S.R.Sekar v. V.Nambirajan And 4 Others

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 01-07-2026

CORAM

THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE A.D.MARIA CLETE A No. 4497 of 2025 in C.S. No. 104 of 2025 S.R.Sekar S/o.Mr.Subbu, No.97, Kalaignar Street, Gandhi Nagar, Nallambakkam, Kancheepuram District-600127.

..Applicant(s) Vs

1. V.Nambirajan S/o Vellaiyan, No.6/3, Nithayalakshmi Plot Ananda Ramarishnan St.,, Devaraj Nagar, Dasarathapuram, Saligramam, Chennai -93.

2. South Indian Artistes Association No.21, Habibullah Road, G-1, Nandha Apartments, T.Nagar, Chennai 17, Rep. By Its General Sercretary.

3. The President South India Artistesassocation, No.21, Habibullah Road, G-1, Nandha Apartments, T.Nagar, Chennai 17.

4. The General Secretary South Indian Artistes Association, No.27, Habibullah Road, G-1, Nandha Apartments, T, Nagar, Chennai 17.

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5. The Treasurer South Indian Artistes Association, No.16, Habibullah Road, T.Nagar, Chennai 17 ..Respondent(s) PRAYER: To Reject the Plaint in C.S.No.104 of 2025 on the file of this Honble Court.

For Applicant(s):

M/s. Puhazh Gandhi Bhavani Devi Ak Teja For Respondent(s):

Mr.Thoma T.Jacob for R1.

Mr.Krishna Ravindran for R2 to R5.

ORDER

The present application is filed by the fifth defendant under Order XIV Rule 8 of the Original Side Rules, read with Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking the rejection of the plaint in C.S.No.104 of 2025. The applicant seeks rejection of the plaint on two grounds, namely that it does not disclose any cause of action within the meaning of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC and that the suit is barred by law within the meaning of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 2/28

2.

The suit has been instituted by the plaintiff, who claims to be a life member of the first defendant, namely, the South Indian Artistes Association, a Society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. According to the plaintiff, the Executive Committee elected in March 2022 was entitled to hold office for only three years, in terms of Bye-laws 24 and 37 of the Society, read with Section 15(4) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. It is his case that the elected committee was required to demit office on 19.03.2025 and that fresh elections ought to have been conducted before the expiry of the statutory tenure. 3.

The plaintiff's grievance arises from a resolution allegedly passed at the 68th Annual General Body Meeting on 08.09.2024. According to the plaint, the Executive Committee proposed continuing the existing office-bearers for another three years on the ground that construction of the Association's new building was in progress and that holding elections at that stage would entail considerable expenditure. The plaintiff contends that such a resolution is wholly contrary to the Society's Bye-laws and to Section 15(4) of the Act. It is further pleaded that the agenda circulated for the General Body Meeting did not specifically disclose that the extension of the Executive Committee's tenure would be considered, and consequently the resolution is liable to be declared null and void. On the above 3/28

pleadings, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that the impugned resolution is illegal, consequential injunctions, and a mandatory direction to conduct fresh elections. 4.

The present application proceeds on an entirely different footing. The applicant, who claims to be a senior life member of the Society, states that the proposal to continue the existing office-bearers originated with the members themselves. According to him, more than 300 members submitted a requisition requesting that the present committee be permitted to continue until completion of the building project, as conducting elections would involve substantial expenditure that could otherwise be utilised for the construction. It is further stated that the proposal was placed before the General Body Meeting held on 08.09.2024 and was unanimously approved by nearly 870 members without any objection. 5.

The applicant would therefore contend that the plaintiff, having chosen not to attend the General Body Meeting and having questioned the resolution only after several months, lacks locus standi to maintain the suit. It is also alleged that the plaintiff is merely lending his name to certain disgruntled persons who have repeatedly obstructed the affairs of the Society by instituting litigation. According 4/28

to the applicant, the suit is vexatious, does not disclose any enforceable cause of action, and should be rejected at the threshold. 6.

