Pondy Die Castings P Ltd v. Appellante Assistant
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 27.10.2017
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SURESH KUMAR T.C.(Revision) Nos.37 and 39 of 2017 M/s.Pondy Die Castings (P) Ltd., Represented by its Director P.Prasad, S/o.A.Prabhakara Rao No.A1 and A2, Industrial Estate Sedarapet, Puducherry - 605 111 ... Petitioner in both the Tax Case Revisions versus Appellate Assistant Commissioner (Commercial Taxes) Puducherry ... Respondent in both the Tax Case Revisions Tax Cases (Revision) filed under C Rule (40)(1)(a) against the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Puducherry dated 17.03.2017 made in Tax Appeal Nos.14 and 15 of 2016 against the order dated 11.07.2016 passed in Appeal Nos. 4/CST/2016-2017/AAC and 5/CST/2016-2017/AAC by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT) Puducherry preferred against the Assessment orders dated 06.01.
2016 passed under the Commercial Tax Act 1956 for the assessment years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 by the Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer(IAC) For Petitioner : Mr.P.Suresh For Respondent : Mr.C.T.Ramesh, Government Advocate, Puducherry COMMON ORDER (Common order of the Court was made by S.MANIKUMAR, J.) Tax Case Revisions are filed against the order, dated 17.03.2017, made in Tax Appeal Nos.14 and 15 of 2016, by the Pondicherry Value Added Tax Appellate Tribunal, Puducherry.
2. As Tax Case Revision Petition Nos.37 and 39 of 2017, have been preferred on the same set of facts, submissions being common, they are taken up together and disposed of by this common order.
3.
Tax Case Revision Petitions have been filed, on the following questions of law:
(i) Whether the Assessing Officer has got power to pass the order for years 2004-2005 and 2005-06 on 06.01.2016 after almost 11 years from the end of the year which is beyond the period of limitation is sustainable in law?
(ii) Whether Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 read with Rule 5(6) and 5(10) of Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 is applicable to the petitioner's case that where, for any reason, the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of five years from the expiry of the year to which the turn relates, re-assess the tax?
(iii) Whether the assessing officer has got power to over look the provision of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 is unsustainable in law? (iv) Whether imposition of the additional tax @ 10% for non-submission of Form 'C' for CST sales made for the year 2004-2005 and 2005-06 is sustainable in law?
4. Brief facts leading to the revisions are that the Petitioner is a manufacturing unit of Pressure Die Castings and Aluminium Alloys with Tax Identification Number 34480004564 and Central Sales Tax Act Number 34480004564 dated 16.04.2008 under the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 registered on the file of the Commercial Tax Officer (lAC), Commercial Taxes Department, Puducherry. The said Unit was registered as a Small Scale Industry, registered with the Directorate of Industries, Government of Puducherry vide registration No. 59 03 3633 PMT SSI dated 20.08.1987.
5. The petitioner has paid taxes, as per the returns filed and also filed Audited Balance Sheet, Manufacturing, Trading Profit and Loss Account, Purchase Account, Sales Account for the period from April 2004-2055 and 2005-06. "C" Forms for CST sales were also filed before the Authority, while submitting the returns for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-06.
6. The assessing authority has not passed any order for the above said assessment years 2004-2005 and 2005-06. The reasons
for the same were not known. The Petitioner has been following with the assessing authority for the purpose of passing the assessment order, for the above said period. The Petitioner has submitted all the records and books, before the authority.
7. It is the case of the petitioner that the then assessing officer was transferred to other division in the same department. The incumbent officer issued notice dated 12.11.2015 for non-submission of "C" Forms to the tune of Rs.54,46,149/- and in the absence of "C" forms, the said authority imposed 10% to the tune of Rs. 5,44,615/-. Accounts relating to the assessment period is 2004-2005 and 2005-06, the notice issued by the authority is 12.11.2015. The accounts Manager of the petitioner unit left the job and a new person assumed office. The present accounts Manager has given a letter dated 21.11.2015 for extension of the time as the matter relates to 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 respectively. The accounts Manager was not aware of the facts that "C" forms were already submitted by the petitioner's company in the respective assessment years 20042005 and 2005-2006.
8. The assessing officer (lAC), Commercial Taxes Department, Puducherry, without considering the objections raised by the petitioner, unilaterally passed assessment orders dated 06.01.2016, by imposing 10% tax for "CST" sales for Rs.45,67,484/-, i.e. tax Rs.4,56,748/- for the period 2004-2005 and for CST sales for Rs.54,46,149/- CST imposed tax of Rs.5,44,615/- for the period 2005-2006, additionally without any authority.
9. Aggrieved against the same, the Petitioner filed Appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Puducherry by paying 12.5% of the disputed tax raising all grounds raised by the Petitioner before the Assessing Officer. The appellate authority, going through the records and submissions made by the Petitioner, passed a common order dated 11.07.2016, dismissing the appeals.
10. As against the same, petitioner filed Tax Appeals before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Puducherry in Tax Appeal No.14 and 15 of 2016. It is the case of the petitioner that the Appellate Tribunal, without considering the grounds raised by the petitioner confirmed the findings of the respondent by his order dated 11.07.2016. The petitioner has assailed the findings of the Appellate Tribunal on the following grounds: A. The impugned orders of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal confirming the orders of the Addl. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (lAC), Puducherry and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Puducherry and the respondent herein is totally incorrect, without
application of mind and is against the provisions of law.
B. The Appellate Tribunal ought to have seen that all the Original C Forms were filed by the petitioner at the time of completion of Assessment. But the then Assessing Officer has failed to pass the orders. After lapse of 11 years, the Assessing Officer has imposed the additional tax of 10% for non-production of "C" Form for CST sales for the year 2004-2005 and 2005-2006.
C. The "C" forms were filed before the Appellate Authority. The then assessing officer has not passed the Assessing Order for respective period 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. It is statutory duty of the Assessing Officer to pass the order after verifying the accounts and after collecting "C" Form etc. The petitioner was ready and willing to submit the duplicate "C" Form for the CST sales in respect of the Assessment year 2005-06 and approached the present Assessing Officer after receipt of the notice dated 12.11.2015. But, the authorities did not accept the "C" form.
