Madras High CourtWP/44019/2016dismissed

Mellow Agro Tech Private Ltd v. The Presiding Officer

2016-12-22Honourable Mr Justice S. Manikumar,Honourable Mr Justice M. Govindaraj11 pages

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Dated: 22/12/2016 C O R A M The Honourable Mr.Justice S.Manikumar and The Honourable Mr.Justice M.Govindaraj Writ Petition No.44019 of 2016

1. Mellow Agro Tech Private Limited rep. by its Director Mr.David Samuel No.54/43 "O" Block Ganapathy Colony 36th Street Anna Nagar East Chennai 600 101.

2. Mr.David Samuel Director Mellow Agro Tech Private Limited Flat No.207 Shri Mahalakshmi Malikai Joshi Housing Limited 6/38 J Rathnavel Pandian Road Golden George Nagar Mugappair East Chennai 600 107.

3. Mr.Dilip Kumar R. Khatri Director Mellow Agro Tech Private Limited No.4-A Manohar Avenue Casa Major Road Egmore Chennai 600 008.

...

Petitioners Vs

1. The Presiding Officer Debts Recovery Tribunal No.2 No.770 A, 4th Floor Dewa Towers Anna Salai Chennai 600 002.

2. The Recovery Officer Debts Recovery Tribunal No.2 No.770 A, 4th Floor

Dewa Towers Anna Salai Chennai 600 002.

3. Bank of Baroda Adyar Branch rep. by its Branch Manager AnuArcade No.1, 15th Cross Street Shastri Nagar Adyar Chennai 600 020.

...

Respondents Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records from the first respondent relating to impugned order in O.A.No.141 of 2013 dated 4/5/2016 and quash the same and consequently permit the petitioners to cross examine P.W.1 (Branch Manager, Bank of Baroda, Adyar Branch, Chennai 20, who sworn the proof affidavit.) For petitioners ...

Mr.A.Ramaswamy - - - - - -

O R D E R

(Order of the Court was made by S.Manikumar,J) Order impugned in this writ petition is made in O.A.No.141 of 2013, dated 4/5/2016, by the Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Chennai, by which, the Tribunal has granted the following reliefs:- "20. In the result, application is allowed as under:- a. The applicant is entitled to recover a total sum of Rs.1,14,65,373/- (Rupees One Crore Fourteen lakhs sixty five thousand three hundred and seventy three only) with rate of interest @ 12% p.a. (simple) in respect of cash credit facility, term loan and other receivables from the defendants 1 to 3 jointly and severally from the date of OA till the date of realisation, together with costs. The sum of Rs.13,50,000/- being the sale proceeds of hypothecated goods in auction had to be adjusted towards loan account on the appropriate date.

(b). The applicant bank is directed to file costs memo within two weeks of the receipt of this order;

21. Issue recovery certificate in favour of the applicant bank in terms of this final order."

2. When the matter came up for admission, when we posed a question to the learned counsel for the petitioners as to whether the order impugned before us is appealable under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, or not, the reply was in the affirmative.

3. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, reads as hereunder:- "Appeal to Appellate Tribunal -

(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed) to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal:

[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower:] [Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty percent, of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less:

Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five percent of debt referred to in the second proviso].

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,

1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder."

4. Repeatedly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when there is an efficacious and alternate remedy, under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act or Securitisation And Reconstructions of Financial Assets Act, 2002, as the case may be, writ petition is not maintainable. We deem it fit to consider the following decisions.

(i) In Precision Fastenings v. State Bank of Mysore, reported in 2010(2) LW 86, this Court held as follows: "This Court has repeatedly held in a number of decisions right from the decision in Division Electronics Ltd. v. Indian Bank (DB) Markandey Katju, C.J., (2005 (3) C.T.C., 513), that the remedy of the aggrieved party as against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act is to approach the appropriate Tribunal and the writ petition is not maintainable. The same position has been succinctly stated by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Transcore v. Union Of India (2006 (5) C.T.C. 753) in paragraph No. 26 wherein the Supreme Court has held as under: - "The Tribunal under the DRT Act is also the Tribunal under the NPA Act.