The plaintiff has filed a detailed counter-affidavit disputing each of the above allegations. It is contended that the application is wholly misconceived, as neither Order VII Rule 11(a) nor Rule 11(d) permits the Court to examine disputed questions of fact or the defendants' probable defence. According to the plaintiff, he has specifically pleaded his membership, the statutory provisions governing the tenure of the committee, the impugned resolution, and the infringement of his legal rights as a member. Those averments, if assumed to be true, unquestionably disclose a complete cause of action. The plaintiff further contends that the pendency of a construction project cannot authorise the Executive Committee to perpetuate itself in office contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Bye-laws. 7.

During the course of the hearing, learned counsel for the applicant and for defendants 1 to 4 placed considerable reliance on G.O. (D) No. 311, Commercial Taxes and Registration Department, dated 14.10.2025, issued under Section 54 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. Under the said Government 5/28

Order, the Society has been exempted from the operation of Section 15(4) of the Act for a period of three years commencing on 20.03.2025, and the existing officebearers have been permitted to continue without holding elections during that period.

8.

Building upon the said Government Order, the learned counsel submitted that the very foundation of the suit has disappeared. According to the defendants, once the Government, in exercise of powers under Section 54 of the Act, exempted the Society from the operation of Section 15(4), the resolution passed by the General Body stood eclipsed by the statutory order of exemption. Consequently, it was argued that the plaintiff cannot continue to prosecute the present suit, and that, if at all he is aggrieved by the Government Order, his remedy lies only in instituting appropriate proceedings to challenge it, not in continuing the present civil suit.

9.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted that the entire argument overlooks the limited scope of an enquiry under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It was argued that the Court is required to examine only the averments contained in 6/28

the plaint and not any defence subsequently raised by the defendants. The Government Order came into existence several months after the institution of the suit and therefore cannot constitute a ground for rejection of the plaint. It was further submitted that, even assuming the Government Order is taken note of, several substantial questions arise regarding its effect upon the plaintiff's civil rights, and none of those questions can be decided in an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

10.

In light of the rival submissions, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether the plaint discloses a cause of action sufficient to survive an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC;

(ii) Whether any bar of law appears from the statements in the plaint so as to attract Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC;

(iii) Whether the subsequent Government Order issued under Section 54 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, provides grounds for rejecting the plaint; and (iv) To what relief, if any, the applicant is entitled. 7/28

11.

Before considering the rival submissions, it is necessary to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing the rejection of a plaint. The jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 is limited. The Court is not concerned with the truth or otherwise of the allegations contained in the plaint. Equally, the Court is not expected to weigh the probable defence of the defendants. The exercise is confined to examining whether, assuming every averment in the plaint to be true, the plaintiff has disclosed a cause of action and whether any statutory bar is apparent from the plaint itself.

12.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, when exercising power under Order VII Rule 11, the Court must read the plaint as a whole in a meaningful manner and not dissect individual sentences in isolation. The plaint cannot be rejected merely because the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff may ultimately fail. A plaint can be rejected only where, upon a meaningful reading of the entire pleading, it is found that no cause of action whatsoever is disclosed, or that the suit is barred by law, from the statements contained in the plaint itself. 8/28

13.

Equally well settled is the principle that, when considering an application under Rule 11(d), the Court cannot go beyond the plaint to adjudicate disputed questions of fact. The defendants' defence, however plausible it may appear, is wholly irrelevant at this stage. If determining the alleged bar requires examining disputed facts or interpreting documents produced by the defendants, the matter necessarily falls outside the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 14.

The above principles have consistently been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557; Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510; and, more recently, in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366. The ratio of these decisions is that the power of rejection is an exceptional power intended to terminate only those litigations that are demonstrably untenable on the face of the plaint. Where arguable questions of fact or law arise, the suit must necessarily proceed to trial.

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15.

Tested against the above principles, the contentions advanced on behalf of the applicant warrant careful examination.

16.

