The President v. P.Natesan

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 12.07.2023 CORAM :

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.SURESH KUMAR and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.KUMARESH BABU W.A.Nos.1244 and 1245 of 2009 and M.P.Nos.1 and 1 of 2009 1.The President Thenkumari Educational Society (Running The Sivanthi Adithanar College), Nagercoil - 629 002.

2.The Secretary Thenkumari Educational Society (Running The Sivanthi Adithanar College), Nagercoil - 629 002.

...

Appellants in both appeals -Vs1.P.Natesan 2.The Director of Collegiate Education College Road, Nungambakkam Chennai - 600 006.

...

Respondents in both appeals Prayer : Writ Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order in W.P.M.P.Nos.1573 and 1574 of 2007 in W.P.Nos.7167 and 9242 of 1998 dated 06.03.2009.

For Appellants :

Mr.S.Subbiah, Senior Counsel for Mr.P.Raja For Respondents :

Mr.V.Vijay Shankar - for R1 Mr.K.V.Sajeev Kumar Special Government Pleader - for R2 1/23

J U D G M E N T

(Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.SURESH KUMAR, J.) These intra court appeals have been directed against the order passed in W.P.M.P.Nos.1573 and 1574 of 2007 in W.P.Nos.7167 and 9242 of 1998 dated 06.03.2009.

2. The appellant is the Management which runs a college called Sivanthi Adithanar College (hereinafter referred to as 'the Management'). The first respondent was the erstwhile Principal of the college (hereinafter referred as 'the employee').

3. The employee was serving as Principal of the Management college for several years. While so, the Management had placed him under suspension pending initiation or contemplation of enquiry into a disciplinary proceedings. The said order of suspension-cum-charge memo dated 08.05.1998 was under challenge in W.P.No.7167 of 1998. This Court, having entertained the said writ petition, granted an order of stay, ie., staying the operation of the suspension order.

4. While the said writ petition was pending and an order of stay granted by this Court was in effect, the Management proceeded to terminate the services of the employee by proceedings dated 29.06.1998. Challenging the said order of 2/23

termination, the employee filed another writ petition in W.P.No.9242 of 1998. Both the writ petitions were heard together and decided by a common order of the writ Court dated 11.02.1999. The learned Judge ultimately has passed the following order.

"

33. In view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and taking into consideration the fact of this case, I feel that the impugned orders cannot stand. The termination is in the nature of a stigma. Moreover, the order of suspension is also violative of the principles of natural justice. Impugned orders have been passed in violation of orders of this Court. They are also in contravention of Sec.19 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1974. I further find that the authority of the college committee to terminate the services of the petitioner is itself doubtful when the constitution of that Committee is the subject matter of a writ petition before this Court and interim orders have been obtained.

34. For the above reasons, I allow writ petition Nos.7167 and 9242 of 1998. Orders impugned therein are quashed. It is declared that the petitioner is entitled to continue as Principal of Sivanthi Adithanar College as before. Respondents are prevented from causing any obstruction to the petitioner discharging his duties as Principal of Sivanthi Adithanar College. No costs. Connected W.M.Ps. are closed."

6. Therefore, both the writ petitions were allowed by the learned Judge, pursuant to which the employee was taken back to service with effect from 31.03.2004 and he worked till 31.05.2004, the date on which since he attained superannuation, he retired from service. Since the employee was working after 3/23

reinstatement only for two months period, two months salary alone was paid by the Management and with regard to the backwages ie., the salary payable to the employee for the period between 1998 and 2004 since no such payment was made, the employee had sent a request letter on 15.07.2004 to the Management seeking to pay the arrears of salary for the said period from 1998 to 2004.

7. In response to the said letter of the employee, the Management had sent a reply on 27.07.2004 stating the following:

"

The students are remitting the fees for the current year. Admissions are going on. The teachers and other employees are also yet to be paid their salary. Sufficient funds are not available. You are required to wait for another month or two. Definitely we will clear your arrears as early as possible."

