High Court of Punjab and HaryanaCRA-D/200/2004disposed of

Lachhman And Chand Singh v. State Of Haryana

2025-03-17Mr. Justice Gurvinder Singh Gill,Mr. Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi32 pages

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5. Upon registration of the FIR, the investigation started. The investigation revealed that the coaccused Munna Bhoi was running a liquor (local) factory situated adjacent to his paddy field. The deceased after working for sometime in the paddy field

accompanied the accused persons to the liquor factory. Something went wrong while the accused persons and the deceased were in the liquor factory. The locals working in the vicinity of the liquor factory heard some commotion coming from the liquor factory. After sometime, the locals saw the deceased coming out of the factory with burn injuries on his body. One of the prosecution witnesses Hanu Khetrapal (PW2), who was present in the nearby agricultural field, enquired with the deceased as to what had happened. At that point of time, the deceased is said to have informed the PW2 that the accused persons had poured hot lali (raw material used for preparing local liquor) on his body as a result of which he had suffered burn injuries. Saying so, the deceased left and thereafter his dead body was recovered from the drain of Duribam Tea Estate.

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21. The law regarding the nature, scope and value as a piece of evidence of oral and written dying declarations is now fairly well settled by various judicial decisions of this Court. A dying declaration, oral or written, before it could be relied upon, must pass a test of reliability as it is a statement made in the absence of the accused and there is no opportunity to the accused even to put it through the fire of cross examination to test is genuinity or veracity. The court has, therefore, to subject it to close scrutiny. But once the court is satisfied that it is a truthful version as to the circumstances in which the death resulted and the persons causing injuries, the law does not expect that there should be corroboration before it can be relied upon. However, if there are infirmities and the court does not find it safe to base any conclusion on it without some further evidence to support it, the question of corroboration arises.

22. We may refer to one of the decisions of this Court in the case of Heikrujam Chaoba Singh v. State of Manipur, (1999) 8 SCC 458, wherein in para 3 this Court observed as under:

"3. An oral dying declaration no doubt can form the basis of conviction, though the Courts seek for corroboration as a rule of prudence. But before the said declaration can be acted upon, the Court must be satisfied about the truthfulness of the same and that the said declaration was made by the deceased while he was in a fit condition to make the statement. The dying declaration has to be taken as a whole and the witness who deposes about such oral declaration to him must pass the scrutiny of reliability. ..."

23. "Truth sits upon the lips of a dying man." 0 Matthew Arnold

24. The whole idea of accepting a statement in the name of dying declaration comes from a maxim "Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire" which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. It is believed that when a man is at the point of death and when every expectation of this world is gone, it hushes away every motive of lie.

25. In our view, the oral evidence of the PW02, namely, Hanu Khetrapal is quite natural. On the day of occurrence, he was working in his agricultural field. His presence in his field could be said to be natural. There is no good reason for Hanu Khetrapal (PW02) to come before the trial court and depose falsely against the accused persons. It is not even the case of the accused appellant herein that Hanu Khetrapal (PW02) had some axe to grind against him, including the other co0accused and, therefore, fabricated the entire story of an oral dying declaration. Besides the same, the oral dying declaration of the deceased made before Hanu Khetrapal (PW02) stands corroborated with the medical evidence on record. The medical evidence on record would suggest that there were 75% burn injuries on the chest of the deceased. The burn injuries were suffered by the deceased as the accused persons are said to have poured hot lali (raw material used for preparing liquor)." >

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" "15. Coming to the evidence of extra judicial confessions, we find the same to be improbable and lacking in credence. According to Gurmej Singh and Jabarjang Singh PWs, the confessing accused came to them and blurted out confessions. They also requested those two witnesses to produce them before the police. The resume of facts given above would go to show that according to the prosecution case, the murders of the three deceased persons were committed in a most heinous manner and under a veil of secrecy. Persons who commit such murders after taking precautions of secrecy are not normally likely to become garrulous after the commission of the offence and acquire a sudden proneness to blurt out what they were at pains to conceal.

In any case it seems rather odd that all the three accused who had not been arrested till the morning of May 9, 1972 should be seized almost at the same time by a mood to make confession. It is significant that Surjit Singh, Charan Kaur and Jito accused had no particular relationship or connection with Gurmej Singh and Jabarjang Singh P Ws. These two witnesses were also not in such a position that the above mentioned three accused would be willing to repose their confidence in them. If Surjit Singh, Charan Kaur and Jito wanted to surrender themselves before the police, we fail to understand as to why they should not themselves surrender before the police and go instead to Gurmej Singh and Jabarjang Singh and blurt out confessions before them.

The evidence of extra judicial confession in the very nature of things is a weak piece of evidence. The evidence adduced in this respect in the present case lacks plausibility and, as observed by the High Court, it does not inspire confidence."

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"14. The conviction of the appellant is largely based on the extra judicial confession allegedly made by him before PW1. So far as an extra judicial confession is concerned, it is considered as a weak type of evidence and is generally used as a corroborative link to lend credibility to the other evidence on record. In Chandrapal v. State of Chattisgarh6, this Court reiterated the evidentiary value of an extra judicial confession in the following words: "11.

