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"152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made :
"certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty.
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence. "
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"15. Coming to the evidence of extra judicial confessions, we find the same to be improbable and lacking in credence. According to Gurmej Singh and Jabarjang Singh P Ws, the confessing accused came to them and blurted out confessions. They also requested those two witnesses to produce them before the police. The resume of facts given above would go to show that according to the prosecution case, the murders of the three deceased persons were committed in a most heinous manner and under a veil of secrecy. Persons who commit such murders after taking precautions of secrecy are not normally likely to become garrulous after the commission of the offence and acquire a sudden proneness to blurt out what they were at pains to conceal.
In any case it seems rather odd that all the three accused who had not been arrested till the morning of May 9, 1972 should be seized almost at the same time by a mood to make confession. It is significant that Surjit Singh, Charan Kaur and Jito accused had no particular relationship or connection with Gurmej Singh and Jabarjang Singh P Ws. These two witnesses were also not in such a position that the above mentioned three accused would be willing to repose their confidence in them. If Surjit Singh, Charan Kaur and Jito wanted to surrender themselves before the police, we fail to understand as to why they should not themselves surrender before the police and go instead to Gurmej Singh and Jabarjang Singh and blurt out confessions before them.
The evidence of extra judicial confession in the very nature of things is a weak piece of evidence. The evidence adduced in this respect in the present case lacks plausibility and, as observed by the High Court, it does not inspire confidence."
3 4 .$% &$ %3 4/ 7 "14. The conviction of the appellant is largely based on the extra judicial confession allegedly made by him before PW
1. So far as an extra judicial confession is concerned, it is considered as a weak type of evidence and is generally used as a corroborative link to
lend credibility to the other evidence on record. In Chandrapal v. State of Chattisgarh6, this Court reiterated the evidentiary value of an extra judicial confession in the following words: "11. At this juncture, it may be noted that as per Section 30 of the Evidence Act, when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.
However, this court has consistently held that an extra judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence and unless it inspires confidence or is fully corroborated by some other evidence of clinching nature, ordinarily conviction for the offence of murder should not be made only on the evidence of extra judicial confession. As held in case of State of M.P. Through CBI v. Paltan Mallah, the extra judicial confession made by the co accused could be admitted in evidence only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In absence of any substantive evidence against the accused, the extra judicial confession allegedly made by the co accused loses its significance and there cannot be any conviction based on such extra judicial confession of the co accused."
15. It is no more res integra that an extra judicial confession must be accepted with great care and caution. If it is not supported by other evidence on record, it fails to inspire confidence and in such a case, it shall not be treated as a strong piece of evidence for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion of guilt. Furthermore, the extent of acceptability of an extra judicial confession depends on the trustworthiness of the witness before whom it is given and the circumstances in which it was given. The prosecution must establish that a confession was indeed made by the accused, that it was voluntary in nature and that the contents of the confession were true. The standard required for proving an extra judicial confession to the satisfaction of the Court is on the higher side and
these essential ingredients must be established beyond any reasonable doubt. The standard becomes even higher when the entire case of the prosecution necessarily rests on the extra judicial confession."
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23. The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs. 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2."
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"32. We shall now weigh the last seen doctrine with respect to D
Priya Nanda. According to P.W.
11, after about 30 to 45 minutes when he saw A 1 and D 1 walking towards the beach, he had seen 1 alone while A 2 was sitting with D 2 in the hotel. After some time, he saw the accused persons and D 2 walking away from Iguana Miraj Hotel. We can safely assume that P.W. 11 saw both the accused persons along with D 2 latest by around 10.30
11.00 p.m. P.W.
6 Amit Banerjee had only a momentary glance of the lady sitting in the Maruti car who, according to the prosecution, came to Hotel Seema on 27.02.1999 with D 2 with a male person allegedly A
1. P.W.
6 has mentioned that the guard of the hotel had an opportunity to see the persons who came along with D 2.