Under Section 19 of the DRT Act read with Rule 7 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (1993 Rules), the applicant bank or FI has to pay fees for filing such application to DRT under the DRT Act and, similarly, a borrower, aggrieved by an action under Section 13(4) of NPA Act was entitled to prefer an Application to the DRT under Section 17 of NPA."

(ii) In Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, reported in 2010 (5) LW 193 (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:

"16. The facts of the present case show that even after receipt of notices under Section 13(2) and (4) and order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. Only a paltry amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid by respondent No.

1 on 29.10.2007. She did give an undertaking to pay the balance amount in installments but did not honour her commitment. Therefore, the action taken by the appellant for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) and by filing an application under Section 14 cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground and, in our view, the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by entertaining the writ petition of respondent No. 1.

17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc.

, the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

18. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for re-dressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens.

In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1=1999-2-L.W. 200 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.

interest, pass appropriate interim order.

27. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.

28. Insofar as this case is concerned, we are convinced that the High Court was not at all justified in injuncting the appellant from taking action in furtherance of notice issued under Section 13(4) of the Act.

29. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Since the respondent has not appeared to contest the appeal, the costs are made easy."

(iii) In Saraspathy Sundararaj v. Authorised Officer and Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, reported in (2010) 5 LW 560, the Court held as follows:

"The petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the possession notice dated 16.09.2004 issued by the respondent under the SARFAESI Act and consequently direct the respondent to effect the settlement in accordance with the SBI OTS-SME 2010 Scheme as contained in its letter dated 18.03.2010 and unconditionally restore physical possession of the six rooms taken physical possession by it at No. 29, Sarojini Street, T. Nagar, Chennai - 17 with such damages. ... When a specific forum has been created which enables the borrower to challenge the action of the financial institution by filing necessary petition under Section 17, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. What could not be achieved by the petitioner by filing a petition before the appropriate Forum, which is at present barred by period of limitation, could not be permitted to be achieved by extending the jurisdiction conferred

to this Court under Article 226 of The Constitution of India. Above all, since the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the loan by transferring the property in favour of her son, this Court is not inclined to entertain the petition.

7. In this connection, we are fortified by the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others) III (2010) BC 495 (SC) = 20105-L.W. 193, wherein in para Nos. 17 and 18, it was held thus:- "17. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc.

and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters.

Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order, (underlining added).

9. In the light of the above decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, the writ petition filed by the petitioner seeking to set aside the possession notice issued to her long back is legally not

sustainable. We are of the considered view that this petition has been filed only to drag on the proceedings and to evade repayment of the loan. That be so, the petitioner has no legal right to compel the bank to accept the one time settlement offer made by her.

13. The present case is identical in nature and it is covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court mentioned supra. In this case, the petitioner has violated the condition of mortgage by transferring the secured asset in favour of her son and therefore, as per clause 1.7 of the OTS Scheme offered by the bank, the petitioner has to be excluded from extending the benefits of the scheme which was rightly done by the bank. In any event, without exhausting the alternative remedy, the relief sought for by the petitioner by invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of The Constitution of India cannot be granted."

5. In the light of the above decisions, writ petition is dismissed.

No costs.

Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.

Sd/- Asst.Registrar /true copy/ Sub Asst. Registrar mvs/ars To

1. The Presiding Officer Debts Recovery Tribunal No.2 No.770 A, 4th Floor Dewa Towers Anna Salai Chennai 600 002.

2. The Recovery Officer Debts Recovery Tribunal No.2 No.770 A, 4th Floor Dewa Towers Anna Salai Chennai 600 002.

3. The Branch Manager Bank of Baroda Adyar Branch AnuArcade No.1, 15th Cross Street Shastri Nagar Adyar Chennai 600 020.

+1cc to Mr.A.Ramaswamy, Advocate sr.74753 Writ Petition No.44019 of 2016 ca(co) ss(24/01/2017)