At this juncture, it may be noted that as per Section 30 of the Evidence Act, when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. However, this court has consistently held that an extra judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence and unless it inspires confidence or is fully corroborated by some other evidence of clinching nature, ordinarily conviction for the offence of murder should not be made only on the evidence of extra judicial confession. As held in case of State of M.P. Through CBI v.

Paltan Mallah, the extra judicial confession made by the coaccused could be admitted in evidence only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In absence of any substantive evidence against the accused, the extra judicial confession allegedly made by the coaccused loses its significance and there cannot be any conviction based on such extra judicial confession of the coaccused."

15. It is no more res integra that an extra judicial confession must be accepted with great care and caution. If it is not supported by other evidence on record, it fails to inspire confidence and in such a case, it shall not be treated as a strong piece of evidence for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion of guilt. Furthermore, the extent of acceptability of an extra judicial confession depends on the trustworthiness of the witness before whom it is given and the circumstances in which it was given. The prosecution must

establish that a confession was indeed made by the accused, that it was voluntary in nature and that the contents of the confession were true. The standard required for proving an extra judicial confession to the satisfaction of the Court is on the higher side and these essential ingredients must be established beyond any reasonable doubt. The standard becomes even higher when the entire case of the prosecution necessarily rests on the extra judicial confession."

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" "Another incriminating circumstance sought to be proved against the accused is the extrajudicial confession alleged to have been made by the ninth accused Paltan Mallah wherein he named A1, A2, A5 and A6. It is alleged that he made the confession to PW 105 Satyaprakash Nishad and A9 is alleged to have disclosed to PW105 that these accused persons had given him money and he murdered Shankar Guha Niyogi for the sake of money. Under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the extrajudicial confession made by a coaccused could be admitted in evidence only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In the absence of any substantive evidence against these accused persons, the extrajudicial confession allegedly made by the ninth accused loses its significance and there cannot be any conviction based on such extra judicial confession. The High Court, in our view, has given cogent and satisfying reasons for the acquittal of the accused A1 to A8. We do not find any reason to interfere with such a finding, especially when this being an appeal against acquittal and this

Court would be slow in reversing such a finding unless the High Court had made a perverse or erroneous appreciation of the evidence resulting in grave miscarriage of justice. The evidence adduced by the prosecution can only throw some serious suspicion against these accused which cannot be used as a substitute for evidence."

(emphasis supplied) 8.

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" "14. As against A2Pancho, the prosecution is relying mainly on the extra judicial confessional statement of A1Pratham. The question which needs to be considered is what is the evidentiary value of a retracted confession of a coaccused?

15. The law on this point is well settled by catena of judgments of this court. We may, however, refer to only two judgments to which our attention is drawn by Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel. In Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 159 referring to the judgment of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, 76 Indian Appeals 147 and observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chukerbutty, 38 Cal. 559 this court observed that proper way to approach a case involving confession of a co accused is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it.

If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. This court further noted that cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession, he would not be prepared to accept.

16. In Haricharan Kurmi v. State Bihar, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1184 the Constitution Bench of this court was again considering the same question. The Constitution Bench referred to Section 3 of the Evidence Act and observed that confession of a coaccused is not evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is neither oral statement which the court permits or requires to be made before it as per Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act nor does it fall in the category of evidence referred to in Section 3(2) of the Evidence Act which covers all documents produced for the inspection of the court. This court observed that even then Section 30 provides that a confession may be taken into consideration not only against its maker, but also against a co accused.

Thus, though such a confession may not be evidence as strictly defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act, it is an element which may be taken into consideration by the criminal court and in that sense, it may be described as evidence in a nontechnical way. This court further observed that Section 30 merely enables the court to take the confession into account. It is, not obligatory on the court to take the confession into account. This court reiterated that a confession cannot be treated as substantive evidence against a co accused.

Where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused against another, the proper approach is to consider the other evidence against such an accused and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused, the court turns to the confession with a view to assuring itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. This Court clarified that though confession may be regarded as evidence in generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act.

cannot start with the confession of a co accused; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence.

17. Applying the above principles to the case on hand, we find that so far as A2Pancho is concerned, except the evidence of alleged belated discovery of certain articles at his instance, which we have already found to be doubtful, there is no other evidence on record to connect him to the offence in question. When there is no other evidence of sterling quality on record establishing his involvement, he cannot be convicted on the basis of the alleged extrajudicial confession of the coaccused A1Pratham, which in our opinion, is also not credible. Once A1Pratham's extrajudicial confession is obliterated and kept out of consideration, his conviction also cannot be sustained because we have come to the conclusion that the alleged discovery of articles at his instance cannot be relied upon. There is thus, no credible evidence to persuade us to uphold the conviction of A1Pratham."

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" "4. Now, the only circumstance which remains is that the accused has a motive for the commission of the offence which alone cannot form the basis for conviction as it is well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should be such so as to lead to only one irresistible conclusion, which is incompatible with the innocence of the accused. This being the position, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the High Court was not justified in upholding the convictions of the appellant."

