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Madras High CourtSA/532/2016dismissed

M.C.Sekar v. Municipal Commissioner

2016-06-23Honourable Mr Justice K. Ravichandrabaabu3 pages

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 23.06.2016

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.RAVICHANDRABAABU Second Appeal No.532 of 2016 and C.M.P.No.9536 of 2016 C.Sekar ` ... Appellant/Defendant vs.

Municipal Commissioner, Municipal Office,By-pass Road, Hosur.

...Respondent/Plaintiff

Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 19.09.2014 made in A.S.No.6/2013 on the file of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hosur, confirming the judgment and decree dated 07.08.2012 passed in O.S.No.237 of 2000 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Hosur. For Appellant : Mr.R.Venkatavarthan For Respondent : Mr.P.Srinivas

J U D G M E N T

This Appeal is filed by the defendant challenging the concurrent finding rendered by the Courts below in a suit for recovery of money.

2(i) The plaintiff is the Hosur Municipality and the defendant is the successful bidder in an auction conducted by the plaintiff Municipality for collecting toll in the bus stand for the period from 01.04.1998 to 31.03.1999 for a sum of Rs.4,00,500/-. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant has only paid a sum of Rs.1,98,790/- in total, on various dates upto 30.07.1998 and failed to pay the balance amount with interest. Therefore, the said suit was filed for recovery of a sum of Rs.3,28,725/- comprising of principal sum of Rs.2,41,010/- and interest at the rate of 18% per annum on such principal amount.

2(ii). The defendant contested the said suit. It is his contention that even though the license period was for one year commencing from 01.04.1998 to 31.03.1999, he was not able to collect the toll from the buses at the rate specified in the auction notification since the bus stand, though claimed to be an A-Grade Bus stand, was in fact, classified as A-Grade bus stand only at a later point of time, i.e., on 02.11.1998. Therefore, it is contented that he is not liable to pay the amount due to the Municipality for the period commencing from 01.04.1998 to 01.11.1998.

3. The trial Court, after hearing both parties and considering the evidence let in on both sides, found that the defendant having collected the toll from 01.04.1998 till 29.11.1998, is liable to pay the sum of Rs.94,887/- with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 30.11.1998 till the filing of the suit and thereafter, at the rate of 9% per annum till the date of decree and thereafter at the rate of 6% till the full payment is made. Challenging the said judgment and decree, the defendant filed the Appeal before the First Appellate Court.

the First Appellate Court, though confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court insofar as the decretal amount is concerned, has however, modified the decree of the trial court insofar as the interest part of it is concerned, by holding that the defendant is liable to pay interest at the rate of 9% from the date of filing of the suit till the date of the decree and thereafter 6% from the date of the decree till the date of realisation. Challenging the said judgment and decree of the Courts below, the present Second Appeal is filed before this Court.

4. I heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent and perused the materials placed before this Court.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the AGrade certificate was not issued by the Panchayat Municipality during the relevant point of time and it was delayed by nearly 7 months and therefore, the defendant could not collect the toll from the bus stand and thus, he contended that the defendant cannot be directed to pay the license fee for the whole period.

6. First of all, the above contentions raised by the appellant is purely on factual aspects of the matter which the Courts below have considered in detail and decided against the defendant, based on the evidence let in by the parties. Though the learned counsel for the appellant invites this Court's attention to the evidence of P.W.1 to suggest as if P.W.1 has

admitted that the defendant has not collected the rent or toll from the buses at the relevant point of time, I do not think that the learned counsel is right in contending so, while reading the evidence of P.W.1, which only referred to the representation made by the defendant as if he has not collected the rent for that period. Hence, such testimony of P.W.1 is not sufficient to hold that the defendant has not collected the toll at the relevant point of time, without there being any third party witness supporting the case of the defendant that no toll was collected at the relevant point of time. It is needless to say that the representation of the defendant is a self-serving document with which one cannot rely to hold that he has not collected the toll at all during such time.

At any event, these factual aspects of the matter have been gone into by the Courts below in detail and found against the defendant. Under these circumstances, I find that no substantial question of law arises for consideration to entertain this Second Appeal. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

Sd/- Assistant Registrar(CS V) //True Copy// Sub Assistant Registrar vsi To

1. The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hosur.

2. The Subordinate Judge, Hosur.

1 cc to M/s.C.Uma, Advocate, sr.35145 1 cc to Mr.P.Srinivas, Advocate, sr.35142 Second Appeal No.532 of 2016 ug co kra 20.07.2016