D. The Appellate Tribunal ought to have seen that the petitioner is having the duplicate "C" form for the year 2004-2005 and 2005 - 2006. Both the Assessing Officer and the Appellate Authority refused to receive the same. As such, there is no illegality on the part of the petitioner.
E. Additional imposition of the Tax @ 10 % for non-production of the "C" form for CST sales of Rs.54,46,149/- and Tax of Rs. 5,44,615/- is illegal, unconstitutional, arbitrary and without any basis. F. The assessing authority passed the order for the year 2005-06on 06.01.2016 after almost 11 years from the end of the year, which is beyond the period of limitation and hence is bad in law and has to be considered as null and void.
The orders passed by the learned assessing authority beyond 5 years, from the end of relevant year is bad in law and null and void.
11. The Appellate Tribunal has failed to appreciate the fact that the assessing authority has not given sufficient opportunity to the dealer to furnish the duplicate portion of "C" despite the fact that the dealer has repeatedly requested the assessing authority for extending the time to furnish the forms. Original portion of Form "C" declarations were submitted before the Assessing Authority at the relevant point of time (i.e. at the time of assessment for the year 2005-2006.
12. The Appellate Tribunal has failed to appreciate the fact that the assessing authority is not correct in stating that the dealer has not filed the forms in response to the notices, as the dealer, in fact has responded and submitted "C" Forms for the entire CST sales at the time of assessment for the year 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. The assessing officer has not passed the order and misplaced C Forms and again issued notice to submit "C" Forms for CST sales made for the year 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, and has sought further time for filing the duplicate forms for the inter-state turnover value of Rs.54,46,149/-.
13. The dealer had been closely following the matter with the customers for submission of forms and that the dealer was unable to furnish the forms due to various genuine reasons beyond his control which had been expressed to the assessing authority including administrative reasons of the issuing government authority and all the above had contributed to the inability of the dealer in submitting C-Forms to the assessing authority, before passing the order.
14. The appellate authority erred in upholding the assessment order as it is only fair and proper to consider the duplicate forms submitted before the appellate authority. The petitioner has relied on the following decisions:
(1) State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and company [1982 51 STC 381 (Mad)],
(2) State of AP v. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Production Ltd. {1994 AIR 2364 (SC),
(3) R S Cotton Mills v. The State of Punjab [CWP No. 12426of 2008 9HC - P&H)],
(4) Prestolite Of India Limited v. The State Of Haryana And Ors. [198870 STC 198 (P H)], and
(5) Larsen & Toubro Ltd., v. Orissa Sales Tax Tribunal & others [(2008)15 VST 484 (Orissa)].
15. The Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer-IAC, Pondicherry, has filed a counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent and denied the averments. According to him, the Petitioner filed returns for the assessment years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, which were admitted provisionally pending submission of the declaration forms as the case be, under Rule 12(7) of the CST (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, which mandates filing of declaration Forms C/F/H/l /E1/E2 to the prescribed authority within three months after the end of the period to which the declaration forms relates i.e on or before 30th June of the succeeding assessment year. Failure to file the declaration forms within the prescribed time will make the dealer liable to pay tax 'at the scheduled rates applicable to the goods inside Union Territory of Puducherry.
16. As per section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, every dealer, who makes inter-state sales to a registered dealer
shall pay the tax at the concessional rate, provided they produce Form-C declaration obtained from the prescribed authority of purchasing dealer at the time of assessment. As per Rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules 1957, to avail the concessional rate of tax, the dealer has to submit the declaration in Form-C to the prescribed authority or Assessing Officer within three months after the end of the period to which the declaration or the certificate relates.
17. The Assessing Officer has scrutinized the returns filed by the Petitioner for the above said assessment year and it was found that the Petitioner had effected interstate sales and Export of goods to other States and country respectively. In order to claim concession/ exemption against the interstate sales/export, the petitioner has to file Form-C and proof of export pertaining to the above said assessment year on or before 30th June of every year respectively, for the assessment years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 respectively. However, the petitioner had furnished C-forms for certain interstate transactions and failed to furnish Declaration Forms for the remaining transactions. Therefore notices were issued to the Petitioner with a direction to produce relevant Declaration Forms for completion of assessment.
18.
Despite several notices issued and even after a lapse of nine years, the Petitioner has not responded and submitted the required declaration forms. Thereafter, pre-assessment notices dated 12.11.2015 were issued to the above said assessment year to the petitioner with the proposed higher rate of tax, instead of concessional rates or exempted rates as claimed by the petitioner. Further, the petitioner was also directed to file his objection if any on or before 19.11.2015. In response to the pre-assessment notice, the petitioner sought for extension of time for submitting declaration forms vide his letter dated 21.11.2015. As requested the assessing officer has extended time upto 07.12.2015 to produce the declaration Forms. 19.
Even though, sufficient time was given for furnishing the declaration forms, but till the date of finalizing the assessment order, the Petitioner has not furnished the required forms for claiming concession/ exemption. Therefore, the Assessing Officer had no other alternative and finally determined the total and taxable turnover for the assessment year 2004-2005 under CST Act, 1956 and PGST Act, 1967 and raised CST demand of Rs.4,80,477/-. Similarly, for 2005-06 under CST Act, 1956 and PGST Act, 1967 and raised CST demand of Rs.5,05,228/ -.
20. The petitioner filed appeals before the Appellate Asst. Commissioner against the order of the Assessing Officer for the assessment years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. After hearing both sides and taking into consideration of all the relevant facts put forth by the Assessing Officer as well as the Petitioner, the appellate authority confirmed the assessment orders passed by the Assessing Officer and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the same T.A. Nos.14 and 15 of 2016 have been filed before the Appellate Tribunal and the same was dismissed.
21. The respondent has further submitted that the statutory forms pertaining to the years ought to have been furnished by the Petitioner on or before 30th June of every year, as per above said Rules. Further, the assessing officer has no dispute over the returns submitted and turnover reported by the petitioner during the assessment years and therefore the returns were admitted by the assessing officer provisionally pending submission of the Declaration Forms as the concessional rate claimed are subject to production of Declaration Forms. Without producing the required Declaration forms, the petitioner has availed the concessional rate of tax.
