State Of Punjab v. Labh Singh And ORS.
! " #
$$ % & '&
(
()
*% +, *& " -
. - ,, +, *& " - &-&- /0
!"#$"
% &'"&( )( * " *+ ,- + ..
/ 0
)1 $! *+#+2+#3+ ..4 & / 0 4 *+ ,- + ..
1&
.5 .
, 1 "&( 04 *+#+2+#3+ ..4 0, *+ ,- + ..
+%
&-&- /01 "&
) !(""
2-
!345 .& ,56 -$76
689 ()
24$8 -$76 .& -
!345 6891 !1"
! " & ( )
) .7.7 ..
1* 8 9(:
;<" !1" ! (/ (
( 4.,+3 ,7-+ *
; => 4 (! ) )1% ! " 0 ; => 4 ! (( & (!
+ "(Statement of Kuldip Kaur d/o Tejinder Singh Jat Sikh resident of Mohalla Sethian, Gali Hakima Wali Faridkot, age about 26 years.
It is stated that I am residing in the house of my parents for the last about 1 1⁄2 years and I have two daughters. I have been married for the last about six years. I was married with Labh Singh son of Bhagwant Singh Caste Jat Sikh r/o Chhateana, District Muktsar and now was residing in the house of my parents. Because I was distressed from my in1laws family and my husband Labh Singh, brother1in1law (Jeth) Gawa Singh, sister1in1law (Jathani) Kuldip Kaur used to harass me and said to bring more dowry from my parents, which my parents could not give. For this reason, on being harassed by my
husband, jeth and jethani, on 8.6.98, at about 7 p.m. I poured kerosene oil upon me and set on fire myself. At that time except my grandmother Mohinder kaur, no one was present in the house. On catching fire, I raised alarm for rescue and neighbourers gathered, who put earth upon me and extinguished the fire. My father had gone to the field who was brought and he got admitted me in the medical college/hospital Faidkot for my treatment.
RO & AC RTI Kuldip Kaur Sd/1 Piare Lal EM Faridkot dated 9.6.98 at 3.10 a.m. today in Guru Gobind Singh Medical Hospital, Faridkot Police proceedings1 Today one medical ruqa No 1662 dated 8.6.98 received from the doctor of Guru Gobind Singh Medical College that Kuldip Kaur daughter of Tejinder Singh resident of Mohalla Sethian is admitted in the hospital due to catching fire in a burnt condition, upon which I the ASI alongwith HC Nachhatar Singh 1466 PHG Balwinger Singh, C.
Naval Kishore 726 on Government Canter the driver of which is Paramjit Singh reached the hospital for recording statement of Kuldip Kaur and asked from the doctor in writing that Kuldip Kaur is able to give statement or not and due to serious condition of Kuldip Kaur, her dying declaration be got recorded from the magistrate, upon which after writing the request produced before SDM Sahib Faridkot who has deputed Shri Piare Lal Tehsildar 1cum Executive Magistrate, who on reaching hospital, recorded the aforesaid statement of Kuldip Kaur.
( admitting it correct, put her right thumb impression underneath her statement, which has been attested by Shri Piare Lal Executive Magistrate. From this statement offence under Section 498 A IPC is found, upon which this statement is sent to the police station for registration of case under the said offence against the aforesaid accused through C. Naval Kishore. On registration of the case, case number be intimated, Higher officer and P.C.R be intimated. I alongwith co1officials is busy for investigation at the spot. Special reports be issued Sd/1 Purjit Singh ASI, PS City Faridkot dated 9.6.99 GGSM Hospital, Faridkot, time 4 a.m. Today in the police station: On receipt of the aforesaid statement on registration of the case under the said offence against the said accused in the register, copy of the FIR along with original statement is being sent to the concerned ASI at the spot, through the arrival constable. Special reports are being sent to the higher officers through HC Jaljit Singh 700. Information is being given to the I/C PCR through wireless message.
* ; &/ ?+ 0,,.7.27-.55) 8 ?
'@" *1;< .7.27-A 4 ( ; " & ( )1()) ( & "
( B4 * * ! * (" ( !1* "(!())
' * 8 ";< ( .477-"(
( 4.,+3",7-+ 4, *! ) ?(( , # ( "( >)
C " )" .7.277-" ( ( => "! 1# ";<( ) % "!
'! (* '";<"!(1 ( (=> 4 ! )<) ') % ! ( )<) () =>
) )< ) ) ! ( 4. ) .7.277- " ( ) " ! (+>) " < !! =>( & ( 1 () ' & 1 ! ! 1 )<) ') ) ) )< ) ' < )(
*<&(< % => , ( >) C4#%%!"
"; ( ( #) "$$ ( (";<"!( ( %
...) 2.277- !(() 1
!).5) .-.277- ! )*8 2.277-'
!