Point No.(i): Reading the plaint as a whole and assuming every averment therein to be true, as the Court is bound to do at this stage, it cannot be said that the plaint is devoid of a cause of action. The plaintiff asserts that he is a member of the first defendant Society; that the Society is governed by its registered Bye-laws and the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975; that the tenure of the elected Executive Committee is limited to three years under Bye-law Nos. 24 and 37, read with Section 15(4) of the Act; that the committee elected in March 2022 was bound to demit office on 19.03.2025; that, notwithstanding the statutory mandate, a resolution was passed on 08.09.

2024 extending the tenure of the existing office-bearers for a further period of three years; that the said resolution was not part of the notified agenda and is contrary to the Bye-laws and the statute; and that, by reason of such action, his legal right, as a member entitled to participate in the democratic administration of the Society, has been infringed.

infringement, and the relief flowing therefrom. Nothing more is required to constitute a cause of action.

17.

The applicant's submission that the resolution was unanimously passed by the General Body, that nearly 870 members supported the proposal, that the plaintiff did not attend the meeting, and that the suit has been instituted at the instance of certain disgruntled persons are matters forming part of the defence. Whether the plaintiff had notice of the agenda, whether the General Body validly approved the proposal, whether there was acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, and whether the suit has been instituted with an oblique motive are disputed questions that necessarily require evidence. These matters lie wholly outside the enquiry contemplated under Order VII Rule 11. At this stage, the Court is concerned only with the existence of a triable cause of action, not with the probable success of the plaintiff. On that principle, the plaint cannot be rejected under Rule 11(a).

18.

The objection to locus standi is equally misconceived. The plaintiff admits to being a member of the first defendant Society. One of the incidents of membership 11/28

of a registered society is the right to insist that the Society's affairs are conducted in accordance with its registered Bye-laws and the governing statute. If a member alleges that the Executive Committee has acted in breach of the Bye-laws or contrary to the statutory provisions governing its tenure, that grievance undoubtedly gives rise to a civil dispute. Whether the allegation is ultimately established is a matter for trial. The mere fact that the plaintiff was not present at the General Body Meeting, or that the majority approved the resolution, cannot, by itself, extinguish his right to question an action alleged to be contrary to the statute.

19.

It is trite that a majority opinion cannot validate an act otherwise alleged to be contrary to the governing statute or the registered Bye-laws. A democratic decision is binding only when it is taken within the four corners of the authority conferred by law. If the very competence of the General Body to pass such a resolution is put in issue, the plea that an overwhelming majority supported it cannot furnish a ground for rejecting the plaint. Whether the General Body possessed such authority itself falls for adjudication in the suit. 12/28

20.

Point Nos. (ii) & (iii): The principal contention advanced on behalf of the applicant rests on G.O. (D) No. 311, dated 14.10.2025, issued by the Government under Section 54 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. It is submitted that, having exempted the Society from the operation of Section 15(4) for a further three years and permitted the existing office-bearers to continue in office, the Government has rendered the very foundation of the suit inoperative. Considerable emphasis was placed on the recital in the Government Order that the Executive Committee may continue without conducting elections until 19.03.2028.

21.

Attractive though the submission may appear, it cannot be accepted at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11. The primary reason is that the Government Order was issued long after the suit was instituted. The suit was instituted in April 2025, whereas the Government Order was issued only on 14.10.2025. It therefore constitutes a subsequent event. Order VII Rule 11 obliges the Court to examine the plaint as it stood on the date of its presentation. A subsequent executive order, which did not exist when the suit was instituted and 13/28

which forms no part of the plaint, cannot be imported into the plaint for the purpose of rejecting it.

22.

More importantly, the Government Order itself raises questions that are far from straightforward. The defendants' submission necessarily rests on the premise that Section 54 empowers the Government not merely to exempt a society from the operation of a statutory provision but also to extend the tenure of an elected Executive Committee beyond the expiry of its term. Whether such a consequence necessarily follows from Section 54 is itself a substantial question of statutory interpretation.

23.