22. As per the CST Act, 1956, furnishing of statutory Form is mandatory on the part of the petitioner, even after lapse of nine years the petitioner failed had to submit the entire Cforms for assessment without valid justification. Therefore, the allegation made by the petitioner in Ground (B) that all Original C-forms were filed by him at the time of completion of the Assessment is totally false. Since, the petitioner had furnished C forms only for the portion of the interstate sales turnover, the Assessing Officer had rightly imposed higher rate of tax for non-production of C-Forms for the year 2004-2005 and 2005-06, by way of an assessment order.
23. The respondent has further submitted that the assessing officer after granting adequate opportunity, scrutiny of the accounts and on collecting salable Forms submitted by the dealers for the interstate effected at the concessional rates passed the assessment order imposing higher rate of tax for nonproduction of C-Forms. Further, the request of the petitioner to accept duplicate part of the C-Form cannot be entertained as law mandates that assessment of interstate sales turnover at concessional rate can be made only on submission of original portion of the C-Forms. Therefore the Ground (C), (D) and (E) are liable to be rejected.
24. As regards limitation, the respondent has contended that Rule 5(6) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules 1967 states that after the end of the year the assessing authority
shall after scrutiny of accounts assess under a single order the tax or taxes payable under the Act for the preceding year or for the year to which the return submitted relates. The said Rule only says that an order has to be passed after the close of the year and it does not specify any time frame. The CST assessment order passed for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 respectively were passed, after the close of the year and does not contravene the said Rule. Rule 5(10) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules 1967 speaks about reassessment to assess the escaped turnover. The said rule says that such reassessment shall be done within five years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates. The assessment order dated 06-01-2016 is not a reassessment order, but it is the first assessment order and therefore the time limit specified in Rule 5 (10) of the CST (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 does not applies to the case on hand.
25. The respondent has further submitted that the statutory forms pertaining to the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, ought to have been furnished by the Petitioner on or before 30th June of every year, as per Rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules 1957. Further, the petitioner has filed returns without furnishing of C forms, but availed concessional rate of tax and therefore it is mandatory on the part of the petitioner to produce original C forms declaration and that he has no right to avail the concessional rate of tax without furnishing the requisite declaration Forms. However, even after ample time and opportunity granted to produce the CForms for more than 9 years for the assessment related to the year 2005-06, the petitioner has not produced the requisite forms.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer has issued preassessment notice dated 12.11.2015 granting time upto 19-112015. Even after 9 years lapsed, the petitioner has requested further time. However, in order to follow due process of law and natural justice, the Assessing Officer has granted time upto 07.12.2015. But, the petitioner did not submit any C form even after the issue of the pre-assessment notice dated 12.11.2015.
26. The respondent has further submitted that the petitioner has furnished C forms only to a portion of the interstate sales turnover to the assessing officer. The Assessing officer imposed higher rate of tax for the interstate sales turnover for which C-Forms were not submitted. Therefore, the averments made by the petitioner that the assessing officer has not passed the order and misplaced the Form-C and again issued notice to submit the Form-C for the CST sales made for the year 2005-06 is false and denied. Moreover, the petitioner neither in the grounds of appeal filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT) nor in the affidavit filed before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had mentioned that he had already submitted C Forms to the Assessing Authority. On the contrary the petitioner at para 6 of the grounds of appeal filed before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner (CT) and at para 2, 4 and 6 of the grounds of appeal filed before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Puducherry had stated that if time was granted he would submit the C forms and further stated that Assessing Authority had not appreciated the efforts taken to obtain the C forms from the consumer. Therefore the claim of the petitioner that he had already submitted the C forms is contrary to his submission made before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT) and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (STAT) and hence the averment is false.
27. The Assessment orders dated 06.01.2016 for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 were passed after granting adequate opportunity. The petitioner was granted nine years time and therefore the contentions made by the petitioner that the Appellate Tribunal erred in upholding the assessment order, which had not granted time is contrary to facts.
28. Furnishing original C forms is mandatory and not a mere procedural aspect to support the genuineness of the transactions and does not alter the character of the transaction of sale to registered dealers as alleged by the petitioner. The orders of the assessing authority are in consonance with the Act and Rules and as such the averments of the petitioner in Paras 7,9 and 10 of the Grounds are of no relevance and liable to be rejected. Citations relied on by the petitioner were not applicable to the present case except the below case.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Limited reported in (1994) 94 STC 410 has observed that:- "This power can of course be exercised only where sufficient cause is shown by the dealer for not filing them up to the time of assessment before the first assessing authority. If in a given case, a dealer had obtained further time from the first assessing authority and yet failed to produce them before him, it is obvious that the appellate authority would adopt a stiffer standard in judging the sufficient cause shown by the dealer for not producing them earlier. It is necessary to reiterate that receipt of those forms in appeal cannot be a matter of course, it should be allowed only where sufficient cause is established by the dealer for not producing them before the first assessing authority as contemplated by Rule 12(7)."
30.
As per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the appellate authority shall not accept declaration forms, unless he is satisfied there was sufficient cause for not producing the same before the assessing officer. The assessing officer has given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, but till the
date of finalizing the assessment order i.e. after a lapse of nine years, the petitioner has not produced the required declaration forms. For the above said reasons, the respondent has prayed for dismissal of the Tax Case revision petitions. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
31. As both the assessment orders for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, are similar, suffice to consider one such order of the Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer IAC) for the assessment year 2005-2006, is as follows:
GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY COMMERCIAL TAXES DEPARTMENT PROCEEDINGS OF THE ADDL. DY. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER (IAC) Station : PUDUCHERRY
Present
: Tmt. V.Jayabarathi Date : 06/01/2016
1. Assessment Number and year : CST 2496/2005-06
2. Name of the Assessee(s) : PONDY DIE CASTINGS
3. Nature of the Business : Manufacturers of Aluminium and Zinc Rough Castings
4. Place of Business : A1 & A2 Industrial Estate Sedarapet, Puducherry
5. Turnover reported Total Turnover : Rs.1,03,96,233.00 Taxable Turnover : Rs.1,01,03,359.00
6. Turnover Determined Total Turnover : Rs.1,05,82,118.00 Taxable Turnover : Rs.1,05,82,118.00
7. Document produced in support : Form XVII and Declaration Form submitted by the dealer Note: An appeal against this order can be filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner within 30 days of receipt of this order.