+ "1) There were superficial as well as deep burns present on whole of body except head axillae, part of race, right shoulder joint lateral part of right arm and fingers of both hands. White creame onitment was present here and there. Superficial slought was fallen off at places. Approximate percentage of burns was 90%.
The patient was kept under observation for surgeon's opinion and the probable duration was within one to two weeks. I have brought the original medico1legal register today in the court. Ex.P5 is the certified carbon copy of the MLR, which bears my signatures and is correct as per original. Ex.P5/1 is the pictorial diagrams showing the burns".
5
C4 # %% ! ( ( )) >) .-5) -.277- 1 % %
!
1 + "There were superficial as well as deep burns present on whole of body except head part of face, right shoulder joint axillae lateral part of right arm, fingers of both hands and public region. Superficial slough was fallen
: off at place. Pulse was present over burnt areas. Approximate percentage of burns was 90%". 2
" ( ( ! () 7.D !(! ( ( 1 ( (+>) "
% ! ) (1) .5) .-.277-1 "! ' !) 1>( () B
( >) C,% )"
! & ( ( (1 .5.277-1* *8 ";< (
( 75* * )1% ) ! > => . $ ( " # ) " ()=> 8 " C2( ) ; => 4 CB ( <<
( -
( >) C-# $!" # ;<" ! " =>( & () % "!
( C7 ! ( )" % ! ) 177 &! ) )"/ !1!& 1
) ) ) 1 ?41 ! "1 1) )!1 (( !) ) 5."...?+ 1 ! ) # ) ) "(( "
( 5* * * ;<=& "
(1!< (( & '
( 5* *" !(" ) ( B..?+) ! > @ % "
(("!& (( @ 1 ! ) (1* " & 1 .2..)" E1 < < ! 1 +! & % ! ) ( E +!F ( & (+>) " ?> ) +!F
( & ! !) ) ') ! =>#" '!&" ) ( ! =>#' ( (
; ) ! =>#)( (!( 1 (' )(
( 5* *!& -77B! ! ;< () ) (( ' ) "8 < ! ! ( ! ) 7
( >) C. "
!! '% !) .B?.-1! (( 4G1 )"&(
! (( % " (("
() !& (! ) (( ) ) 1 ) (( ) ) 1" % () "
!1 G1 (
(
5* * (( ) (
) (! >1* B..?+ ) " 1 > ) ( 1* ()) (1 < <
.
( >) C8 "
!! ' ) C. ( >)
C # "!(% )<) ..) .7.27- ) !(1 ( >) #
" @"$$"
(* '";<"!( )<) ...) .7.277- & (< % % .54 )
B.277- )( (
>) C, ($ ( "!!
& @ ( ( 1'(
( B4* * "( >)
C5 "!!(!( & 1 (+>) " (& << )( & " ( 1 >( ) ' ( ! .?5 )
( <<' ( 4?, '&( ( # '( ) 1 ( ( & (") (( !(
( 44* * "
0 1 && ! ( + "I am Innocent. Ghawa Singh and his wife Kaldip Kaur were separated in mess and cultivation from me. There
was no demand of any dowry or articles and harassment on my part. Kuldip Kaur deceased was married since more than seven years before her death. Kuldip Kaur deceased used to reside for more than 1 1⁄2 years with her grand mother at Faridkot, before her death. She filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. against me in the year 1997. Tejinder Singh, her father and Major Singh her uncle i.e. of the deceased, had taken her to G.G.S. Medical College, Faridkot for treatment, where they both made statement before the doctor that Kuldip Kaur had received burn injuries accidentally and there is no fault of any body and they don't want to proceed against any body and they don't want to proceed against any body for her burns. Both Tejinder Singh and Major Singh had signed their statement before the doctor. Later on, they concocted 1% )< 1) ) ( ( one. I have been falsely implicated in this case by making all relations as false witnesses".
) !< 1(+(( " )1"
$! % )
( 44 * * ?(( >) #C # % ! #& " ! ( .-.277- ! ) (1) (1@ # ) 1=># ! 1>) 1)' 3 !.?B. !-,)
! )1; (#) " !("(!
# ') ) )
(&=> " ) "! 4 (
! (
* ,- .
&) 1 * ((1(& ( (
("1 ( "!(!(1
C "=>( & "% " (("
& ?(( !
& ) ;
) C7 (1! " % % " ( ( ! ( ( 1"
(
( !) !1
! .B1 ) " (
( ,7-+ 4., 3!() ( ") (! 1 .5.277- ()) (
.-.277- " ! 1 ")& (!&( 1 , @ " (
04% )!+ +!
98 : % " ((=& &) 1!1 ( & (1 !1
)
=& ")( ( "!
