reddy, Aged 54 years, Occ. Employee, R/o H.No. 1343-38/902, Sai Hills Colony, Medipally, MedchalIVlalkajgiri District. ...Appellant AND

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Judicature for the state of Telangana at Hyderabad. ...RespondenUComPlainant

2. Chippalapalli Srinu, S/o. Buchaiah, Aged about 40 years, Occ: Coolie, R/o Vangala H/o Thurkalshapuram, Gundala Mandal, Nalgonda District.

3. Chippalapalli Madhu, S/o Papaiah, Aged about 26 years, Occ- Coolie, Rio Vangala Hio Thurkalshapuram, Gundala Mandal, Nalgonda District.

4. Gayam Jayaprada, W/o Late Krishna Reddy, Aged about 65 yea1s, Occ Home Maker, R/o Vangala H/o Thurkalshapuram, Gundala Mandal, Nalgonda District.

5. Veeraboina Veeraiah, S/o Lingaiah. Aged 67 years, Occ. Agriculture, R/o Vangala H/o Thurkalshapuram, Gundala Mandal, Nalgonda District.

...Respondents/Accused No. 1 to 4

Counsel for the Appellant :

Sri Rapolu Bhaskar Counsel for Respondent No.1 Mr. M. Ramachandra Reddy, Additional Public Prosecutor Counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 :

The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTTCE P.SAMKOSHY AND TTIE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI CRL.A.No.987 OF 2024 JUDGMENT (per Hon'ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy) Heard Mr. Rapolu Bhaskar, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and the Mr. M.Ramachandra Reddy, leamed Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No'l/State' Perused the record.

2.

The present is an appeal which has been filed under Section 419(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023' 3.

The challenge is to the judgment dated 07 -10'2022 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, at Bhongir in Sessions Case No.189 of20l7.

4.

Vide the impugned judgment, the leamed trial Court has found respondent Nos.2 to 4/accused Nos'l to 4 in the aforementioned sessions case to be not guilty for the offences with 'which they were charged i.e., under Section 302 IPC read with 34 IPC so far as accused Nos.l and 2 are concerrred, under sections 302, 2Ol read with Section 109 IPC so far as acdisBd No'3 is

concemed and as far as accused No.4 is concemed, as he was charged only for the offence under Section 2l2IpC, the trial Court did not found materials to substantiate the said charge and found him not guilty ofthe said offence.

5.

The present is an appeal by Gayam Mahender Reddy, the complainant, at whose instance the prosecution case was initiated against the respondents/accused Nos. I to 4. The date of incident in the instant case is said to be 13.05.2016. The deceased Soma Shekhar Reddy is the son of accused No.3 and brother of the complainant. It is said that the deceased was for a considerable period of time subjecting accused No.3 to high level of ill-treatment and cruelty and when the cruelty became unbearable, accused No.3, the mother, is said to have colluded with accused Nos.l and 2 in eliminating the deceased. In the process, accused Nos.l and 2 are said to have taken the deceased along with them in the garb of having alcohol and subsequent to consumption of liquor, accused Nos.l and 2 are said to have assaulted the deceased in order to kill him and from there, they went to the house of accused No.4 and later on threw the body of the deceased Soma

Shekhar Reddy into the well situated adjacent to the house of accused No.3. The complainant, the brother of the deceased, having come to.know about the said body of the deceased lying in the well, after ascertaining the same, is said to have gone to the police and todged the complaint on the basis of which Cr'No'2S of 2016 was registered and investigation began.

6.

Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were charged for the offences punishable under Section 3Q2 read with Section 34 IPC, accused No.3 was charged for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 109 IPC and accused No'4 was charged for the offence punishable under Section 212 IPC' The crime was registered as Cr.No.28 of 2016 and subsequently the charge sheet was hled making the four accused persons responsible for the death of the deceased and the matter was put to trial before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, at Bhongir where the case was registered as Sessions Case No.189 of 2017.

7.

The prosecution in all examined 16 witnesses as P'Ws'l to 16, in the course also it marked 26 exhibits i'e', Exs'P-l to P-26' Sixteen M.Os were also marked i.e., M-Os.1 to 16' No witnesses

were examined in support of the defence neither were there any documents marked or material objects produced Court. After the conclusion of the trial, vide the impugned judgmenr, the leamed trial Courr passed the judgment of acquittal holding that the prosecution has failed in proving the case by leading cogent, substantial evidence in the course of the trial and as a consequence forlnd accused Nos. 1 to 4 not guilty of the said charges that were levelled against them.

8.

The .iudgment was one which was passed on 07.10.2022. The State i.e., the prosecution has not preferred any appeal against the said judgment of acquittal. The appeal has now been preferred by the brother of the deceased, the complainant (p.W.l ). 9.

The leamed counsel for the complainant took the Court through a position and the evidence which has been collected by the prosecution in the course of trial and submitted that there were enough material to show that accused Nos. I and 2 being responsible for the assault made on the deceased and further submits thal accused Nos.l and 2 have been instrumental in eliminating the deceased at the instance of accusetl No.3, the

mother. It was fuither contended that the evidence was not properly appreciated by the trial Court and the judgment of acquittal has been passed in a mechanical manner.