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514. In the present case the testimony cannot be wholly reliable or wholly unreliable. He is not a chance witness who had no reason to be found near the deceased at the time of the occurrence. There is evidence to show that Palani (PW7) used to sleep with the deceasedSenthil in the verandah of the house. What makes it suspect is that the witness has, despite being a natural witness, made a substantial improvement in the version without their being any acceptable explanation for his silence in regard to the fact and matters which was in his knowledge and which would make all the difference in the case. The Court would, therefore, look for independent corroboration to his version, which corroboration is not forthcoming. All that is brought on record by the prosecution is

the presence of a strong motive but that by itself is not enough to support a conviction especially in a case where the sentence can be capital punishment. In N.J. Suraj v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2004)11 SCC 346, the prosecution case was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence and a motive. Having discussed the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, this Court rejected motive which was the only remaining circumstance relied upon by the prosecution stating that the presence of a motive was not enough for supporting a conviction, for it is well settled that the chain of circumstances should be such as to lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is incompatible with the innocence of the accused.

To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v. State through CBI., 2010(4) RCR (Criminal) 593 : 2010(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 518 : (2010)9 SCC 747 and Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka, 2011(3) RCR (Criminal) 745 : 2011(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 306 where this Court held that motive alone in the absence of any other circumstantial evidence would not be sufficient to convict the appellant. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Sunil Rai @ Paua and Ors. v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 2011(3) RCR (Criminal) 636 : 2011(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 164 .

"In any event, motive alone can hardly be a ground for conviction. On the materials on record, there may be some suspicion against the accused but as is often said suspicion, howsoever, strong cannot take the place of proof."

15. Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants the question of the appellantVelu having the motive to harm the deceasedSenthil for falling in love with his sister, Usha did not survive once the family had decided to offer Usha in matrimony to the deceasedSenthil. Yet even assuming that the appellantVelu had not reconciled to the idea of Usha getting married to the deceased Senthil, all that can be said was that the appellantVelu had a motive

for physically harming the deceased. That may be an important circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place of conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt."

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587. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime on the part of the accused assumes greater importance. This Court in various decisions has laid down the principles holding that motive for commission of offence no doubt assumes greater importance in cases resting on circumstantial evidence than those in which direct evidence regarding commission of offence is available. It is equally true that failure to prove motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself. However, it is also well settled and it is trite in law that absence of motive could be a missing link of incriminating circumstances, but once the prosecution has established the other incriminating circumstances to its entirety, absence of motive will not give any benefit to the accused.

88. Having regard to the nature of the evidence on record, there is something to indicate that the accused appellant had illicit relationship with Manju and wanted to settle in life marrying Manju. As noted above, in the past accused appellant had got engaged with Manju and was on the verge of getting married. At the relevant point of time when the accused appellant got engaged with Manju, it appears that one and all including the deceased Sangeeta were consenting parties. There is nothing on record to indicate that

at the time of engagement of accused appellant with Manju, the deceased Sangeeta had raised hue and cry or had opposed such decision of her husband. Of course, this is something which is very personal. If at all we believe the illicit relationship of the accused appellant with Manju, then it is possible that the deceased Sangeeta might be an absolutely helpless lady and could not have done anything in that regard. However, the moot question is should this motive by alone be held sufficient to convict the accused appellant for the alleged crime and sentence him to death.

89. In the case of Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police Krishnagiri, (2012) 4 SCC 124, decided on 02.03.2012, this Court held as under:

"29. In N.J. Suraj v. State [(2004) 11 SCC 346 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 85] the prosecution case was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence and a motive. Having discussed the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, this Court rejected the motive which was the only remaining circumstance relied upon by the prosecution stating that the presence of a motive was not enough for supporting a conviction, for it is well settled that the chain of circumstances should be such as to lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is incompatible with the innocence of the accused.

30. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v. State [(2010) 9 SCC 747 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1469] and Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka [(2011) 4 SCC 779 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 488 : AIR 2011 SC 1585] where this Court held that motive alone in the absence of any other circumstantial evidence would not be sufficient to convict the appellant. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Sunil Rai v. UT, Chandigarh [(2011) 12 SCC 258 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] . This Court explained the legal position as follows: (Sunil Rai case [(2011) 12 SCC 258 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] , SCC p. 266, paras 3132)

"31. ... In any event, motive alone can hardly be a ground for conviction.

32. On the materials on record, there may be some suspicion against the accused, but as is often said, suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot take the place of proof."

31. Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants the question of the appellant Velu having the motive to harm the deceased Senthil for falling in love with his sister, Usha did not survive once the family had decided to offer Usha in matrimony to the deceased Senthil. Yet even assuming that the appellant Velu had not reconciled to the idea of Usha getting married to the deceased Senthil, all that can be said was that the appellant Velu had a motive for physically harming the deceased. That may be an important circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place of conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."

[Emphasis supplied]

90. Thus, even if it is believed that the accused appellant had a motive to commit the crime, the same may be an important circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place as a conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the accused appellant but suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

91. The fact that we have ruled out the circumstances relating to the making of an extra judicial confession and the discovery of the

weapon of offence as not having been established, the chain of circumstantial evidence snaps so badly that to consider any other circumstance, even like motive, would not be necessary." >:

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