) !1) ) .41"
! & (( 11 1 =& "!1 ! (G1 ! / ) 1 "1 ( ! (1 =>( & &1 ( "! (1(( ) % " (( (! & ! 1 ( ! 5 C& (
( 2
(" ( 4.,+3 H!1 A &
) !1)
+ "304−B. Dowry death. -(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation. -For the purpose of this sub− section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
( seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
Section 304B (1) defines 'dowry death' of a woman. It provides that 'dowry death' is where death of a woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Sub− clause (2) provides for punishment for those who cause dowry death. Accordingly, in Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC 201, a three−Judge Bench of this Court held as follows:
"10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304−B IPC, the following essential ingredients are to be established: (i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a 'normal circumstance';
(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage;
(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry; and (v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death." B % &! "!& >) ! ( 4.,+3 *! (C&>) !% "
' (("! (( 1 (
( !) !1"H A (") ( ( % !) .21 C7)! ( ' ! ! ) !1 ) ) % % " ') 1 )) ) .
?.41" )' .4 1" ?(( ) ) 1 )=& C. 4G 1 )" ! ?(( % % " ( (" () C7 C. (1 % )& ( ) (
( 5* * ! ) ( B..?+ ) ! .5.277- @ 1 ! ) (1* "% &
1" .2..)" E1 < < " ) E +!F) ( & C7 ) > ) +! ( & " ) ()) (1%
% ! +!F ( &(
( * * ( & " 1 (;)) C7 C. " G1()) ("% !1! ) "1 1( ) "(
! (( 11 1)
=&
!" )& ( ( " ! ) !1 % ()) (!
) +!F ( &=& !" 1
&1! (
( ! ) !1 .21 )"! ! !1 .4?.,1 ) -
("!( (
( 4.,+3"' F )* ) Harjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2006 AIR (Supreme Court) 680 and 2006(1) SCC 463 ! +
19. In the case of unnatural death of a married woman as in a case of this nature, the husband could be prosecuted under Section 302, Section 3041B and Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The distinction as regards commission of an offence under one or the other provisions as mentioned hereinbefore came up for
: consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in -<$8 -$76 = 8& <& -
!345 681
( 8$>$? '' -%@
) - A1 wherein it was held :
"Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is "at any time" after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are "in connection with the marriage of the said parties". This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or giving property as between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of "dowry". Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 3041B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage.
It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 3041B is to be invoked. But it should have happened "soon before her death." The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words "soon before her death" is to
) emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is vide the court would be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the harassment or cruelty would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept "soon before her death"."
20.
Yet again in Hira Lal and Others v. State (Govt. of NCT ) Delhi, 2003(3) RCR (Criminal) 830 (SC): [(2003) 8 SCC 80], this Curt observed that "The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 3041B IPC and Section 1131B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before" used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods "soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession". The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however,
; to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence".
7 ("(( (<
(.B..) .-.277- ) 1 C4 #%%!"% " ((" .5) .-.277- " (" !( ( "&
=& ") !(.5.)
.7.277-=& "!) (* ' ;< ())(8 ( ) ?1 ( ( (" ( 1 ( 1 =>( & "!&"! 8 ( ! 1 &" & @ ( & )&
( ) 8 ( ( ) &" (" () !! ( ! ( "!& (1
* ! ( &!< 1 * ! &! !
(1 &
) 1*
. 1' F )* ) 26B88 68 .& -
*686891
) -3C8> 38
) ' 8$>$?
) ! + "14. As the trial court and High Court, having appreciated the evidence on record, has come to diametrically opposite conclusions, mandating herein to observe certain witness statements which may have an important bearing in this case. In the processes of appreciating the evidence at the appellate stage, we need to keep in mind the views of this court as expressed in Tota Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, 1987(2) RCR (Criminal) 35 : 1987 CriLJ 974 1 "The High Court has not found in its judgment that the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of PW2 and PW6 were either unreasonable or perverse.
What the High Court has done is to make an independent reappraisal of the evidence on its own and to set aside the acquittal merely on the ground that as a result of such reappreciation, the High Court was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded by the learned Sessions Judge.
variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterized as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a view which is plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous."
In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, 1997(3) RCR (Criminal) 62 : 1996 CriLJ 2867, this Court observed:
"This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it
were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed."
8$>$? CC? & ( (E
'
@<$ -68> . -
<8>
&&&
?6$ 68A"( .B .
"' F )*
+ "Before venturing into the merits of the case, we would like to reiterate the scope of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.P.C.') while deciding an appeal by the High Court, as the position of law is rather settled. We would like to quote the relevant portion of a recent judgment of this Court in Jafarudheen and Others v. State of Kerala (2022 SCC Online SC 495) as follows:
"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.
Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering
acquittal.
Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."
&! &( " )
) .7.7 ..
1* 8 9(:;<" &
(( 1)
4 ( " 1" "
(( 1
,
* ( (<*
5 ( ( )1 ) 9 . - ,, "
&-&- /0 4.5 .
, "
amit rana C< ? I?0 C
I?0