8. Despite the said reply given by the Management, directing the employee to wait for another month or two to clear the arrears payable to the employee, since nothing had come, he had sent another letter on 05.09.2004, where the employee has stated the following:

"

It is long since, my arrears of salary are pending. I have no pension or any other benefits. I am financially facing difficulties. Please be good enough to credit the arrears of my salary in my Account No.250100 immediately.

Thanking you, Yours faithfully, M.Natasan"

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9. Even thereafter, since no payment of arrears of salary was paid to the employee, he sent another letter on 01.11.2004, wherein he has stated the following:

"

Inspite of my repeated oral request for payment of my arrears of salary. You are always replying 'wait-wait'.

I silently and patiently waited for five months. During this period, I understand the Secretary has cleared salary arrears of the teachers and others who are in service to the tune of Rs.35 lakhs. I am retired, not in service. I am old. I find it difficult to manage. I request you to kindly disburse my arrears of salary as detailed below within a month. I hope my service your institution as founder Principal of the College for 20 long years will be recognized and respected and the Secretary shall not allow me to suffer further. If I am not getting relief within a month, excuse me Sir, I may have to seek remedy through appropriate forum.

April 2000 to March 2001 Rs.255000.00 April 2001 to March 2002 Rs.267435.00 April 2002 to March 2003 Rs.288390.00 April 2003 to December 2003 Rs.217485.00 ------------------ Total Rs.1028310.00 ------------------- Thanking you, Yours faithfully, (M.Natesan)"

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10. Despite these letter communications since the arrears of salary has not been paid to the employee, he issued a legal notice on 25.11.2004 asking the Management to pay the arrears to the extent of Rs.10,28,310/- within 15 days.

11. Despite these communications as well as legal notice since arrears was not paid to him, the employee moved contempt applications before the Division Bench of this Court.

12. It is pertinent to note here that, as against the order passed by the writ Court dated 11.02.1999, the Management filed intra court appeal in W.A.Nos.347 and 348 of 1999, which came to be dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 19.02.2004, with the following order: "

The appeals have no merit whatsoever. It is the admitted position that there was no prior approval obtained for suspending the petitioner and it is also pointed out that there was a stay order in W.P.No.7167 of 1998 and during the pendency of that stay application, the termination came to be effected by order dated 29.06.1998, which termination was obviously without jurisdiction of firstly, it was during the pendency of the stay order and secondly it was without holding any enquiry whatsoever.

2. In that view, the learned single Judge was correct in allowing both the writ petitions ie., first challenging the suspension and second one challenging the order of termination. The writ appeals have no merit and it is dismissed. No costs."

13. Since the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ Court was confirmed by the said order of the Division Bench dated 19.02.2004, the employee 6/23

filed contempt petitions before the Division Bench, where the Division Bench was informed by the employee that already clarification petitions, as an abundant caution, were filed by the employee to clarify the order for payment of the backwages. The Division Bench, which heard the contempt petitions, had permitted the petitioner ie., the employee to seek the clarification of the order and therefore no orders was passed further in the contempt petitions. It was further observed in the said order of the Division Bench that the contempt petitioner was at liberty to work out his rights thereafter in the manner known to law.

14. Therefore, the employee persuaded the clarification petition filed in M.P.Nos.1573 and 1574 of 2007 in W.P.Nos. 7167 and 9242 of 1998. The said miscellaneous petitions seeking clarification were posted before a learned Judge, as per the orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the learned Judge, who heard the said miscellaneous petitions, passed an order by way of clarification on 06.03.2009. The said clarificatory order passed by the learned Judge in the said miscellaneous petitions on 06.03.2009 is impugned in these writ appeals.

15. Questioning the said order passed by the learned Judge dated 06.03.2009, Mr.S.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Management has contended that the order passed by the writ Court originally in the two writ petitions filed by the employee by order dated 11.02.1999 having been confirmed by the order of the Division Bench dated 19.02.2004, it has got merged with the Division Bench order. When that being so, no clarification can be filed before the 7/23

learned Single Judge and moreover, when the employee filed contempt petitions, the Division Bench did not entertain the contempt petitions except giving liberty to the employee to pursue his clarification petition already filed to work out his remedy in the manner known to law, and that cannot ipso facto give any right to the employee to re-agitate the issue which has already been concluded by the orders of the writ court as well as the Division Bench to the extent to expand the scope of the relief that has already been given by the Division Bench seeking for the backwages.

16. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the very clarification petitions that have been filed before the learned Single Judge are not maintainable and in this context, even though some judgments have been cited by the Management before the learned Judge, those judgments as well as the legal proposition projected on behalf of the Management has not been considered by the learned Judge in proper perspective. Hence, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the reasons given by the learned Judge in entertaining the clarification petitions in the order impugned by taking aid of the liberty given by the Division Bench to the employee is an erroneous approach and therefore, for these reasons, the order impugned is liable to be interfered with, he contended.

17. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the following judgments.

● Dwaraka Das -Vs- State of Madhya Pradesh and another reported (1999) 8/23

3 SCC 500.

● Jayalakshmi Coelho -Vs- Oswald Joseph Coelho reported in (2001) 4 SCC 181.

● Ram Chandra Singh -Vs- Savitri Devi and Others reported in (2004) 12 S.C.C.713.

● Chandi Prasad and Others -Vs- Jagdish Prasad and Others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 724.

● Narpat Singh -vs- Rajasthan Financial Corporation reported in 2007 SCC Online 1580.

● State of Haryana -vs- M.P.Mohla reported in (2007) 1 SCC 457 ● Shiv Kumar Sharma -vs- Santosh Kumari reported in (2007) 8 SCC 600. ● Gangadhara Rao -vs- The Revenue Divisional Officer and another reported in 2011 (2) CTC 451.

18. On the other hand, Mr.Vijay Shankar learned counsel appearing for the first respondent employee would submit that, it is an admitted fact there has been no enquiry conducted before terminating the employee by the Management and in this regard, Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has been violated and despite the interim order of stay granted by this Court, which was in force against the very suspension ordercum-charge sheet, unmindful of the stay that was pending before this Court, the Management proceeded to terminate the services of the employee. Therefore, for these three gross violations on the part of the Management, the suspension ordercum-charge memo as well as the termination order would not stand in the legal scrutiny and this aspect having been considered, the learned Judge set aside those orders and allowed the writ petitions filed by the employee. 9/23

19. Learned counsel would also submit that, insofar as the payment of backwages is concerned, it is the settled proposition of law in service jurisprudence including the labour law issues that, whenever the termination is set aside on the basis of violation of the Statute, then it goes without saying that the employee is entitled to get reinstatement, of course with back wages. This proposition has been reiterated once again by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jayanthibhai Raojibhai Patel -vs- Municipal Council, Narkhed and Others reported in (2019) 17 SCC 184, wherein the learned counsel relied upon Paragraph 14, which reads thus, "

14. The Court laid down the following principles to govern the payment of back wages (Deepali Gundu Surwase case, SCC pp.356-58, para 38) 38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule."

20. In this context, the learned counsel for the employee would further submit that, even the clarification petitions that had been filed on behalf of the employee is uncalled for, but only as an abundant caution that has been filed. Even without a clarification petition, what has been ordered by the writ Court allowing the writ petitions filed by the employee, whereby the termination order was set aside, that would give a right to the employee to seek for reinstatement as well as back wages. This position has not been disputed initially by the Management, which is 10/23

evidenced from the letter correspondences between the Management and the employee and at one point of time, they turned back and re-agitated the issue saying that the clarification petitions, first of all, were not maintainable and assuming that the clarification petitions were maintainable, that cannot be made as a review application to review the order already passed by the writ Court, which got merged with the order of the Division Bench.

21. The said stand taken by the Management is against the settled proposition of law. Therefore, that has been rightly taken on and decided by the learned Judge, who passed the order impugned in the clarification petitions filed by the employee. Therefore, that order which is impugned herein is to be sustained and the employee is entitled to get the back wages, he contended.