M/s PONDY DIE CASTINGS, Puducherry, Manufacturers of Aluminium and Zinc Rough Castings at A1 & A2 Industrial Estate, Sedarapet, Puducherry have reported in their Returns a Total and Taxable turnover of Rs.10582118.00 and Rs.10289244.00 claiming exemption on a turnover of Rs.292874.00 in the annual return in Form 1 filed under the CST Act 1956 for the year 2005-06.
The details of the Turnover Reported is as follows:- Tax Period Total Turnover reported Taxable Turnover reported April 2005 to March 2006 Rs.1,03,96,233/- Rs.1,01,03,359/- The check of accounts (Form XVII) and the Declaration forms submitted by the dealer reveals the following:- The details of the Turnover Determined is as follows:- Sl.
No.
Item Turnover Rs.
Rate of Tax Rs.
Output Tax Rs.
Total Sale of Aluminium and Zinc Rough Castings reported as per Returns 10582118.00 2.
Sale of Aluminium and Zinc Rough Castings supported by Form-C @ 1% 4843095.00 1% 48431.00 3.
Sale of Aluminium and Zinc Rough Castings not supported by FormC taxable @ 10% 5446149.00 10% 544615.00 4.
Exports not supported by Documents @ 10% 292874.00 10% 29287.00 Total 10582118.00 622333.00 The dealer has to file Form 'C' / Form 'I' / Form 'F' for the concessional rate of tax claimed for the turnover reported and determined as above. Rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax Registration and Turnover Rules 1957 mandates filing of the declaration in Form 'C'/'F'/'I' as the case may be, to the prescribed authority within three months after the end of the period to which the declaration forms relates. However inspite of several reminders, the dealer has not filed C, F, I Forms for the year 2005-2006 till date for some of the transactions as stated above.
Finally the dealer was issued a pre assessment Notice dated 12/11/2015 for the year 2055-06 and therefore, it was proposed to assess the turnover reported by them at a higher rate of tax,
instead of concessional rates or exempted rates as claimed by the dealer. The details of the proposition as proposed in the notice is summarised as follows:- Total and Taxable Turnover proposed Total Turnover Proposed : Rs.10582118/- Taxable Turnover Proposed : Rs.10582118/- Exempted Turnover Proposed : Nil Tax Due : Rs.622333/- Tax Paid : Rs.117105/- Balance Tax to be paid: Rs.505228/- The dealer was asked to file their objection, if any, to the above proposal along with required documents on or before 19/11/2015. It was clearly stated in the notice that. In case no objection is received, orders will be passed accordingly, without further notice.
The dealer had requested for extension of time vide their letter dated 21.11.2015. The dealer was given further extension of time up to 07/12/2015 to produce the declaration form. Even after considering their request, and reasonable opportunity been given and further extension of time granted to the dealer, they have not turned up and not produced any further forms in support of their claim of connectional rate of tax. As the assessment cannot be prolonged further, and the dealer had more than 10 years to produce the C Forms, the proposition of tax as per Notice is hereby confirmed and the dealer is finally assessed as follows:
Sl.
No.
Item Turnover Rs.
Rate of Tax Rs.
Output Tax Rs.
Sale of Aluminium and Zinc Rough Castings supported by Form-C @ 1% 4843095.00 1% 48431.00 2.
Sale of Aluminium and Zinc Rough Castings not supported by Form-C taxable @ 10% 5446149.00 10% 544615.00 3.
Exports not supported by Documents @ 10% 292874.00 10% 29287.00 Total
Total Turnover Proposed : Rs.10582118/- Taxable Turnover Proposed : Rs.10582118/- Exempted Turnover Proposed: Nil Tax Due : Rs.622333/- Tax Paid : Rs.117105/- Balance tax to be paid: Rs.505228/- For this a notice in Form 3 is issued separately. ADDL. DY. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER-IAC PUDUCHERRY To M/s.PONDY DIE CASTINGS A1 & A2 Industrial Estate Sedarapet Puducherry FORM - 3 Notice of Final Annual Assessment and Demand under Rule 5(6) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1963 issued under Sections 13(3) and 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956) [See rule 5(6)] CST.2496/2005-06 Joint/Deputy/Assistant ADDL. DY. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER (1AC) To M/s.
PONDY DIE CASTINGS A1 & A2 Industrial Estate Sedarapet, Puducherry Take notice that you have been finally assessed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, to a tax of Rs.622333.00 for the year ending the 31st March 2006 and that, after deducting the total amount of the monthly payment(s) already made by you towards the tax for that year you have to pay a (further) sum of Rs.
by crossed postal order or to the J.C.T.O./Deputy Commercial Tax Officer/ Assistant DY.COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER (1AC) or to the headman of or to the bill collector failing which the amount will be recovered as if it were arrear of land revenue and you will be liable to fine as provided in rule 11 of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1963. Turnover as determined by the assessing authority in respect of, -- ---------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- Name of goods Rate of Tax Turnover (1) (2) (3) ---------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- -As per Assessment Order - ---------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- Place: Pondicherry Date: 06/01/2015 ADDL. DY.
COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER (1AC) PONDICHERRY ---------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- Note:- Where payment is made by cheques, the cheques shall be crossed and shall be such as under compilation of Treasury Rules is receivable by the Government treasury concerned.
32. For the assessment year 2004-2005, the Assessing Officer, imposed tax of Rs.4,80,447/- on the total Turn Over of Rs.69,37,400/- and issued a demand notice dated 06.01.2016 demanding balance tax amount of Rs.3,87,374. For the returns filed for the assessment year 2005-2006, imposed total tax of Rs.6,22,333/- on the total Turn Over of Rs.1,05,82,118/- and issued a demand notice dated 06.01.2016 demanding balance amount of Rs.5,05,228/-. For the returns filed for the assessment years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, in time, pre-assessment notices have been issued only in the year 2015. As per Section 2(k) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, "year" in relation to a dealer, means the year applicable in relation to him under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State, and where there is no such year applicable, the financial year.