Section 54, on its plain language, authorises the Government to exempt any registered society or class of societies from all or any of the provisions of the Act. The provision's emphasis is on exemption. An exemption ordinarily removes the applicability of a statutory provision and dispenses with compliance with a statutory requirement. It does not, by itself, create a substantive right that the statute does not otherwise confer. There is a fundamental distinction between exempting a person or an institution from the operation of a statutory restriction 14/28

and positively conferring a fresh legal authority upon an elected body to continue in office after the expiry of its prescribed tenure. The former is a power of exemption; the latter is a power of extension. The two concepts are distinct both in law and in principle.

24.

Section 15(4) prescribes the maximum tenure of the Executive Committee. Assuming the Government grants an exemption from the operation of that provision, a legitimate question is whether the exemption merely removes the statutory restriction or automatically enlarge the tenure of the existing elected committee. The Act does not expressly provide that an exemption from Section 15(4) shall have the effect of extending the tenure of the existing committee. Equally, Section 54 does not expressly authorise the Government to renew or extend the tenure of elected office-bearers. Section 54 is couched entirely in terms of exemption. The Legislature has consciously employed the expression "exempt from the provisions of the Act".

The provision nowhere authorises the Government to extend the tenure of an elected committee, to continue office-bearers beyond the period for which they were elected, to postpone elections indefinitely, or to create a fresh source of authority in favour of an Executive Committee whose statutory tenure has otherwise expired.

statutory restriction. It does not, by itself, create a substantive right that the statute itself has not conferred. Whether such a consequence can be implied is a question requiring careful examination and cannot be assumed in favour of the defendants when deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 25.

This aspect assumes greater significance when the statutory scheme is examined as a whole. The Legislature has incorporated Section 34-A, which provides for the appointment of a Special Officer in the situations contemplated therein. The existence of separate statutory machinery for the administration of a society's affairs when normal management cannot continue cannot be ignored when construing the scope of Section 54. Whether Section 54 can independently sustain the continuation of an elected Executive Committee notwithstanding the expiry of its tenure, or whether it merely removes the applicability of Section 15(4), is therefore a substantial issue that cannot be resolved without full consideration of the statutory scheme.

26.

The facts of the case decided by this court in Rt. Rev. Aruldoss v. Moses Thambi Pillai reported in AIR 2011 Madras 201. Prima facie, the factual 16/28

background noted therein appears materially different. The exemption considered in that case related to the office of the Bishop/President, not to the continuation of the tenure of the entire elected administration of the Society. The present Government Order, on the other hand, permits all the existing office-bearers to continue in office for a further period of three years without conducting elections. Whether both situations stand on the same footing is itself a matter requiring detailed examination. At any rate, the said decision cannot be read as concluding, at this interlocutory stage, that Section 54 necessarily authorises the continuation of the entire elected Executive Committee. That issue is left entirely open. 27.

The recitals in the Government Order show that the reasons which weighed with the Government were that the Society was engaged in constructing a new building estimated to cost about Rs.150 crores; that conducting elections would entail an expenditure of about Rs.40 lakhs; that the majority of members desired the existing committee to continue until completion of the project; that the General Body had passed a unanimous resolution to that effect; and that the District Registrar had received no objections. Based on the report submitted by the District Registrar and the recommendation of the Inspector General of Registration, the Government granted an exemption under Section 54 from the operation of Section 17/28

15(4) for a further period of three years. It permitted the existing office-bearers to continue without conducting elections.

28.

Whether those circumstances justified the exercise of the power under Section 54; whether the pendency of construction of a building or the financial burden of holding elections could furnish a legally sustainable basis for postponing democratic elections; whether a newly elected Executive Committee could equally continue the construction; whether exemption from Section 15(4) necessarily authorises the continuation of the existing office-bearers; and whether the Government Order has the effect of validating the impugned resolution are all questions that directly arise from the Government Order itself. These are not questions that can be decided in an application under Order VII Rule 11. They require examination of the statutory provisions, the Bye-laws, the scope of the Government's power under Section 54, and the legal effect of the Government Order. Such issues cannot be concluded based on assumptions favourable to either side.