However, the prosecution chose not to examine the guard to identify either A 1 or A
2. It is difficult to believe P.W.
6 that he had seen A
2 sitting in the car when he had got an opportunity to look at her for merely one to two minutes. In his statement, he has described her as a lady with short hair. He has not given any description indicating that he had seen somebody sitting in the car whose face was visible from one side. Even when he was examined by the police, he had not described the features of A
2. In the absence of any other supporting material on record, it will not be possible to believe the statement of P.W.
6 that he had seen A 2 sitting in the car on the night of 27.02.1999 to establish the fact that when D left the hotel she accompanied A
2. Similarly, with respect to A 1, P.W.
6 who had an opportunity to see A 1 for the first time for a very short duration to recognise him to be a person who accompanied D 2 to Hotel Seema on the night of 27.2.1999, he had only a fleeting glance of male person who came with D 2 as he was busy in settling the account with her. That apart, the dead body of 2 was found at around 7.30 a.m. on 28.02.1999 at Vagator Beach, around 60 kms. from the beach where the dead body of D was recovered and quite a long distance from Hotel Seema. Hence, there has been a considerable time gap of approximately 81⁄2 hours when D 2 was last seen alive with the accused couple. There being a considerable time gap between the persons seen together and the proximate time of crime, the circumstance of last seen together, even if proved, cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt on the accused. **** **** ****
35. In the light of the factors that evidence regarding the recovery of the incriminating materials from the accused persons has been discarded; that there has been sufficient time gap between the instances when the accused persons were last seen together with the deceased persons; and in the absence of any other corroborative piece of evidence to complete the chain of circumstances to fasten the guilt on the accused couple, we are of the opinion that the accused have been rightly given the benefit of doubt by the courts below. We have found that the finding of the
High Court that the chain of circumstances is not complete to conclusively establish that either A 1 or A 2 alone or with the common intention of each other have committed the dreadful crime of murder of newly married couple, is correct and merely suspicion, however grave, cannot replace the weight attached to the evidence. Accordingly, we order for dismissal of the appeals. Appeals dismissed."
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This is because the underlying rationale of the said right is to ensure the reliability as well as voluntariness of statements that are admitted as evidence. This Court has recognised that the protective scope of Article 20(3) extends to the investigative stage in criminal cases and when read with section 161(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 it protects accused persons, suspects as well as witnesses who are examined during an investigation. The test results cannot be admitted in evidence if they have been obtained through the use of compulsion. Article 20(3) protects an individual's choice between speaking and remaining silent, irrespective of whether the subsequent testimony proves to be inculpatory or exculpatory. Article 20(3) aims to prevent the forcible 'conveyance of personal knowledge that is relevant to the facts in issue'. The results obtained from each of the impugned tests bear a 'testimonial' character and they cannot be categorised as material evidence.
222. We are also of the view that forcing an individual to undergo any of the impugned techniques violates the standard of 'substantive due process' which is required for restraining personal liberty. Such a violation will occur irrespective of whether these techniques are forcibly administered during the course of an investigation or for any other purpose since the test results could also expose a person to
adverse consequences of a non penal nature. The impugned techniques cannot be read into the statutory provisions which enable medical examination during investigation in criminal cases, i.e. the Explanation to Sections 53, 53A and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Such an expansive interpretation is not feasible in light of the rule of 'ejusdem generis' and the considerations which govern the interpretation of statutes in relation to scientific advancements. We have also elaborated how the compulsory administration of any of these techniques is an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would also amount to 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' with regard to the language of evolving international human rights norms.
Furthermore, placing reliance on the results gathered from these techniques comes into conflict with the 'right to fair trial'. Invocations of a compelling public interest cannot justify the dilution of constitutional rights such as the 'right against self incrimination'.
223. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test.
However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted, in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The National Human Rights Commission had published 'Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused' in 2000.
technique' and the 'Brain Electrical Activation Profile' test. The text of these guidelines has been reproduced below :
(i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test. (ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
(iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate. (iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer. (v) At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a 'confessional' statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
(vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
(vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record."
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