33.
Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, deals with the rates of tax on sales in the course of inter-state trade or commerce and the same reads as follows:- "8. Rates of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce- (1) Every dealer who in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, sells to a registered dealer goods of the description referred to in sub-section (3); shall be liable to pay tax under this Act, which shall be three per cent, of his turnover or at the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State under the Sales Tax Law of that State, whichever is lower 3 Provided that the Central Government may, by notification In the Official Gazette, reduce the rate of tax under this sub-section.
(2) The tax payable by any dealer on his turnover in so far as the turnover or any part thereof relates to the sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce not falling within sub-section (1), shall be at the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State under the sales tax law of that State.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, a dealer shall be deemed to be a dealer liable to pay tax under the sales tax law of the appropriate State, notwithstanding that he, in fact, may not be so liable under that law.
(3) The goods referred to in [***] sub-section (1)- (a) (Deleted from 1st April 1963);
(b) are goods of the class or classes specified in the Certificate of Registration of the registered dealer purchasing the goods as being intended for re-sale by him or subject to any Rules made by the Central Government in this behalf, for use by him in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale or [in the telecommunications network or] in mining or in the generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power;
(c) are containers or other materials specified in the Certificate of Registration of the registered dealer purchasing the goods, being containers or materials intended for being used for the packing of goods for sale;
(d) are containers or other materials used for the packing of any goods or classes of goods specified in the certificate of registration referred to in clause (b) or for the packing of any containers or other materials specified in the
Certificate of Registration referred to in clause (c).
(4) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to any sale In the course of inter-State trade or commerce unless the dealer selling the goods furnished to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner a declaration duly filled and signed by the registered dealer to whom the goods are sold containing the prescribed particulars In a prescribed Form obtained from the prescribed authority.
Provided that the declaration is furnished within the prescribed time or within such further time as that authority may, for sufficient cause, permit.
34. Section 9 of the Central Sales Act, 1956 speaks about levy and collection of tax and the same is extracted here under: "9. Levy and collection of tax and penalties.-
(1) The tax payable by any dealer under this Act on sales of goods effected by him in the course of interState trade or commerce, whether such sales fall within clause (a) or clause (b) of section 3, shall be levied by the Government of India and the tax so levied shall be collected by that Government in accordance with the provision of sub-section (2), in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced: 3 [Provided that, in the case of a sale of goods during their movement from one State to another, being a sale subsequent to the first sale in respect of the same goods and being also a sale which does not fall within sub-section (2) of section 6, the tax shall be levied and collected- (a) where such subsequent sale has been effected by a registered dealer, in the State from which the registered dealer obtained or, as the case may be, could have obtained, the form prescribed for the purposes of 4 [sub-section (4) of section 8] in connection with the purchase of such goods; and (b) where such subsequent sale has been effected by an unregistered dealer in the State from which such subsequent sale has been effected.]
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the authorities for the time being empowered to assess, re-assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under general sales tax law of the appropriate State shall, on behalf of the Government of India, assess re-assess, collect and enforce payment of tax, including any 5 [interest or penalty,] payable by a dealer under this Act as if the tax or 6 [interest or penalty] payable by such a dealer under this Act is a tax or 7 [interest or
penalty] payable under the general sales tax law of the State; and for this purpose they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under the general sales tax law of the State; and the provisions of such law, including provisions relating to returns, provisional assessment, advance payment of tax, registration of the transferee of any business, imposition of the tax liability of a person carrying on business on the transferee of, or successor to, such business, transfer of liability of any firm or Hindu undivided family to pay tax in the event of the dissolution of such firm or partition of such family, recovery of tax from third parties, appeals, reviews, revisions, references, 8 [refunds, rebates, penalties,] 9 [charging or payment of interest,] compounding of offences and treatment of documents furnished by a dealer as confidential, shall apply accordingly: Provided that if in any State or part thereof there is no general sales tax law in force, the Central Government may, be rules made in this behalf make necessary provision for all or any of the matter specified in this sub-section.
(2A) All the 2 [provisions relating to offences, interest and penalties] (including provisions relating to penalties in lieu of prosecution for an offence or in addition to the penalties or punishment for an offence but excluding the provisions relating to matters provided for in section 10 and 10A) of the general sales tax law of each State shall, with necessary modifications, apply in relation to the assessment, re-assessment, collection and the enforcement of payment of any tax required to be collected under this Act in such State or in relation to any process connected with such assessment, reassessment, collection or enforcement of payment as if the tax under this Act were a tax under such sales tax law.]
(2B) If the tax payable by any dealer under this Act is not paid in time, the dealer shall be liable to pay interest for delayed payment of such tax and all the provisions for delayed payment of such tax and all the provisions relating to due date for payment of tax, rate of interest for delayed payment of tax, of the general sales tax law of each State, shall apply in relation to due date for payment of tax, rate of interest for delayed payment of tax, and assessment and collection of interest for delayed payment of tax under this Act in such States as if the tax and the interest payable under this Act were a tax and an interest under such sales tax law.]
(3) The proceeds in any financial year of any
tax, 4 [including any interest or penalty] levied and collected under this Act in any State (other than a Union Territory) on behalf of the Government of India shall be assigned to the State and shall be retained by it; and the proceeds attributable to Union territories shall form part of the Consolidated Fund of India."