22. We have considered the said rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials placed before this Court.

23. It is a fact that the employee was the Principal working in the college run by the Management. While that being so, initially a suspension order-cum-charge memo was passed against him by the Management, which was under challenge before this Court, where stay of the operation of the suspension order-cum-charge memo was granted by this Court. Once the suspension order is stayed, automatically the employee would be taken back to the job and everyday delay on the part of the Management in not taking the employee back into job, would cause 11/23

the damage to Management alone, as the Management has to pay the salary / back wages to the employee for such a period.

24. That apart, Section 19(3)(b) of the Act reads thus, "(b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher or other person shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher or other employee."

25. Therefore, no such suspension that has been made against the employee who was working as Principal in the college, whose service conditions are governed by the Act, shall remain in force for more than two months from the date of suspension, if the inquiry is not completed within that period and such person shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been reinstated.

26. Assuming that the order of suspension has been stayed by this Court, that would not automatically preclude the Management from initiating disciplinary proceedings which is a separate action. However, it is an admitted case on the part of the Management that no such enquiry was contemplated, no charge memo has been issued, served on him and no reply was given. Therefore, the fact remains that there was no enquiry conducted.

27. While the stay order granted by this Court was in force, the Management 12/23

proceeded to terminate the services of the employee abruptly without having conducted any enquiry.

28. In this context, Section 19(1) of the Act makes it clear that, before making an order of dismissal or removal of service, prior approval of the competent authority must be obtained. The relevant portion of Section 19 reads thus, "19. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other persons employed in private colleges.- (1) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority"

29. Here in this case, no such prior permission was obtained from the competent authority. Therefore, while making the suspension order as well as the dismissal order against the employee, the Management has committed the following violations. Firstly, the suspension order, though was stayed by the order of this Court, the employee was not reinstated. Secondly, when the order of suspension was under stay by the orders of this Court, without conducting an enquiry, the Management proceeded to terminate the services of the employee. Thirdly, whatever be the reason, even after conducting an enquiry, if an employee has to be removed from service, prior approval should have been obtained from the competent authority as per Section 19(1) of the Act. Such prior permission was also 13/23

not obtained by the Management.

30. For such series of violations on the part of the Management, the order of suspension-cum-charge memo as well as the termination order since would not stand in the legal scrutiny, the learned Judge, after having an exhaustive discussion in Para 33 and 34 of the order dated 11.02.1999, allowed those writ petitions by order dated 11.02.1999, which has already been extracted herein above.

31. While allowing the writ petitions, the learned Judge stated that, I allow the writ petition Nos.7167 an 9242 of 1998. The impugned orders are quashed. It is declared that the petitioner is entitled to continue as Principal of Sivandhi Adithanar College as before. The respondents are prevented from causing any obstruction to the petitioner discharging his duties as Principal of Sivandhi Adithanar College.

32. The meaning thereby is, in our considered view, that both the orders ie., the suspension order-cum-charge memo and termination order having been set aside and it has been declared by the learned Judge that the employee is entitled to continue as Principal of the College, the position that was available prior to the passing of those orders got restored. That is the reason that the learned Judge says he is entitled to continue as Principal of the College as before. That means, before passing of these orders ie., suspension order-cum-charge memo and termination order. Once the original position is restored, the employee is very well entitled to 14/23

seek the salary ie., back wages for the period he was out of employment despite the orders of stay granted by this Court.

33. Therefore, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the employee, the very filing of the miscellaneous petitions seeking clarification of the order passed by the learned single Judge is uncalled for.

34. Be that as it may. Those applications were filed which were pending and in the mean time, the employee had filed contempt petitions before the Division Bench, as the order of the learned single Judge has got merged with the order of the Division Bench by order dated 19.02.2004, where the Division Bench also found that, it is an admitted position that there was no prior approval obtained for suspending the employee and it is also pointed out that there was a stay order and during the pendency of that stay application, termination order came to be passed by order dated 29.06.1989, which termination was obviously without jurisdiction and it was during the pendency of the stay order, that too without holding any enquiry whatsoever. Therefore, the order passed by the learned single Judge in the writ Court was upheld by the Division Bench.

