High Court of Punjab and HaryanaCWP/3198/2026dismissed

Shalender v. State Of Haryana And Others

2026-02-17Mr. Justice Sandeep Moudgil10 pages

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!, "14. The scope of interference by the Court with the order of suspension has been examined by the Court in a large number of cases, particularly in State of M.P. v. Sardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108;P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India, (1993) 1 SCC 419; Director General, ESI & Anr. v. T. Abdul Razak, AIR 1996 SC 2292; Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2118; Delhi Cloth General Mills vs. Kushan Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806; U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors. v. Sanjeev Rajan, (1993) Supp. (3) SCC 483; State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 417; Secretary to Govt., Prohibition and Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157; and Allahabad Bank & Anr. v.

Deepak Kumar Bhola, (1997) 4 SCC 1, wherein it has been observed that even if a criminal trial or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to the court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon them by the provisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order, if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned. Where the charges are baseless, mala fide or vindictive and are framed only to keep the delinquent employee out of job, a case for judicial review is made out.

But in a case where no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in question and in order that the disciplinary proceedings may continue unhindered the court may not interfere. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the authority is not proceeding expeditiously as it ought to have been and it results in prolongation of sufferings for the delinquent employee, the court may issue directions. The court may, in case the authority fails to furnish proper explanation for delay in conclusion of the enquiry, direct to complete the enquiry within a stipulated period. However, mere delay in conclusion of enquiry or trial can not be a ground for quashing the suspension order, if the charges are grave in nature.

But, whether the employee should or should not continue in his office during the period of enquiry is a matter to be assessed by the disciplinary authority concerned and ordinarily the court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed in mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employee with the misconduct in question.

Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of his position. More so, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as which version is true when there are claims and counter claims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it an appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review."

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(1) The appointing authority or any other authority to which it is subordinate or the punishing authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor, by general or special order, may place a Government employee under suspension where─ (a) a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial: or (c) in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State:"

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, "13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and 5 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483: 1994 SCC (L&S) 67: (1993) 25 ATC commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action.

It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him.

the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.

14. On the facts in this case, we are of the considered view that since serious allegations of misconduct have been alleged against the respondent, the Tribunal was quite unjustified in interfering with the orders of suspension of the respondent pending inquiry. The Tribunal appears to have proceeded in haste in passing the impugned orders even before the ink is dried on the orders passed by the appointing authority. The contention of the respondent, therefore, that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal should not be interferred with and this Court would be loath to interfere with the exercise of such discretionary power cannot be given acceptance."

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! Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji (supra) Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (supra)

State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra) '

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sham Whether speaking/reasoned :

Yes/No Whether reportable :

Yes/No