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29.

It is also necessary to bear in mind that the Government is not a party to the present proceedings. The validity, scope or legal effect of the Government Order does not directly arise for adjudication in this application. This Court is therefore neither required nor called upon to pronounce finally upon the legality of the Government Order. Suffice it to observe that the Government Order constitutes a subsequent event relied upon by the defendants as part of their defence. Whether it completely eclipses the plaintiff's cause of action, whether it furnishes a complete answer to the reliefs claimed in the suit, or whether the plaintiff is entitled to question its effect are matters that must necessarily await adjudication in appropriate proceedings after completion of pleadings. It would be wholly inappropriate to record any concluded finding on those issues while exercising the narrow jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 30.

Equally unacceptable is the submission that the cause of action pleaded in the plaint has merged in the Government Order. The cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff arose on the date when, according to him, the General Body resolved to retain the existing office-bearers contrary to the Bye-laws and Section 15(4) of the Act. That cause of action cannot retroactively disappear merely because, several months later, the Government issued an executive order under Section 54. At best, 19/28

the subsequent Government Order may furnish an additional defence to the defendants or may necessitate appropriate pleadings by the parties. It cannot retroactively obliterate the cause of action that existed on the date of institution of the suit.

31.

It was faintly argued that, in view of the Government Order, the Civil Court has ceased to have jurisdiction and that the plaintiff can only invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The submission deserves to be rejected. The present suit is one in which a member of a registered society seeks to enforce civil rights allegedly arising from the Society's Bye-laws and the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. Such a dispute is undoubtedly civil in nature. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the Civil Court to try all suits of a civil nature, except those expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusion of civil jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. Unless the statute expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or creates a special forum with finality attached to its decision, the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Court remains unaffected. 20/28

32.

Neither Section 54 of the Act nor the Government Order issued thereunder contains any provision expressly excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Equally, no provision of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act has been brought to the notice of this Court from which such exclusion can necessarily be implied. The availability of a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot, by itself, extinguish the ordinary civil remedy. The constitutional and civil remedies operate in different fields. The mere fact that the plaintiff may, if so advised, question the Government Order in appropriate proceedings cannot render the present suit non-maintainable.

33.

Learned counsel appearing for the defendants also contended that, in the absence of a challenge to the Government Order, the suit itself has become infructuous. This submission again overlooks the limited scope of the present application. Whether the plaintiff ought to amend the plaint by incorporating appropriate pleadings with reference to the subsequent Government Order, whether any consequential relief becomes necessary by reason of the subsequent event, and what the effect of the Government Order would be upon the final adjudication are 21/28

all matters which may arise for consideration at the appropriate stage. None of them constitutes a ground for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11. 34.

The continuance in office of a person or a body of office-bearers beyond the tenure for which they were democratically elected is, in principle, inconsistent with the very foundation of democratic governance. An elected office carries a mandate for a definite period only. Upon the expiry of that mandate, the office-bearers cannot claim a legal or moral right to continue as though they still possess the confidence of the electorate.

35.

There may, no doubt, arise extraordinary situations-such as the outbreak of a pandemic like COVID-19, war, natural disasters, or other unforeseen emergencies-in which the conduct of elections becomes temporarily impossible. In such exceptional circumstances, the outgoing office-bearers may be required to continue only in a purely caretaker capacity to ensure that day-to-day administration does not come to a standstill. Such continuation is solely to preserve the institution until elections become feasible. It cannot be construed as an extension of the democratic mandate or as conferring upon them the status of full22/28

fledged elected office-bearers entitled to exercise all powers as if a fresh mandate had been obtained.

36.

