Nirmal Singh v. State Of Haryana
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7.
Section 379A IPC, as applicable to Haryana defines 'Snatching' as under :
"379A - Snatching - (1) Whoever, with the intention to commit theft, suddenly or quickly or forcibly seizes or secures or grabs or takes away from any (,''
person or from his possession any movable property and makes or attempts to make escape with such property, is said to commit snatching.
(2) Whoever, commits snatching, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine of rupees twenty five thousand."
8.
As the provision of Section 379A IPC reproduced above would reveal, the prosecution is required to prove the following ingredients to prove the offence of snatching:- (a) Intention to commit theft, (b) Suddenly or quickly or forcibly, (c) i) seizing or securing or grabbing or ii) taking away, (d) from any person or from his possession, (e) any movable property; and (f) making or attempting to make escape with such property. .
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''( 7 , "114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.
Illustrations The Court may presume - &+ that a man, who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession ;
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17.
Learned counsel for appellant has assailed the conviction on the ground that no independent witness from the public was joined. The contention is devoid of any merit because there is no such law that to believe the police official, it is sine-quo-non to join any independent witness from the public. Simply because no public witness was ),''
joined in the recovery proceedings does not ipso facto make the recovery doubtful. Witnesses cannot be disbelieved simply because they are police officials, particularly when no enmity has been alleged. In fact, court cannot start with the presumption that official witnesses will not tell the truth before the Court. The evidence of the official witnesses, cannot be disbelieved and distrusted, if the same is found to be credit worthy. 19.
It has been observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs. Sunil 2001(1) RCR (Crl.) 56 that : "court cannot start with the presumption that police records were untrustworthy and rather, as a proposition of law, presumption should be other way around and that official acts of the police are regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognized even by the legislature." 20.
In another case titled Ravinder Vs. State of Maharashtra 2002(3) RCR (Crl.) 598, the case was based on official witnesses. No independent witness was examined. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that official (police) witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belonged to the police force and are interested in the investigating or the prosecuting agency. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court further that prudence dictates that their evidence needs to be subjected to strict scrutiny and as far as possible corroboration of their evidence in material particulars should be sought. The desire of such witnesses to see the success of the case based on their investigation requires greater care to appreciate their testimony.
21.
Similarly, in Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh through its Registrar (General) Vs. Om Parkash Chaudhary and others 2006(2) RCR (Crl.) 426, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as testimony of any other witness and there is no principle of law that without .,''
corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. It was further held that the presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police personnel as of other persons and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. Hon'ble High Court relied upon an authority of Hon'ble Supreme Court titled Karamjit Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration) 2003(2) RCR (Crl.) 789. It was further held that it will all depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and that no principle of general application can be laid down.
22.
In present case, there is neither any suggestion nor any circumstance pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant so as to show any animosity of the police officials i.e. PW1 and PW2 with the accused so as to falsely implicate him. In these circumstances, mere non-joining of the independent witness from the public, cannot be a ground to disbelieve PW1 and PW2.
23.
The contention of learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that only two police officials were examined, though they were also accompanied by other police officials, has no merit, because it is the quality of the evidence, which matters and not the quality. 24.
Having regard to the afore-said discussion, it is held that the learned trial Court did not commit any error in recording the conviction of the appellant.
25.
As far as the order of sentence is concerned, Section 379A IPC provides for the minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment and fine of ₹25,000/- though the said imprisonment may extend up to ten years. The Court has already taken the lenient view by imposing only the minimum sentence.
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26.
As such, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal either against the judgment of conviction or against the order of sentence. Dismissed.
February 19, 2024 ( DEEPAK GUPTA ) renu JUDGE Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No 1 D4! '',''