The Managing Director, Osmanabad Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. Mahadeo Shankar Mali And ORS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.829 OF 2013 The Managing Director, Osmanabad Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd.

Head Office, Main Road, Osmanabad, Tq. and District Osmanabad PETITIONER

VERSUS

1. Mahadeo S/o Shankar Mali, Age-49 years, Occu-Service, R/o Massa (Khandeshwari), Tq. Kalamb, Dist.Osmanabad,

2. Vijaykumar S/o Vishwanath Hanchate, Age-53 years, Occu-Service, R/o Vaibhav Niwas, Tambari Division, Near Bhosale High School, Osmanabad,

3. Mohan S/o Dadarao Aagawane, Age-36 years, Occu-Service, R/o Chinchpur (Dhage), Tq. Bhoom, Dist.Osmanabad,

4. Mandakini Haribhau Ambure (Dead) Through LR's 4A] Vijaykumar S/o Vishwanath Hanchate, Age-60 years, Occu-Nil, 4B] Vaibhav S/o Vijaykumar Hanchate, Age-34 years, Occu-Nil, 4C] Gauri Vijaykumar Hanchate, Age-22 years, Occu-Education, All 4A to 4C R/o Janta Bank Colony, Vaibhav Niwas, Tambari Division, Near Bhosale High School, Osmanabad, Tq and Dist.Osmanabad.

RESPONDENTS

WITH WRIT PETITION NO.4068 OF 2013 The Managing Director, Osmanabad Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd.

Head Office, Main Road, Osmanabad, Tq. and District Osmanabad PETITIONER

VERSUS

Mohan S/o Dadarao Aagawane, Age-37 years, Occu-Service, R/o Chinchpur (Dhage), Tq. Kalamb, Dist.Osmanabad RESPONDENT Mr.A.N.Irpatgire, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr.A.V.Patil, Advocate for the respondents.

( CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.) DATE : 14/10/2015 ORAL JUDGMENT :

1.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the parties.

2.

In both these petitions, the same petitioner Bank has assailed the judgment and order dated 25/07/2012 delivered by the Labour Court, Latur in Application (IDA) No.62/2004 (Old No.10/2003) and 20/2004 (Old No.02/2002), by which the claims of the respondents under Section 33(C)(2) of the I.D.Act, 1947 have been allowed. 3.

I have heard Mr.Irpatgire, learned Advocate for the petitioner,

who has strenuously criticized the impugned judgment and Mr.Patil on behalf of the respondents / employees. Since all the employees are identically placed and in employment with the same petitioner and since these matters involve an identical issue, I have heard the learned Advocates in both these petitions together. 4.

It is an admitted position that the petitioner has declined to pay bonus and ex-gratia @ 35% (both together) to the respondents purely on the ground of disciplinary proceedings having been initiated against them and they being negligent in their work. The contentions of the petitioner on this count are evident from paragraph Nos. 3 and 4 of the written statement, wherein it is specifically contended that these respondents are deprived of bonus / ex-gratia as they are undergoing disciplinary action. 5.

In paragraph No.5 of the written statement, the petitioner has stated that bonus and ex-gratia have been paid to all other employees, who are working diligently and have a clean past record. 6.

After hearing Mr.Irpatgire and Mr.Patil, it is evident that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against these respondents have been quashed and set aside before the Lower Court. The petitions

filed by the petitioner before this Court have been dismissed and the Special Leave Petitions preferred by the petitioner in the Apex Court have also been dismissed. In short, all these respondents/ employees cannot be said to have a blemished service record since the disciplinary proceedings have been reduced to a naught and no orders of punishment have been issued against them. 7.

These aspects have been considered by the Labour Court, which has allowed the claims of the respondents. I do not find that the conclusions of the Labour Court to this extent could be termed as being perverse or erroneous.

8.

The petitioner has put forth another grievance with regard to the amount of bonus / ex-gratia and the interest awarded by the Labour Court. He submits that the petitioner had declared 35% bonus / ex-gratia and not 38%. Mr.Patil concedes that the said amount was never @ 38%. The claims put forth by the respondents were on the basis of 35% bonus/ex-gratia and their calculations have also been on the said basis. He, therefore, submits that though the amounts granted by the Labour Court are not incorrect, it is mistakenly stated in the impugned judgment that 38% bonus exgratia is to be paid.

9.

Mr.Irpatgire has raised a grievance about interest of 10% granted by the Labour Court from the date of the Section 33(C)(2) applications. He submits that under no circumstances could this quantum of interest be made available to the respondents under any Law. So also, there is no justification as to why the Labour Court has granted interest @ 10% p.a. Mr.Patil has defended the grant of interest on the ground that the petitioner has made the respondents run from pillar to post in their endeavour to secure bonus / exgratia, which was lawfully payable to them. 10.

I find that the amount of unpaid bonus / ex-gratia has been correctly calculated by the Labour Court and the same is on the basis of 35% bonus / ex-gratia payable. It appears to be a typographical mistake in the impugned judgment that it is mentioned as 38%. 11.

So far as the interest amount is concerned, I find that the Labour Court has not dedicated even a single sentence in the impugned judgment to justify grant of interest. No doubt, the petitioner has kept the respondents engaged in litigation on various fronts. Nevertheless, a simple interest @ 4% p.a. would amount to a sufficient penalty to the petitioner for depriving the respondents of the said amounts.

12.

In the light of the above, these petitions are partly allowed only to the extent of reducing the interest from 10% p.a. to 4% p.a. The rest of the challenge of the petitioners stand rejected. 13.

In the event, the amounts as directed by the Labour Court with interest @ 4% is not paid to the respondents within 4 (four) weeks from today, the said amounts shall carry an interest @ 6% from the date of the applications of the respondents filed before the Labour Court.

14.

This Court had directed the petitioner to deposit certain amounts in this Court, out of which the respondents are allowed to withdraw some portion of the amount. As such, the respondents shall withdraw the remaining amounts from this Court with accrued interest. The remainder amounts, as directed above with interest, on the total amounts shall be calculated by the petitioner and the same shall be paid by the petitioner to the respective respondents, as directed above.

15.

Rule is made partly absolute in the above terms. ( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)