Kasthuri Janardhan Reddy v. The State Of Telangana

I \ [ 3431 l tN rHE HlcH couRr fgE-rt{E sTArE oF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR _ PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY THE HoN,BLE sRIJUSTICE #TPo,o*o"u RAJESHWAR RAo LA.No.1 of 2024tNtAND CRIMINAL APPEAL No: 1055 of 2O24 Appeal under Section 4.13 of BNSS, 2023, against the Judgment dated 16-04-2024 passed in s.c.No.1g7 0f *,21 0n the fire of the court of the principar District and Sessions Judge, at Siddipet.

I Between:

Kasthuri Janardhan Redrtv ,,5/s...lrl3rayana Reddy, Age: 2g years. Occ E m p royee, r/o La xm idevip'a lv vtrrage, bId;,#i D;3iiA:ie ta n s a n a Private ...Appella nUCom pla ina nt AND ][:"TT"fl ];i*:iirli5r;PitsPubricProsecutor''l*:."Jx,::*.

2. Dongala Nars Occ: Private Telangana.

imulu @ Narsimha Reddv. s/o Narayan Reddy. Age 29 years. Emptoyee, r/o. laxmioevfaif -n,riigi-" 3,di,rplt' o,rt,,"t. Bonguram Linqa Reddv. s/o. Ramulu, Age: 23 years, Occ. Bolero Driver, r/o Laxmidevipaily Viilage, -Siddipet oistriit, T;ifi ,in"J.' " I Pathuri Sanleeva Reddv. s/ ,.ro r_,,,."'ri"i"ii;iii v:il'd;,6"ii;;ix,irr,#"ri*ffi;#J""^, occ contractor,

...Respondents/Accused

IANO:1OF 2024 Petition under Section. 413 of the BNSS praying f hat in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fi{ed in support of the &t,ir", the High C";; ;;;; pleased to grant reave to the frtitioner to r'ir"' crr*nar Appear against the Judgment dated 16-04-2024 pasied in s..rlnr-cIse No. 192 of 202r, bv the Court of the principat District and SessionsJuag., iiO-Oip"t '. -, (,'i

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. Ch. Satya Sadhan, representing Ms. B. Geetha Counsel for the Respondent No.1: Mr. M. Ramachandra Reddy, Additional Public Prosecutor The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT

^ TIIE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWARRAO I.A.No.l of 2024 IN/AND Crl.A.No.I055 OF 2024 .ITJDCMEN'I' (per Hon'ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy) Heard Mr. Ch. Satya Sadhan, leamed counsel represer)ting Ms. B.Geetha, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and the Mr. M.Ramachandra Reddy, Additional Public Prosecutor lirr respondent No. I /State. Perused the record.

2.

The present is an appeal which has been filed under Section 419(4) ol'the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2021. challcnging the judgment dated 16.04.2024 passed by the learncd l'rincipal District and Sessions Judge, at Siddipet in Sessions Casc No. I 97 o1202 I .

l.

Vide the impugned judgment, the learned trial Courr has tound rcspondent Nos.2 & 3/accused Nos.l & 2 in tlrc alirrcurentioncd sessions case not guilty of the ot'fences punishablc uncler Sections 302,201 and 120-8 of the IPC and has acrluittctl thenr o[' tlre charges levelled against them. Respondent No.4i

I accused No.J was found not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302 &. 120-8 of the IPC read with Section 109 of the IPC and was accordingly acquitted.

4.

The State has not challenged the judgrnent of acquittaL The instant is an appeal by lhe dc facto complainant, the brother-inlaw ofthe dcceased. It is a casc wherb the dead body ofthe Pathuri Raju was lound in a well in an open tleld on 16.04.2019. In the course o[ investigation f'rom tlre call data report of the mobile number uscd by the deceased, the respondents/accused were apprehended. Subsequent to their apprehension, based upon their confessional statements recorclcd. they were made accused in the said case. 1hc charge shcct u,as filed and the matter was put to trial beforc thc Sessions Courl at Siddipet where it was registered as S.C.No. 197 ol'202 l.

5.

The prosccution in all cxarnincd l7 witnesses as P.Ws.l to l7 and also exhibited as nrany as 99 documents as Exs.P-l to P-99. Twenty nrirterial ob.jects rvcre also collected and marked as M.Os.l to 20 durins tlrc coursc of trial. Meanwhile, no witnesses were exarnincd in sultport of' the dctence nor wer€ any documents

F,, marked or material objects produced in defence. After the conclusion of the trial, vide the impugned judgment, the hamed trial Court found the prosecution to have failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt so far as the involvement of the respondents/accused in the commission of the oflence is concerned and passed the judgment acquitting them ofall the charges levelled against them.

6.