However, in the ordinary course, the inability or failure to hold elections immediately upon the expiry of the term cannot justify permitting the elected body to perpetuate itself in office. On the contrary, such failure itself constitutes a circumstance warranting intervention by the statutory authorities in accordance with law. The Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, specifically provides, under Section 34-A, that, in appropriate cases, the Government may appoint a Special Officer to administer the affairs of the society. The legislative intent is clear that where democratic governance cannot be continued through a duly elected body, the vacuum is to be filled by a neutral statutory administrator, not by allowing an outgoing committee to remain in office indefinitely. 37.

The constitutional scheme governing the Union and the States also offers a useful analogy. Where, for any reason, a general election cannot be held and no duly elected Government can be constituted, the Constitution does not contemplate the indefinite continuation of an outgoing Ministry merely because elections have 23/28

become impracticable. Instead, constitutional mechanisms are provided to ensure that governance continues through an alternative constitutional arrangement until the electorate is in a position to elect a fresh Government. Although the constitutional provisions operate in an entirely different field, the underlying democratic principle remains the same-continuity of administration cannot become a vehicle for perpetuating an expired electoral mandate. 38.

Experience in public administration also underscores the importance of this principle. On several occasions, when elections to local bodies, including the Chennai Corporation, were not held for prolonged periods, the administration was entrusted to Special Officers or appointed administrators rather than allowing the previous elected representatives to continue indefinitely. Such appointments were often criticised in public discourse as being antithetical to democratic decentralisation, and constitutional courts, public institutions and civil society repeatedly emphasised the necessity of restoring elected local bodies at the earliest opportunity. The criticism itself underscores the constitutional value attached to periodic elections and the impermissibility of allowing democratic institutions to function indefinitely without a fresh electoral mandate. 24/28

39.

Democracy is sustained not merely by elections, but by periodic elections. The legitimacy of every elected body flows from the continuing will of its electorate. Once the prescribed tenure expires, that legitimacy also expires unless renewed by a fresh election in accordance with law. Therefore, any continuation beyond the prescribed term must remain strictly temporary, confined to a caretaker role, and cannot be treated as an extension of the elected tenure. 40.

It is now well settled that rejecting a plaint is a drastic measure that deprives the plaintiff of the opportunity to establish his case by evidence. Unless the Court is satisfied that, even if every allegation in the plaint is accepted as true, the suit is bound to fail, the plaint cannot be rejected. Whenever the pleadings disclose substantial questions requiring the interpretation of statutory provisions or the determination of disputed facts, the proper course is to permit the suit to proceed to trial. The present case is a classic illustration of such a situation. The controversy raised by the parties extends beyond the factual arena and involves questions touching the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing registered societies. Those questions deserve a full-fledged adjudication and cannot be summarily concluded in an application under Order VII Rule 11. 25/28

41.

On careful consideration of the pleadings, the rival submissions and the settled principles governing the rejection of a plaint, this Court is of the clear opinion that the plaint discloses a complete cause of action; that no bar of law is discernible from the averments in the plaint; that the objections relating to locus standi, acquiescence, the validity of the General Body resolution, the effect of the subsequent Government Order and the interpretation of Sections 15(4), 34-A and 54 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act are matters for adjudication upon evidence and fuller arguments; and that none of those questions can be decided in favour of the defendants while exercising jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

42.

In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Further, it is made clear that all observations contained in this order are confined exclusively to the limited enquiry under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. No opinion is expressed on the legality or otherwise of the resolution dated 08.09.2024, the validity or legal effect of G.O.(D) No.311 dated 14.10.2025, the true scope of Sections 15(4), 34-A or 54 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration 26/28

Act, 1975, or the merits of the rival claims. All such issues are expressly left open to be urged by the respective parties at the trial. The defendants shall be at liberty to raise all their defences in the written statements, and the plaintiff shall likewise be at liberty to take such steps as are available to him in law in relation to the subsequent Government Order. The suit shall proceed in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation contained in this order, except to the limited extent necessary for disposal of the present application. 01-07-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order AY 27/28

DR.A.D.MARIA CLETE, J.

AY A No. 4497 of 2025 in C.S. No. 104 of 2025 01-07-2026 28/28