10. However, perusal of the pleadings and the evidence which have come on record, prima facie, the complainant P.W.1 himself in his evidence before the trial Court has turned hostile and has not supported the case of the prosecution in any manner. So also' the evidence of P.Ws.2 to 12 i.e., all the material witnesses upon whom the prosecution was heavily relying upon to establish their case have all tumed hostile and have not supporled the case of the prosecution. Further, from the cross-examination that the prosecution has done so far as P.Ws.2 to 12 arc concerned, it would, in fact, reveal that except for a one line cross-examination which was in the same nature was put to all the 11 witnesses i'e', P.Ws.2 to 12, there does not seem to be any sound enough which the prosecution could get elicited from these witnesses' ln the absence ofany independent witnesses supporting the case of the prosecution, further in the absence of any material witnesses eticiting materials contrary to what they have stated in their

examination-in-chief and in the cross-examination that was conducted, it becomes difficult for the trial Court to reach to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond rea^sonable doubt.

I 1. It is well settled principle of law that in order to give a finding of the charge having been proved in a criminal case, the standartl of proof required is that of it being proved beyond reasonable doubt. [n the instant case, there is not one witness examined by the prosecution can be said to be an indcpendent witness who has supported the case of the prosecution or from whose cross-examination enough could be elicited to hold that the statement given by him is false or it being established that he was a material witness and he has proved his case from his cross_ examination. These facts are lacking in the instant case- Lacking to extent of even the complainant/appellant himself not supporting the case of the prosecution and in the said circumstances, it was difficult for the leamed trial Court to have reached to the conclusion that the chain of circumstances or the depositions of the material witnesses are all linking the charges leveled against the

accused persons, neither can it be said that from the materials, which are brought during the trial is strong enough to reach to the conclusion that the offence having not been done by any other person, but by the accused alone.

12. Having thoroughly perused the records, we even do not find any strong motive available for the accused persons to have committed the said offence except for the vague allegation by the complainant of cruelty and ill{reatment of accused No.3 at the hands of the deceased. We cannot brush aside the fact that the relationship between the deceased and accused No.3 is that of son and mother.

13. So far as interfering with the judgment of acquittal in an appeal by the trial Court, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions that unless there is substantial strong evidence which is not been appreciated by the trial Court and where the commission of offence by the accused is glaringly established, the judgment of acquittal is not be interfered as a matter of routine. fne ftonG6 Supreme Court in the case of

Ballu and Another v. State of Madhya Pradeshr in paragraph Nos.6 to 9 observed as under:

'S. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra2, wherein this Court held thus:

"152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 S;CC 71 : AIR '1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 1291. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of iater de<;isions up{o-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 551 and Ramgopat v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 :AlR 1972 SC 656]. tt may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case (1952) 2 SCC 7't : AIR 1952 SC 343 : '1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129j:

"lt is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature. the circumstances from '2024 SCC online SC 4gl ' lrea+; 4 scc I t6 = tgB rNSC 12l

which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved' ln other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

7. lt can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused 'must be' and not merely'may be' proved guilty before a court can convict the accused' lt has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved'. lt has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty' lt has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. lt has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the

innoc.ence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused.

8. lt is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

9. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or irnpossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena ofjudgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are as reproduced below:

"1 3. ln case of Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.F'. (2016) 4 SCC 357, the Supreme Court has held that:- "ln an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and !aw. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in taw to

r'-'

review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded."

14. Similar, ln case of Harljan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 665, the Supreme Court has held that:- "No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open far the appellate court to express the right conclusion after re-appreciating the evidence lf the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused.""

I I

14. In the given factual backdrop and the judicial precedents flowing from the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the subject matter and also on interfering with the judgment of acquittal and for the reasons narrated in the preceding paragraphs, we find it difTicult to interfere with the judgment of acquittal.

15. This Court, after considering the aforesaid legal proposition, as also the depositions of the material witnesses i.e., P.Ws.1 to 12, does not find any error on the part of the trial Court in reaching to the said conclusion of holding respondent Nos.2 to 5/accused Nos.l to 4 not guilty of the offences with which they were charged.

1,2

16. The appeal thus fails and is, accordingly, rejected. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed A.V.S.S.C.S.M. SARMA J REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// I I SECTION OFFICER To, '1. The Principal Sessions Judge, at Bhongir, yadadri Bhuvanagiri District.

2. The {udicial Magistrate of Flrst Class, Atair, yadadri Bhuvanaliri District.

3. The Station House Officer, Gundala police Station, yadadri Btiuvanagiri D istrict.

4. Two CCs to the Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. [OUT] 9 9n" QQ !o Sri Rapolu Bhaskar, Advocate IOPUC]

6. Two CD Copies Njb/gh {*

HIGH COURT DATED:0911212024 t I c- ,.

) ?1 FtB 2[25 {,t * *

JUDGMENT

\ '.,& .s FAf c CRLA.No.987 of 2024 REJECTING THE GRIMINAL APPEAL @ \11 i-\.W