The contention of the leamed counsel for the appellant/ conrplainant is that the learned trial Court has committed grave error in not properly appreciating the fact that it was a case of a cold blooded murder ol the deceased pathuri Raju. It was also the contention ol'the appcllant that the confession statement made by the accused persons befbre the investigating agency aM the witnesses produced by the prosecution was suffrcient to show that the ot-fence could had been committed by none else, but the rcspondents/accused thenrsel ves.

1.

-l he learned counse I tor the appellant/complainant also tried to canvass the point that since the prosecution case was not properly conclucted, lct the matter be rernanded-"back for fresh

i l I /1\ I trial and a fresh judgment be passed. However, perusal of the records would show that in the course of the trial, all the I material Tvitnesses, particularly the independent witnesses have I I not suppofted the case of the prosecution and have turned hostile. So much so, even the ofhcial witnesses have also not supported the case of the prosecution. ln the absence of any cogent strong materials strong enough to draw the only inlerence of the commissic',n of the of-tLncc only by the respondents/acsur.6 ..a none else, being available neither there being any rnaterial to show that the respondents/accused have any rnajor rolc played over the witnesses to tum hostile.

8.

Moreover, fiom the materials available on record, the FSL report also does not lcad us to any conclusion so as to upset the judgment of acquittal passed by tlrc learnctl trial Court. Neither has the prosecution been ablc to collect any linger prints to prove from any of the ,naterial objects which are saicl to have bcen used by the respondents/accused firr the pu4:rosc ot'conrrnission ol the offence which again makes thc prosccution case substantially rveak.

9.

Hence, except for the confession statement which itself was recorded in the premises of the police station and hence a weak piece of evidence, we do not find any other material available on record strong and cogenl enough to interfere with the judgment of t acquittal passed by the trial Court.

10. So far as interfbring with the judgment of acquittal in an appeal by the trial Court, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions that unless there is substantial strong evidence which is not been appreciated by the trial Court and where the commission ot'ollence by the accused is glaringly established, the judgmcnt o{- acquittal is not be interfered as a matter ol' routine. The I lon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ballu and Another v. Statc of Madhya Pradeshr in paragraph Nos.6 to 9 observed as under:

S. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court in the case I 2(t24 s( ('online SC 4ll I

c'

of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of wherein this Court held thus:

Maharashtra2, '152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AtR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 109.1 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar pradesh (1969) 3 SCC 198:1970 SCC (Cri) 551 and Ramgopat v. State of Maharashtra l(1972) 4 SCC 625 :AtR 1972 SC 6561. tr may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(i952) 2 SCC 71 :AtR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 1291:

'lt is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established. and all the facts so established should be mnsistent only with the hypothesis of the guitt of the accused. Again. the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. ln other 2 goal14 scc I l6 : t984 rNS(. Lzt-.

I words, there must be a chain of evidence so far / cornplete as not to leave any reasonabl€ ground for a ,d l conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

7. lt can thus clearly be seen that it is neoessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle l that the accused 'must be' and not merely 'may be' proved i guilty before a court can convict the accused lt has been I held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved'. lt has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty' lt has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypdhesis except i the one to be proved. lt has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused'

8. lt is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is An accused is

-r presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

9. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or l impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are as reproduced below:

'13. ln case ofSadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. (2016) 4 SCC 357, the Supreme Court has held that:- "ln an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only vvhen there is perversity of fact and !aw. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Cou( is to do substantial justice and avoid miscaniage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of .lustice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute reslriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded."

14. Similar, ln case of Harljan Bhala Teja v. State of Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 665, the Supreme Court has held that:-

I 'No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, t\i\ro views are possible, and the trial court has nI taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However' this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with' even if t \ ( the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record' or perverse, it is always open far the appellate court to express the right conclusion after re-appreciating the evidence lf the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused.""

i

11. In the given factual backdrop and the judicial precedents flowing from the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the subject matter and also on interfering with the judgment ol acquittal and for the reasonsnarratedintheprecedingparagraphs,welinditdifficultto interfere with the judgment of acquittal.

12. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not tind any case made out by the appellant herein to intert-ere rvith the impugned judgment.

13. I.A.No.l of 2024, which is a petition seeking tbr leave to frle criminal appeal, stands rejected and as a consequence, the criminal appeal stands rejected.

Qsnscqucntly, miscellaneous petitions pending, il' any, shall stand closed.

Sd/. K:. SRINIVASA RAO ..IOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// \ I ECTION OFFICER To, 1 The Principal District and Sessions Judge, at Siddipet (with records, if any) 2 The I Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Ctass, Siddipet.

3. The Station House Officer, Siddipet Rural Police Station, Siddipet District.

4. Two CCs to the Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad IOUT]

5. One CC to Ms. B. Geetha, Advocate IOPUC] 6 Two CD Copies kanr. slr a.

i { HIGH COURT DATED:18112t2024 1ilt"

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JUDGMENT

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l.A.No.1 of 2A24 IN/AND CRLA.No.1055 of 2024 c T THE I.A AND THE CRIMINAL APPEAL ARE REJECTED .d,.C }}