Arun Indian Motors v. The District Collector/Chairman

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 03.07.2025

CORAM

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C. SARAVANAN and W.M.P.(MD) Nos.24133, 24135, 24655, 24656 of 2024 & 302 of 2025 Arun Indian Motors, Electrical Vehicles Dealer, Represented by its Proprietor, N.Arun, No.5, Gandhi Road, Salem - 636 007.

... Petitioner in both W.Ps.

Vs.

1.The District Collector/Chairman, The District Rural Development Agency, Virudhunagar District, Virudhunagar.

2.The Project Officer/Joint Director, District Rural Development Agency, Virudhunagar District, Virudhunagar.

3.RDS Industries, Represented by Managing Partner, Devaraj Saravanan, No.30/1a, Somalapuram Village, Ambur, Somalapuram, Tirupathur District.

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4.Saravana Engineering Works, SF No.671/9A1, Opp. to Transport Nagar, Madurai Road, A.Vellodu Village, Dindigul District - 624 303.

... Respondents in both W.Ps.

Prayer in W.P.(MD) No.28433 of 2024 : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records of the second respondent dated 05.11.2024 in Technical Evaluation Entry and the consequential Representation Rejection Entry dated 08.11.2024 entered in the Online bid process for the Bid No.GEM/2024/B/5439320 and quashing the same and thereby directing the first and second respondents to issue the intimation for submission of sample vehicle and carry forward the Tender Process from that stage.

Prayer in W.P.(MD) No.29141 of 2024 : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records of the first respondent's proceedings pertaining to Letter of Acceptance in Lr.No.c5/1416/2023 dated 17.11.2024 signed on 18.11.2024 and the consequential Work Order in Na.Ka.No.C5/1416-2/2023 dated 25.11.2024 granted in favour of the third respondent and quashing the same and thereby directing the first and second respondents to issue the intimation for submission of sample vehicle and carry forward the Tender Process from that stage. Page No. 2 of 24

For Petitioner in both W.Ps.

: Mr.T.Lajapathi Roy, Senior Counsel for Mr.N.K.Ponraj For R1 & R2 in both W.Ps.

: Mr.Veerakathiravan, Additional Advocate General - III, assisted by Mr.K.R.Badurus Zaman, Government Advocate For R3 in both W.Ps.

: Mr.Avinash Wadhwani for Mr.S.Ramesh For R4 in both W.Ps.

: Mr.H.Mohammed Imran for M/s.Ajmal Associates C O M M O N O R D E R By this common order, both these Writ Petitions are being disposed of.

2. In W.P.(MD) No. 28433 of 2024, the petitioner has challenged the rejection of their bid during the technical evaluation stage of the tender process. The tender was floated on 25.09.2024 for the supply of ecarts for garbage removal in connection with solid waste management within the jurisdiction of the respondent, the Commissioner of the Corporation.

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3. In W.P.(MD) No.29141 of 2024, the petitioner has challenged the Letter of Acceptance dated 17.11.2024 and the Work Order dated 25.11.2024 issued in favour of the third respondent.

4. In the second-mentioned Writ Petition, i.e., W.P.(MD) No.29141 of 2024, an interim order was passed by this Court on 04.12.2024 directing the first respondent, the District Collector/Chairman, District Rural Development Agency, Virudhunagar District, not to make any payment to the third respondent, who emerged as the successful bidder.

5. The challenge to the tender proceedings for awarding the contract to the third respondent is primarily on the ground that the petitioner was not informed of the date on which the sample e-cart, proposed to be supplied by the petitioner in the event of the contract being awarded, was to be called for technical evaluation.

6. Mr.T.Lajapathi Roy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner's vehicle meets both the required criteria, namely, it is equipped with a lithium battery and has a power capacity of 1200 watts; whereas the e-carts supplied by the third Page No. 4 of 24

respondent are not of substantial capacity and do not have a lithium battery, as mandated in the Tender Document dated 25.09.2024.

7. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention to the stipulation in the tenders floated for similar work in Thiruvannamalai and Ramanathapuram Districts, wherein, on the specified dates, the vehicles were called for technical evaluation. Whereas, in the present case, no such date was specified, and thus, the petitioner was excluded without even being called to produce the e-carts for technical evaluation. It is submitted that the rejection of the petitioner's offer on 05.11.2024, during the technical evaluation, impugned in W.P.(MD) No.28433 of 2024, is liable to be interfered with.