35. Rule 9 of the Central Sales Tax, 1956, deals with levy and collection of tax and penalties and sub-Section (2) of the said read thus:
"Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the authorities for the time being empowered to assess, reassess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under the general sales tax law of the appropriate state shall, on behalf of the government of India, assess, re-assess, collect and enforce payment of tax, including any interest or penalty, payable by a dealer under this Act is a tax or interest or penalty, payable by such a dealer under this Act is a tax interest or penalty payable under the general sales tax law of the state and for this purpose they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under this act is and for this purpose they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under the general sales tax law of the state; and the provisions of such law, including provisions relating to returns, provisional assessment, advance payment of tax registration of the transferee of any business, imposition of the tax liability of a person carrying on business on the transferee of, or successor to such business, transfer of liability of any firm or Hindu undivided family, to pay tax in the event of the dissolution of such firm or partition of such family recovery of tax from third parties appeals, reviews, revisions, references, refunds, rebates, penalties, charging or payment of interest compounding of offences and treatment of documents furnished by a dealer as confidential, shall apply accordingly."
36. Rule 11 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, deals with determination of turn over. For better appreciation Rule 11 is extracted here under: Determination of Turnover - 11(1) The period of turnover in relation to any dealer liable to pay tax under this Act shall be the same as the period in respect of which he is liable to submit returns under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State:
PROVIDED that in relation to a dealer who is not
liable to submit returns under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State, the period of turnover shall be a quarter ending on the 30th June, 30th September, 31st December and 31st March as the case may be, in a financial year.
37.
Rule 5(6) of the of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 reads as hereunder:
"After the close of the year the assessing authority shall after such scrutiny of the accounts and after such enquirq as he considers necessary satisfy himself that the return or returns filed are correct and complete and finally assess under a single order the tax or taxes payable under the act for the preceding year or for the year to which the return submitted relates, as the case may be" 38.
Rule 5 (10) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 reads as hereunder:
"Where, for any reason, the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of five years from the expiry of the year to which the return relates, re-assess the tax due after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary and after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such reassessment."
39. Rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 provides as follows:-
12. (1) The declaration and the Certificate referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 8 shall be in Forms C and D respectively:
.........
.........
(7) The declaration in Form C or Form F or the Certificate in Form E-J or Form E-JJ shall be furnished to the prescribed authority within three months after the end of the period to which the declaration or the certificate relates:
Provided that if the prescribed authority is satisfied that the person concerned was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing such declaration or Certificate within the aforesaid time, that authority may allow such declaration or Certificate to be furnished within such further time as that authority may permit.
40. Returns for the assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06, have been submitted in time, ie., after the closure of the year, ie., "financial year". Pre-assessment notices have been issued, after a decade. Contention of the revenue is that for the first assessment, there is no limitation and it can be done, at any time. Before embarking on the issue, let us consider few decisions, on the interpretation of the statute. (i) In the words of Tindal, C.J., in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & F 85], wherein, he said thus, "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves so alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. (ii) In Nairin v. University of St.
Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice."
(iii) In Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand reported in AIR 1946 PC 51, the Hon'ble Mr.S.R.Das, held as follows:
"The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction."
(iv) In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "It is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself." (v) What is the spirit of law, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R.Das in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh reported in AIR 1954 SC 749, said that, "The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be
given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the Sections of the Act."
(vi) In Hari Prasad Shivashanker Shukla v. A.D.Divelkar reported in AIR 1957 SC 121, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined."
(vii) In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction.
It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the, Act purports to remedy and correct."
(viii) In Attorney-General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in (1957) 1 All.ER 49, Lord Somervell of Harrow has explained unambiguous, as "unambiguous in context". (ix) In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety.
(x) In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr.Vijay Anand Maharaj reported in AIR 1963 SC 946, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"But it is said, relying upon certain passages in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, at p, 68, and in Crawford on "Statutory Construction' at p. 492, that it is the duty of the Judge "to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy," and for that purpose the more extended meaning could be attributed to the words so as to bring all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute even though outside the letter, if within its spirit or reason. But both Maxwell and Crawford administered a caution in resorting to such a construction. Maxwell says at p.68 of his book:
"The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words."
Crawford says that a liberal construction does not justify an extension of the statute's scope beyond the contemplation of the Legislature.
The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. It is a well recognized rule of construction that the meaning must be collected from the expressed intention of the Legislature."
(xi) In Namamal v. Radhey Shyam reported in AIR 1970 Rajasthan 26, the Court held as follows:
"It was observed by Pollock C. B. in Waugh v. Middleton, 1853-8 Ex 352 (356):-- "It must, however, be conceded that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be properly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it." And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry, v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):-- "The
mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated." Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed as follows:-- "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further."
11. Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) at page 226 observes thus:-- "The rule of strict construction, however, whenever invoked, comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important, and it is by the light which each contributes that the meaning must be determined. Among them is the rule that that sense of the words is to be adopted which best harmonises with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and object of the legislature. The paramount object, in construing penal as well us other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent and the rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to have their full meaning, or the more extensive of two meanings, when best effectuating the intention. They are indeed frequently taken in the widest sense, sometimes even in a sense more wide than etymologically belongs or is popularly attached to them, in order to carry out effectually the legislative intent, or, to use Sir Edward Cole's words, to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy."
(xii) In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s.Mangal Sen Shyamlal reported in 1975 (4) SCC 35 = AIR 1975 SC 1106, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is. not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, "ut res magis valiat quam pereat", lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air."
(xiii) In C.I.T., Madras v. T.Sundram Iyengar (P) Ltd., reported in 1976 (1) SCC 77, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, it would be wrong to discard the plain meaning of the words used, in order to meet a possible injustice.
(xiv) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance. (xv) In LT.-Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India reported in 1983 (3) SCC 140, the Hon'ble Apex Court, at Paragraph 8, held as follows:
"8. The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. ..........If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed. This necessitates examination of the broad features of the Act."
(xvi) In Philips India Ltd., v. Labour Court reported in 1985 (3) SCC 103, the Hon'ble Apex Court, at Paragraph 15, held as follows:
"(15) No cannon of statutory construction is more firmly, established than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as 'elementary rule' (See Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All.ER 497]) and as a 'settled rule' (See Poppatlal Shall v. State of - Madras [1953 SCR 667 : AIR 1953 SC 274]). The only recognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: 'it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers' (Quoted with
approval in Punjab Breverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 3 SCR 370 : (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165])."
(xvii) In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 1979, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context. (xviii) It is a well settled law of interpretation that "when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, ie., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. Reference can be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India reported in AIR 1992 SC 1981.