35. Only in that circumstances, contempt petitions had been filed after having written so many letters to the Management by the employee seeking for the back wages as he superannuated on 31.05.2004, only after rendering two months service from the date of reinstatement ie., 31.03.2004. 15/23

36. On 27.07.2004, a reply has been given by the College, where they have categorically stated that the employee has to wait for another month or two definitely the Management will clear the dues ie., arrears as early as possible. This position continued for some time as there had been letter correspondences and ultimately since the Management had not come forward to settle the dues ie, back wages, a legal notice was sent by the employee on 27.07.2004. Since that also did not evoke any response, he was constrained to file contempt petition and when the contempt petition came to be decided, the factor that the clarification petition filed by the employee was pending before the learned single Judge was taken into consideration and hence permission was given to the employee to pursue the said clarification petitions with a liberty to work out his rights thereafter in the manner known to law.

37. Only this aspect has been questioned by the learned Senior Counsel, who appear before us for the Management stating that, merely because permission was granted by the Division Bench in the Contempt Petition, the right of seeking review of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, which got merged with the order of the Division Bench cannot be taken by themselves and therefore, based on such a permission or liberty, the employee would not automatically get any right to reagitate any issue by merely filing a clarification petition. Only in that context, the learned Senior Counsel has cited the aforesaid judgments on behalf of the Management.

16/23

38. Some of the judgments cited before us had already been cited by the Management before the learned single Judge, who passed the impugned order, where those judgments having been considered, the learned Judge has given his reasons as to why such clarification petition has been entertained and allowed. Para 7 and 8 of the impugned order are usefully referred to herein. "

7.Though the proposition of law propounded in the judgment may not be contradicted, it must be stated that the Division Bench of this court in the contempt petition No.1151 of 2005, dated 24.07.2006 specifically permitted the petitioner to seek clarification before the single Judge and therefore, the respondents cannot have any objection about the nature of the petition. Once the said hurdle is removed, the only question was whether the payment of backwages to the petitioner was an issue before this court. As noted earlier, this court has consistently held in more than one decision that want of prior approval will make the order of termination void ab initio and the Teacher is consequently entitled for all benefits including the backwages.

Therefore, when this court allowed the writ petitions on that ground and that view has also been confirmed by the Division Bench, there is no escape for the Management from disowning their liability of payment of backwages. Though the order of this court, as extracted above, had not mentioned about backwages, it cannot be said that the intention was to deny the backwages. On the contrary, the respondent Management is fully aware of the liability towards the payment of backwages. Therefore, when they filed C.M.P.Nos.3602 to 3604 of 1999 in W.A.Nos.347 and 348 of 1999, challenging the order of the learned Judge, they also filed an affidavit sworn to by the respondents.

petitioner succeeding in the writ petition. The averments made in the affidavit, dated 18.02.1999 may be usefully extracted below: "14. ...Apart from that the question of relative hardship is in favour of the petitioner because even in the unlikely event of the writ petitioner succeeding in the writ petition, he can claim the monitory benefits due to him, if any. Now, he cannot enter into service on the basis of the order of the learned Judge."

As held by the Supreme Court in P.KASILINGAM VS. P.S.G.COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY (cited supra), if any termination under the Act is set aside, the Authority competent to decide the same must also deal with the question of backwages."

8.In the present case, excepting maintainability of the petitions, the respondents have not pleaded any other grounds to deny backwages. In the light of the same, these two petitions are allowed and it is hereby declared that the petitioner is entitled for backwages from the date of suspension, namely 08.05.1998 till the date of his reinstatement, namely 31.3.2004. The respondents are hereby directed to make such payment within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. This order will form part of the final order passed by this court in W.P.Nos.7167 and 9242 of 1998. However, there shall be no order as to costs."