8. Secondly, the Letter of Acceptance dated 17.11.2024 and the Work Order issued to the third respondent on 25.11.2024 are liable to be quashed, with a consequential direction to the first and second respondents to accept the petitioner's bid and process the same from the stage of technical evaluation, after intimating the petitioner to produce the vehicle for such evaluation.

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9. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the awarding of the tender and the rejection of the petitioner's bid at the technical evaluation stage on 05.11.2024 are arbitrary and illegal, and are liable to be interfered with, in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Banshidhar Construction Private Limited v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Others, reported in (2024) 10 SCC 273.

10. Specifically, reference is made to paragraph 37 of the said decision, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Government bodies/instrumentalities are expected to act in an absolutely fair, reasonable, and transparent manner, particularly in the award of contracts for mega projects, and that any element of arbitrariness or discrimination may hamper the entire project, which would not be in public interest.

11. Defending the stand of the Government in rejecting the petitioner's bid on 05.11.2024 and accepting the third respondent's bid on 17.11.2024, Mr.Veerakathiravan, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the first and second respondents, submits that the petitioner was required to produce a sample e-cart vehicle on the date specified for the opening of the bid for technical evaluation. Therefore, Page No. 6 of 24

the petitioner cannot now complain, as the petitioner failed to produce the vehicle on the date when the bid was opened, i.e., on 10.10.2024.

12. That apart, it is submitted that the petitioner had also participated in the earlier tender, which was subsequently cancelled. In that process, the petitioner's sample vehicle had miserably failed to meet the technical standards. Fully aware that the same vehicle would not qualify in response to the present tender floated on 25.09.2024, the petitioner deliberately failed to produce the vehicle for technical evaluation.

13. In this connection, reference is made to paragraph 8(vi) of the counter affidavit filed by the first and second respondents in W.P.(MD) No.28433 of 2024. In the said paragraph, it has been stated that, during the earlier tender process pursuant to the notification dated 07.06.2024, the petitioner had produced a sample vehicle for technical evaluation.

14. It is further stated that the petitioner was aware that several other companies, which had applied along with the petitioner on the said occasion, were disqualified, inter alia, on the ground of non-production of Page No. 7 of 24

sample vehicles during technical evaluation. However, the respondents had not issued any written intimation either to the petitioner company or to the other participating companies, directing them to submit their sample vehicles for inspection.

15. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the first and second respondents further submits that, as per the regulation, the ecart with a full charge was required to run between 70 km and 90 km per hour while carrying 300 kg of garbage. However, the sample vehicle produced by the petitioner pursuant to the earlier tender dated 07.06.2024 demonstrated a performance of only 66 km per hour. This was the reason for the disqualification of the petitioner's company. He further submits that the respondents dispute the averments made in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of the present Writ Petitions.

16. That apart, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the first and second respondents submits that the petitioner ought to have been vigilant and taken note of the notification published on the web portal, wherein the sample vehicles of the third and fourth respondents were displayed for efficient testing/examination on 18.10.2024. However, Page No. 8 of 24

the petitioner uploaded its representation on the web portal only on 07.11.2024, which was after the entry relating to the disqualification of the petitioner's company was made on the web portal on 05.11.2024.

17. The learned Additional Advocate General, in support of his submission, relied on the following decisions: i.

N.G.Projects Limited Vs. Vinod Kumar Jain and others, reported in (2022) 6 SCC 127.

ii. Tata Motors Limited Vs. The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (Best) and others, reported in (2023) 19 SCC 1.

18. A specific reference is made to the paragraphs 10, 12, 14, 16, & 23 in the above case in N.G.Projects Limited, which read as under:

10. ....

Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:

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(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety.

The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind [R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Brind, (1991) 1 AC 696 : (1991) 2 WLR 588 (HL)] , Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, 'consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention'. ***

94. The principles deducible from the above are:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.

(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.

(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.

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(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.

(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasiadministrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.

(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.

Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles."

*****

12. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. [Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818] , this Court held that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. It was held as under : (SCC p. 825, paras 13 & 15) Page No. 11 of 24

"13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decision-making process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision.