(xix) In M/s.Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise and others reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716 = AIR 1993 SC 2288, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, where the words of the statute are plain and clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation, which are merely presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The Court would interpret them as they stand.
(xx) In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom....
37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. ......But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act."
(xxi) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in
the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the laguage of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise.
The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected."
(xxii) In Narendra H.Khzurana v. Commissioner of Police reported in 2004 (2) Mh.L.R. 72, it is held that it must be noted the proper course in interpreting a statute in the first instance is to examine its language and then ask what is the natural meaning uninfluenced by the considerations derived from previous state of law and then assume that it was property intended to leave unaltered. It is settled legal position, therefore, that the Courts must try to discover the real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact. (xxiii) In Nathi Devi v.
Radha Devi Gupta reported in AIR 2005 SC 648, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "The interpretation function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent, it is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used.
If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional."
(xxiv) In Nathi Devi's case, it is further held that, "It is equally well-settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors."
(xxv) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the "language" is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.
14. Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.....
15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by "an alert
recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so". (See Frankfurter: "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.)
16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980 (1) All.ER 529] (All ER at p. 542c-d):
"It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest.
19. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [1977 (2) SCC 273] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation."
(xxvi) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous."
(xxvii) In A.N.Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh reported in AIR 2006 SC 2677, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to.
Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions."
(xxviii) In Adamji Lookmanji & Co. v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2007 Bom. 56, the Bombay High Court held that, when the words of status are clear, plain or unambiguous, and reasonably susceptible to only meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be paid to what has been said in the statute, as also to what has not been said. (xxix) In State of Haryana v. Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "One of the basic principles of Interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words.
If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity."
(xxx) In Visitor Amu v. K.S.Misra reported in 2007 (8) SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute."
(xxxi) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows: "52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd."
(xxxii) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear." (xxxiii) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2009 (3) SCC 553]
180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision."
(xxxiv) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise-Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907]
13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission - Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678]"
(xxxv) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors. reported in 2010 CIJ 273 SC (1), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an
interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be."
41.
It is well settled that Tax Laws have to be given strict construction and interpretation. Reference can be made to few decisions.
(i) It is said that tax and equity are strangers, vide Partington v. Attorney General (1869) LR 4 HL 100 Lord Cairns, expressed thus:
"If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind. On the other hand if the Court seeking to recover the tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be".
(ii) The principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes was best enunciated by Rowlatt, J., in Cape Brady Syndicate v. IRC reported in (1921) 1 KB 64:
In a taxing statute one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied.
(iii) In State of Punjab v. Jullunder Vegetable Syndicate reported in AIR 1955 SC 1295, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in taxing statutes the language cannot be strained. (iv) In A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1957 SC 657, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that, "If the Revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the taxing statute no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter."
(v) In Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh Vs. The Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., reported in AIR 1961 SC 1047, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:
"In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed: it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency."
(vi) In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mr.P.Firm, Muar reported in AIR 1965 SC 1216, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that equity is out of place in Tax Laws.
(vii) In Income Tax Office, Tuticorin v. T.S.Devinatha Nadar reported in AIR 1968 SC 623, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, if the words of a taxing statute fail, so must the tax and the Courts cannot, except rarely and in clear cases, help the draftsman by a favorable construction. After considering the statement of Rowlatt, J., it held thus, "These principles have been accepted as correct both by the English Courts and the superior courts in this country. It is now well settled that if the interpretation of a fiscal enactment is in doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject should be adopted even if it results in obtaining an advantage to the subject; the subject cannot be taxed unless he comes within the letter of the law and the argument that he falls within the spirit of the law cannot avail the department."
(viii) In CIT v. Madho Prasad Jatia reported in 1976 (4) SCC 92, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that there could be no consideration of equity if the language of the provision was plain and clear, but where it was not, and two interpretations were possible, the one in consonance with equity and fairness should be preferred.
(ix) In Mathuram Agrawal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1999) 8 SCC 667, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"The intention of the legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the
provisions particularly where the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose of the statute more than what is stated in the plain language. It is not the economic results sought to be obtained by making the provision which is relevant in interpreting a fiscal statute. Equally impermissible is an interpretation which does not follow from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. Words cannot be added to or substituted so as to give a meaning to the statute which will serve the spirit and intention of the legislature. The statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax, the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid.
If there is any ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the needful in the matter." (x) In Raghunath Rai Bareja Vs.
"40. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and the foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statue. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India (AIR 2004 SC 4219).......
(xi) Thus from the foregoing judgments, it is clear that the well settled principles in tax law are, (i) There is no equity in tax, and the principle of strict or literal construction applies in interpreting tax statutes. Hence, on the plain language of the statute, if the assessee is entitled to two benefits, he has to be granted both these benefits.
(ii) If there are two reasonable interpretation of taxing statutes, the one in
favour of the assessee has to be accepted.
42.
Submission of returns in time, has not been disputed by the respondent. Contention of the petitioner that 'C' Form Declarations for all transactions were already submitted at the time of assessment, and some of them were lost by the assessing officer is not substantiated. As rightly contended by the respondent, if all the Form-C declarations were already submitted then, there is no reason for asking time, and allege denial of opportunity. During the course of argument, submission was made that the returns submitted for the subsequent years from 2006-07 onwards, have been assessed and orders passed. Rule 5(6) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 states that after the closure of the year, the assessing officer shall after such scrutiny of the accounts and after such enquiry as he considers necessary satisfy himself and complete and finally assess under a single order the tax or taxes payable under the Act for the preceding year or for the year to which the returns submitted relates, as the case may be. 43.
In a given case, the assessee would not have registered, as a dealer, under the provisions of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and the department may initiate proceedings, for levy of tax and such other action, as the case may be, and in response to the same, the dealer may offer his explanation or file returns. In the instant case, it is the case of the revenue that returns were provisionally admitted.
44.
