Rachna v. Joginder Singh And ANR
!"
#$ %"&'('#)**
+ ,
* - - -
"
#$%!
& $'
"
((((( - -
.
* / 0 *
$
+,-. .
/$
'
0 .)1++-2"1
3
$!
4$
"5,
0 $ 6 859 $
"525-2-26 8-9$
"5,
0 $
-1""-2-"6 8"9
!!$' /$
- '
"
! $
"5,
0 $ !
$6
9:
! ) .
* $! !!
$ :
$ *$ *!
) .
* :
/$
:
8 * ) $ ;
!
"2!
8 * ! $
""2<-2"1
=!
! ;
$ :
/$ '
22"--=22"--<
5!
">25-2"1 ">"2-2"1)
:
'*
:
!!
!
) .
* $ /$ /$
'
22"-51
"221-2"1
$
" !
* :
'
!
*
2+"--2"1
85
5 %
*
!
$
'
$ '* .
.
$ !
;
) !
"525-2-26 8-9 +
'
.
% ?2"22"-<--2-2."2-2-"
$
"525-2-2)
'
-1""-2-"6 8"9
6 859 $
6 8-9
6 8"9 $
> !
$ !
*
/$ /$
!
$ :
$'8! !
$' )
$
!
'
* * :
! *
.
@ 8=9: :
$! :!
A !
$
'
'; $
:'
$ $
6 8<9 0 $' "521-2"1
'
!
!!
:
:
$
$
'
/$ /$ =
'
!
" < !
$ !
-
$
-<2+-2--'*:*
! $ * $
$'
;!
;
$
'
!
$
!
'
$
) !
'
A :
2,
!*:
$!
!
$'
!*!
-5
-521-2"1'
:
:
$ ! 7 $
"+21-2"1 , %
:
$!'
"5,
0 $ )
$
'
:8
!" #
$% &'
( &'
)*" #
( & '
+, 1 0
!
"#$%& ''$'
&"%( A 4'!
$
.
!$ 8 -22. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that under Section 138 of the Act, it is only the drawer of the cheque who can be prosecuted. In the case on hand, admittedly, the appellant is not a drawer of the cheque and she has not signed the same. A copy of the cheque was brought to our notice, though it contains name of the appellant and her husband, the
fact remains that her husband alone put his signature. In addition to the same, a bare reading of the complaint as also the affidavit of examination-in- chief of the complainant and a bare look at the cheque would show that the appellant has not signed the cheque.
23) We also hold that under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, in case of issuance of cheque from joint accounts, a joint account holder cannot be prosecuted unless the cheque has been signed by each and every person who is a joint account holder. The said principle is an exception to Section 141 of the N.I. Act which would have no application in the case on hand. The proceedings filed under Section 138 cannot be used as an arm twisting tactics to recover the amount allegedly due from the appellant. It cannot be said that the complainant has no remedy against the appellant but certainly not under Section 138. The culpability attached to dishonour of a cheque can, in no case "except in case of Section 141 of the N.I. Act" be extended to those on whose behalf the cheque is issued.
This Court reiterates that it is only the drawer of the cheque who can be made an accused in any proceeding under Section 138 of the Act. Even the High Court has specifically recorded the stand of the appellant that she was not the signatory of the cheque but rejected the contention that the amount was not due and payable by her solely on the ground that the trial is in progress. It is to be noted that only after issuance of process, a person can approach the High Court seeking quashing of the same on various grounds available to him. Accordingly, the High Court was clearly wrong in holding that the prayer of the appellant cannot even be considered. Further, the High Court itself has directed the Magistrate to carry out the process of admission/denial of documents.
In such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the trial is in advanced stage.
24) Under these circumstances, the appeal deserves to be allowed and process in Criminal Case No. 1171/SS/2009 pending before the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate
13th Court, Dadar, Mumbai deserves to be quashed, accordingly, quashed against the appellant herein. The appeal is allowed."
"2 A 4'!
$
.
)*
+ + ,
"#"$"&-'-$'
+ & ".( !$ 8 -7. On a fair reading of Section 138 of the NI Act, before a person can be prosecuted, the following conditions are required to be satisfied:
i) that the cheque is drawn by a person and on an account maintained by him with a banker;
ii) for the payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability; and iii) the said cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account. Therefore, a person who is the signatory to the cheque and the cheque is drawn by that person on an account maintained by him and the cheque has been issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability and the said cheque has been returned by the bank unpaid, such person can be said to have committed an offence. Section 138 of the NI Act does not speak about the joint liability.
Even in case of a joint liability, in case of individual persons, a person other than a person who has drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him, cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. A person might have been jointly liable to pay the debt, but if such a person who might have been liable to pay the debt jointly, cannot be prosecuted unless the bank account is jointly maintained and that he was a signatory to the cheque.
8. Now, so far as the case on behalf of the original complainant that the appellant herein - original accused No. 2 can be
convicted with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance.
8.1 Section 141 of the NI Act is relating to the offence by companies and it cannot be made applicable to the individuals. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original complainant has submitted that "Company" means any body corporate and includes, a firm or other association of individuals and therefore in case of a joint liability of two or more persons it will fall within "other association of individuals" and therefore with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act, the appellant who is jointly liable to pay the debt, can be prosecuted. The aforesaid cannot be accepted. Two private individuals cannot be said to be "other association of individuals".
Therefore, there is no question of invoking Section 141 of the NI Act against the appellant, as the liability is the individual liability (may be a joint liabilities), but cannot be said to be the offence committed by a company or by it corporate or firm or other associations of individuals. The appellant herein is neither a Director nor a partner in any firm who has issued the cheque. Therefore, even the appellant cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act. Therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error in not quashing the complaint against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the NI Act.
The criminal complaint filed against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the NI Act, therefore, can be said to be abuse of process of law and therefore the same is required to be quashed and set aside.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order dated 21.08.2019 passed by the High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 2595 of 2019 refusing to quash the criminal complaint against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act is hereby quashed and set aside. The complaint case pending in the
Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate filed by respondent No. 1 - original complainant being C.C. No. 2802/SS/2016 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly."
"2 .
';
$!
:
$!
!
!!
$
/$ /$
?
* /$ 6 8""9'
'*!
) .
*)
*
/$
!
!
!* '!
8=
.
&)
*
/$ /$
$'8! /$
!
'
*
"" 0
:
'
!!
:
'
0 .)1++-2"1
3
$ !
4$
"5,
0 $
6 859 $
"525-2-26 8-9 $
"5,
0 $
-1""-2-"6 8"9
!!$' /$
/$ - -
/&1 .
$;
B
;
C B
C