39. Some more judgments also have been cited before us. We have gone through the said judgments. With respect, we observe that absolutely there has been no quarrel with the principles that have been laid down in those judgments. 18/23

40. In most of such cases, the right of the parties under Section 152 of C.P.C., has been considered. After a decree has been passed by the Civil Court, which got merged with the appellate court decree, subsequently whether by way of correction or error crept in the judgment and decree of the appellate court, whether it could be corrected by way of filing an application under Section 152 of C.P.C., was mainly considered in those judgments.

41. Here, the issue is entirely different. First of all, it was a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Secondly, even a clarification petition, if it is filed, that can only be filed and entertained under Article 226 alone. Thirdly, in our considered view, such a clarification petition need not have been filed or uncalled for.

42. The reason being for such of our observation is that, insofar as the order of termination made against the employee is concerned, it was in violation of the Statute as well as the orders of this Court, which we have discussed herein above. For those reasons, the learned Judge allowed the writ petitions by setting aside those order of suspension-cum-charge memo and the termination orders.

43. Once the order of suspension-cum-charge memo and termination order were set aside and it was declared that the employee was entitled to continue in the job as before, it goes without saying that the employee is entitled for such back wages. This position has been clarified by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme 19/23

Court in (2019) 17 SCC 184 (Jayanthibhai Raojibhai Patel -vs- Municipal Council, Narkhed and Others), as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the employee. Moreover, that proposition has been constantly followed by the law Courts in many orders and number of judgments have been rendered by the Apex Court also in that context.

44. Therefore, for the said relief of back wages, such a clarification in fact was not necessitated. Despite that, since such clarification petitions have been filed and it was directed to be decided by the orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, a learned Judge entertained the said applications and decided the same and has reiterated that, what has been allowed by the writ Court in those two writ petitions filed by the employee gives a right to the employee to seek for back wages also.

45. Without even having the order which is impugned herein, such a right conferred on the employee, in our considered opinion, cannot be taken away. Therefore, independently also the employee is entitled to get the back wages. The reason being that, firstly the employee was terminated from service during the pendency of the writ petition, where the earlier suspension order-cum-charge memo was stayed by this Court. Secondly, there was no prior approval from the competent authority under Section 19 of the Act. Thirdly, no disciplinary proceedings was conducted.

46. It is to be further noted that, if at all the learned Judge who passed the 20/23

order in the writ petitions by order dated 11.02.1999 thought of setting aside the orders and thereafter remitting back the matter to the Management for conducting the enquiry and complete the same to reach its logical conclusion, the learned Judge would have remitted the matter back to the Management for conducting an enquiry, but no such exercise has been undertaken by the learned Judge.

47. The learned Judge has simply set aside the order, declaring the legal position and the entitlement of the employee that he is entitled to continue as before. Therefore, it is an irresistable conclusion that the termination order was passed without enquiry, without getting prior approval from the competent authority and the termination order was passed during the pendency of the writ petition, where interim stay granted by this Court was in force.

48. For all these violations, the order terminating the services of the employee was set aside. Therefore, the employee, no doubt, was entitled to get back wages. This only has been reiterated by the learned Judge in the order dated 06.03.2009, for which also he has given elaborate and exhaustive reasons, which we find that, in the circumstances of the case, has become necessitated.

49. Therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel to state that the clarification petition has expanded the scope of the original order passed by the writ Court dated 11.02.1999, is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected. Consequently, these writ appeals do not have any merits to be 21/23

considered. Therefore, these appeals naturally have to fail. Hence, these writ appeals are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. As a sequel, the employee is entitled to get back wages for the period between 1998 to 2004 ie., the date on which he was suspended from service and the date on which he has been reinstated, with 6% simple interest per annum from the date the amount was due till the date of repayment, deducting the period of interim stay granted in these appeals was in force. (R.S.K.,J..) (K.B.,J.) 12.07.2023 Index : Yes Internet : Yes KST To The Director of Collegiate Education College Road, Nungambakkam Chennai - 600 006.

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R.SURESH KUMAR, J.

and K.KUMARESH BABU, J.

KST W.A.Nos.1244 and 12.07.2023 23/23