The words, "after the closure of the year", and tax or taxes payable under the Act "for the preceding year" or for the years, for which, returns were submitted, casts a duty on the assessing authority to pass an order, in the following year, for which, returns have been submitted by an assessee. When the assessing officer has assessed the returns for the subsequent years from 2006-07 onwards, there is no reason as to why he has not passed orders on the returns submitted by the assessee for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 respectively, immediately, excepting to state that the assessee did not respond to the notices, nor submitted the 'C' form declaration.
45. In India, financial year commences from 1st April to 31st March of every year. The assessment year would begin after the financial year ends, which means, for the turn over of any preceding year, assessment has to be made immediately. As per Rule 5 of Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1957, after the close of the year, the assessing authority, shall, after such scrutiny of the accounts and after such enquiry, as he considers necessary, satisfy himself that the return or returns filed are correct and complete and finally assess under a single year that tax or taxes payable under the Act for the preceding year or for
the year to which the returns submitted relates, as the case may be.
46.
The expression, "for the preceding year or for the year, to which, the returns submitted relates, as the case may be", cannot be read to mean any year, excluding the expression, "after the close of the year", in the instant case, 2004-05 and 2005-06 respectively. As stated supra, returns for the assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06 respectively, have been submitted in time. Therefore, after the close of the year, the assessing officer, after scrutiny of the accounts and after such enquiry, ought to have passed the assessment orders, in the following year. The intention of the legislature is that after the close of the year, assessment has to be done and tax, if any, should be collected from the assessee.
47.
Assessment cannot be carried forward, at any time. The word, "and", used in Rule 5(6) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967, with the expression, after the closure of the year in the opening sentence and the duty cast upon the assessing officer to scrutinize the accounts and after conducting any enquiry, necessary for passing an order, for the preceding year or for the year to which, returns are submitted, has to read conjunctively and cannot be read disjunctively, meaning thereby, that immediately after the submission of returns, assessment has to be done and orders passed and not at any time, as submitted.
48.
Merely because the assessee has not submitted Form 'C' declarations within time, that would not empower the Assessing Officer to pass the order of assessment at any time and in the case on hand, a decade after the submission of the returns for the assessment years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. Contention of the respondent that no time limit has been prescribed in the statute for the first assessment and Rule 5(6) of Pondicherry General Sales Tax Rules, 1957 only states that an order of assessment has to be passed after the closure of year and that such assessment order can be passed at any time, cannot be accepted for the reason that Tax Laws have to be interpreted in strict sense and no liberal construction and interpretation, are permissible.
49. As per Section 2(k) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, "year", in relation to a dealer, means the year applicable in relation to him under the General Sales Tax Law of the appropriate state and where there is no such year applicable, the financial year. As per Section 2(u) of the then Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 1967 "year" means, the financial year. In Rule 5(6) of Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, the expressions, "after the close of the year" and "for the preceding year" have been used, meaning thereby, assessment has
to be done, for the financial year, ending with March of every year, in the following year. Both the expression, "after the close of the year" and "for the preceding year or the year for which returns are submitted", require strict and literal construction and not liberal construction.
50.
The contention that no time limit is prescribed for initial assessment, in our considered view, would amount to substituting the words, "for the preceding year or for the year to which the return submitted relates, as the case may be" as "any year", for which, the returns are submitted. The existing provision Rule 5(6) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 and the provision, according to the respondent, would be, as hereunder:
Existing Rule 5(6) of the Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967 Provision, according to the respondent After the close of the year the assessing authority shall after such scrutiny of the accounts and after such enquirq as he considers necessary satisfy himself that the return or returns filed are correct and complete and finally assess under a single order the tax or taxes payable under the act for the preceding year or for the year to which the return submitted relates, as the case may be"
After the close of the year the assessing authority shall after such scrutiny of the accounts and after such enquirq as he considers necessary satisfy himself that the return or returns filed are correct and complete and finally assess under a single order the tax or taxes payable under the act for any year."
51.
The Hon'ble Apex Court held that substitution or addition should not be made to a statute by process of interpretation. Reference can be made to few decisions, (i) In CIT v. Badhraja and Company reported in 1994 Supp
(1) SCC 280, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain meaning of the Section used by rewriting the Section or substituting the words in the place of actual words used by the legislature.
(ii) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as
possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there."
(iii) In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court held that, "So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own."
(iv) In Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission reported in (2007) 3 SCC 720, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "It is well settled that courts will not add words to a statute or read into the statute words not in it. Even if the courts come to the conclusion that there is any omission in the words used, it cannot make up the deficiency, where the wording as it exists is clear and unambiguous. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule-making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules." (v) In Mohan v.
State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 9 SCC 431, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, " There is no mention in Section 11-A that the period after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the publication of any corrigendum to the said declaration has also to be excluded. We will be adding words to the statute if we put such interpretation to Section 11-A, and it is well settled that the court should not add or delete words in a statute.
52. If initial assessment is permitted to be done, at any time, say in the case on hand, after a decade, after the submission of the returns, for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 and if for any reasons, the whole or part of the turn over is assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable then, it would give leverage to the Taxing Authority, to do assessment, as in the case on hand, after 10 years and re-assess upto a further period of another five years, on the whole, 17 years.
53.
When a statute mandates re-assessment to be done, within five years, it cannot be contended that assessment can be done at any time. When the assessee is mandated to submit returns, within a prescribed period and the Assessing Officer has to scrutinise the accounts and to conduct any enquiry, if he considers necessary and pass an assessment order, levy tax, if any and collect the same, after the close of the financial years, it cannot be contended that initial assessment can be made at any time. In the light of the decisions stated supra, in particular, Taxing Laws, we are of the view that orders of assessment for the years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, are not in conformity with Rules 5(6) of Central Sales Tax (Pondicherry) Rules, 1967, and that the same are liable to be set aside.
54. Accordingly, both the Tax cases are allowed. Orders impugned before us are set aside. Substantial questions of law 1 to 4, are answered in favour of the assessee. No costs. s/d- Assistant Registrar True Copy Sub-Assistant Registrar skm/asr To 1.The Chairperson, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal Chennai.
2. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (Commercial Tax), Puducherry.
3. The Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer(IAC) +1 CC to Ms. P. Suresh, advocate sr 76181.
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