Dilbagh Singh v. Gurcharan Singh And ANR

[1]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Date of decision: 24.03.2026 Dilbag Singh ...Appellant

Versus

Gurcharan Singh and another

...Respondents

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present:

Mr. Arvind Kashyap, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-defendant No.1 assailing the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, whereby the suit filed by respondent No.1-plain6ff for declara6on and permanent injunc6on has been decreed on 04.05.2017, and the appeal preferred by the appellant has been dismissed on 26.10.2022.

2.

The factual matrix, in brief, is that the plain6ff-respondent ins6tuted a suit seeking declara6on to the effect that he is owner in possession to the extent of 8 kanals of land out of the joint holding, on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 29.07.1996 executed by defendant No.2-Avtar Singh, followed by a registered sale deed dated 19.09.1997. Muta6on was sanc6oned on basis of this sale deed and was incorporated in Jamabandi for the year 1997-98. It was further his case that defendant No.2, despite having already agreed to sell the said land to the plain6ff and having received earnest money, subsequently entered into another agreement to sell dated 26.05.1997 in favour of defendant No.1 and, on the basis thereof, defendant No.1 obtained a decree for specific performance dated 05.05.2000 and got a sale deed executed through Court on 20.07.2001. The plain6ff alleged that the said decree and sale deed were collusive, illegal and not binding upon his rights, as he had already acquired

[2] 6tle and possession by virtue of the earlier transac6on. 3.

The suit was contested by defendant No.1 by taking preliminary objec6ons regarding maintainability, limita6on and locus standi. On merits, it was pleaded that the agreement to sell dated 29.07.1996 was forged and ante-dated and had been created in connivance with defendant No.2 to defeat the rights of defendant No.1. It was further asserted that the plain6ff had knowledge of the earlier decree and sale deed and, therefore, the suit was barred by limita6on.

4.

On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed the necessary issues and, aBer apprecia6ng the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the par6es, decreed the suit. It was held that the agreement to sell dated 29.07.1996 stood duly proved through aCes6ng witnesses and other suppor6ng evidence, and that the sale deed dated 19.09.1997 validly conferred 6tle upon the plain6ff. The Trial Court further held that the decree dated 05.05.2000 obtained by defendant No.1 was not binding upon the plain6ff, who was not impleaded as a party therein, and that the subsequent sale deed dated 20.07.2001 was ineffec6ve to the extent it affected the rights of the plain6ff. 5.

Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the appellant preferred an appeal, which too came to be dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court. The Appellate Court, upon reappraisal of the en6re evidence, affirmed the findings of the Trial Court. It was specifically held that the suit was not barred by limita6on, as the cause of ac6on arose only when the possession of the plain6ff was threatened during execu6on proceedings. It was further held that the agreement to sell dated 29.07.1996 had been duly proved and could not be said to be ante-dated. The Appellate Court also recorded a categorical finding that aBer execu6on of the sale deed in favour of the plain6ff, defendant No.2 was leB with only a limited share and, therefore, could not have validly conveyed the same property to defendant No.1.

[3] 6.

Assailing the concurrent findings, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that both the Courts below have misread and misappreciated the evidence on record. It is argued that the agreement to sell dated 29.07.1996 is a fabricated and ante-dated document and has not been proved in accordance with law, par6cularly as neither the original document nor the stamp vendor was produced. It is further contended that the suit is barred by limita6on, as the plain6ff had knowledge of the decree dated 05.05.2000 and the sale deed dated 20.07.2001, yet failed to challenge the same within the prescribed period. 7.

Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and having perused the record, this Court finds that no substan6al ques6on of law arises for considera6on in the present appeal. Both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings of fact aBer due apprecia6on of evidence. 8.

The plea of limita6on raised by the appellant has been rightly rejected. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court clearly show that the plain6ff's possession remained undisturbed and his name con6nued to be reflected in the revenue record since the year 1997-98, and it was only when execu6on proceedings were ini6ated and possession was sought to be taken that a cause of ac6on accrued to him. Such a finding is essen6ally factual in nature and does not warrant interference in second appeal.

9.

As regards the validity of the agreement to sell dated 29.07.1996, both the Courts below have concurrently held the same to be duly proved through aCes6ng witnesses and other corrobora6ve evidence. It is well seCled that non-examina6on of the stamp vendor is not fatal when the execu6on of the document stands otherwise proved. The plea of anteda6ng has been rightly rejected in the absence of any cogent evidence. 10.

Further, it is not in dispute that the sale deed in favour of the plain6ff was executed on 19.09.1997 and muta6on was sanc6oned in his favour. Once defendant No.2 had already conveyed the land to the plain6ff,

[4] he was leB with no right to enter into a subsequent agreement or to suffer a decree in respect of the same property. The decree obtained by defendant No.1 without impleading the plain6ff, who was a necessary party, cannot bind the plain6ff.

11.

The findings recorded by the Courts below are based on sound reasoning and correct applica6on of law. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity or illegality in the impugned judgments. The present appeal, in substance, seeks reapprecia6on of evidence, which is not permissible within the limited scope of jurisdic6on under Sec6on 100 CPC. 12.

Consequently, finding no merit in the present appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 24.03.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned :

Yes/No Whether reportable :

Yes/No