***

15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given." *****

14. In National High Speed Rail Corpn. Ltd. v. Montecarlo Ltd. [National High Speed Rail Corpn. Ltd. v. Montecarlo Ltd., (2022) 6 SCC 401] , this Court sounded a word of caution while entertaining the writ petition and/or granting stay which ultimately may delay the execution of the mega projects. It was held as under : (SCC para 48) "48. Even while entertaining the writ petition and/or granting the stay which ultimately may delay the execution of the Mega projects, it must be remembered that it may seriously impede the execution of the projects of public importance and Page No. 12 of 24

disables the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities from discharging the constitutional and legal obligation towards the citizens. Therefore, the High Courts should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercise of its discretion while entertaining such petitions and/or while granting stay in such matters.

Even in a case where the High Court is of the prima facie opinion that the decision is as such perverse and/or arbitrary and/or suffers from mala fides and/or favouritism, while entertaining such writ petition and/or pass any appropriate interim order, High Court may put to the writ petitioner's notice that in case the petitioner loses and there is a delay in execution of the project due to such proceedings initiated by him/it, he/they may be saddled with the damages caused for delay in execution of such projects, which may be due to such frivolous litigations initiated by him/it. With these words of caution and advise, we rest the matter there and leave it to the wisdom of the Court(s) concerned, which ultimately may look to the larger public interest and the national interest involved."

*****

16. In Galaxy Transport Agencies v. New J.K. Roadways [Galaxy Transport Agencies v. New J.K. Roadways, (2021) 16 SCC 808 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1035] , a three-Judge Bench again reiterated that the authority that authors the tender document is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements, and thus, its interpretation should not be second-guessed by a court in judicial review proceedings. It was observed as thus : (SCC paras 17-18 & 20) "17. In accordance with these judgments and noting that the interpretation of the tendering authority in this case cannot be said to be a perverse one, the Division Bench [New JK Roadways v. UT of Page No. 13 of 24

J&K, 2020 SCC OnLine J&K 733] ought not to have interfered with it by giving its own interpretation and not giving proper credence to the word "both" appearing in Condition No. 31 of the NIT. For this reason, the Division Bench's conclusion that JK Roadways was wrongly declared to be ineligible, is set aside.

18. Insofar as Condition No. 27 of the NIT prescribing work experience of at least 5 years of not less than the value of Rs 2 crores is concerned, suffice it to say that the expert body, being the Tender Opening Committee, consisting of four members, clearly found that this eligibility condition had been satisfied by the Appellant before us. Without therefore going into the assessment of the documents that have been supplied to this Court, it is well settled that unless arbitrariness or mala fide on the part of the tendering authority is alleged, the expert evaluation of a particular tender, particularly when it comes to technical evaluation, is not to be secondguessed by a writ court. Thus, in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] , this Court noted : (SCC pp. 531-32, para 22) '22.

Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made "lawfully" and not to check whether choice or decision is "sound". When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision Page No.

relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted.

Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold.

(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone;

or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say:'the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached';

(ii) Whether public interest is affected.

If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal Page No. 15 of 24

consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.'

***

20. This being the case, we are unable to fathom how the Division Bench, on its own appraisal, arrived at the conclusion that the Appellant held work experience of only 1 year, substituting the appraisal of the expert four-member Tender Opening Committee with its own."

*****

23. In view of the above judgments of this Court, the writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer. The Court does not have the expertise to examine the terms and conditions of the present day economic activities of the State and this limitation should be kept in view. Courts should be even more reluctant in interfering with contracts involving technical issues as there is a requirement of the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon such issues. The approach of the Court should be not to find fault with magnifying glass in its hands, rather the Court should examine as to whether the decision-making process is after complying with the procedure contemplated by the tender conditions.

If the Court finds that there is total arbitrariness or that the tender has been granted in a mala fide manner, still the Court should refrain from interfering in the grant of tender but instead relegate the parties to seek damages for the wrongful exclusion rather than to injunct the execution of the contract. The injunction or interference in the tender leads to additional costs on the State and is also against public interest. Therefore, the State and its citizens suffer twice, firstly by paying escalation costs and secondly, by Page No.

being deprived of the infrastructure for which the present day Governments are expected to work.

(emphasis applied)

19. A reference is made to the paragraphs 54 to 57 in the above case in The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (Best), which read as under:

54. We are of the view that the High Court should have been a bit slow and circumspect in reversing the action of BEST permitting EVEY to submit a revised Annexure Y. We are of the view that BEST committed no error or cannot be held guilty of favouritism, etc. in allowing EVEY to submit a revised Annexure Y as the earlier one was incorrect on account of a clerical error. This exercise itself was not sufficient to declare the entire bid offered by EVEY as unlawful or illegal.

55. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a threeJudge Bench decision of this Court in Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India [Assn. of Registration Plates v. Page No. 17 of 24

Union of India, (2005) 1 SCC 679] .

56. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. [Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617] and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned.

Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere.

57. As observed by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] , that while invoking power of judicial review in matters as to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind that evaluations of tenders and awarding of contracts are essentially commercial functions and principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance in such matters. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not interfere by exercising powers of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.

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20. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the first and second respondents further submits that these Writ Petitions have been rendered infructuous due to the efflux of time, as the vehicles supplied by the third respondent have been in use for over a period of eight months without any payment being made to the third respondent, in view of the interim order passed by this Court on 04.12.2024 in W.P. (MD) No.29141 of 2024.

21. Defending the interest of the third respondent, the learned counsel for the third respondent submits that, pursuant to the Work Order issued on 25.11.2024, the vehicles were supplied on various dates over a period of time, and the last date of supply was 04.04.2025.

22. That apart, it is submitted that the vehicles have also been registered with the RTO and have been put to use. There are no issues in their operation over the past eight months, and they were deployed in Virudhunagar District by the official respondents.

23. The fourth respondent has been unnecessarily impleaded in Page No. 19 of 24

these Writ Petitions. The fourth respondent is merely a bidder, whose bid was also rejected. He has not initiated any proceedings against the rejection order dated 05.11.2024, the Letter of Acceptance dated 17.11.2024, or the Work Order dated 25.11.2024 issued to the third respondent.

24. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the first and second respondents, the learned counsel for the third respondent and the learned counsel for the fourth respondent.

25. The petitioner has not disputed that no sample vehicles were produced by the petitioner in response to the earlier tender notification dated 07.06.2024, and that the vehicles submitted by the petitioner were found lacking, as they did not meet the technical criteria prescribed under the said tender notification.

26. Even assuming that the petitioner was not given any specific intimation to produce the same vehicles for inspection and technical evaluation, Clause No.8 under the heading "Buyer Added Bid Specific Page No. 20 of 24

Terms and Conditions" in the tender document clearly states that, during the technical evaluation of bids, a sample vehicle must be submitted in accordance with the specifications provided in the tender document. It further states that only the samples of technically qualified bidders will be examined, and that the battery-operated e-cart will be evaluated by the departmental officials. The financial bid will be opened only if the samples pass the technical evaluation. The said clause reads as under: Buyer Added Bid Specific Terms and Conditions:- 1....

....

8.During the technical evaluation of bids, a sample vehicle must be submitted in accordance with the specification provided in the tender document. Only technically qualified bidder's samples will be examined. The battery-operated e-cart will be evaluated by department officials. The financial bid will be opened only if the samples pass the examination.

27. Therefore, the petitioner ought to have been vigilant, as the last date for submission of bids and completion of technical evaluation was 09.10.2024. The petitioner also did not challenge the rejection order immediately but approached this Court only on 25.11.2024 and obtained Page No. 21 of 24

an interim order dated 04.12.2024 in W.P.(MD) No.29141 of 2024.

28. During the interregnum, the Letter of Acceptance dated 17.11.2024 and the Work Order dated 25.11.2024 were issued to the third respondent for the supply of 604 e-cart vehicles for transporting municipal garbage in connection with solid waste management in Virudhunagar District. Pursuant to the same, the third respondent also supplied vehicles on various dates, which are currently in use in Virudhunagar District.

29. If at all the petitioner is aggrieved, the petitioner at best can file an appeal in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Act, 1998, and work out the remedy for any damages suffered. Therefore, it is open to the petitioner to file a statutory appeal under Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tenders Act, 1998, before the appellate authority within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

30. If such an appeal is filed by the petitioner, the appellate authority shall consider and dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observations Page No. 22 of 24

contained in this order.

31. In the result, these Writ Petitions are dismissed with the above liberty. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.

03.07.2025 JEN Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No Speaking Order / Non-Speaking Order To 1.The District Collector/Chairman, The District Rural Development Agency, Virudhunagar District, Virudhunagar.

2.The Project Officer/Joint Director, District Rural Development Agency, Virudhunagar District, Virudhunagar.

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C.SARAVANAN , J.

JEN 03.07.2025 Page No. 24 of 24