Surinder Kumar v. State Of Punjab

-1IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of decision: 10.01.2023
 

 ....Petitioner(s)

Versus

    



...Respondent(s)

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMAN CHAUDHARY ***** Present :

Mr. Naveen Bawa, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Kamalpreet Bawa, AAG Punjab.

Mr.PS Hundal, Advocate for respondent No.2-complainant. *****

   Present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of Kalandra bearing No.25 dated 08.03.2018, under Sections 107/150 of Cr.P.C., registered at Police Station Division No. A, District Amritsar and notice dated 08.03.2018 under Sections 107/150 Cr.P.C., whereby petitioner has been summoned to appear before the Court of Deputy Commissioner of Police-cum-Executive Magistrate, Amritsar. Learned counsel appearing on the petitioner makes a reference to Section 116 (6) of the CrPC, as per which the inquiry under the said section has to be completed within six months from the date of its commencement, which he submits has not been done in the present case. He thus, makes a submission that

-2the proceedings would stand terminated automatically as there is nothing on record to show that extension had been granted by the Magistrate. Learned State counsel as also learned counsel for respondent No.2 are unable to controvert the aforesaid submission or produce any order granting extension of the period for conducting the enquiry. Heard.

It is apposite to refer to Section 116(6) of CrPC, which reads thus: "(6) The inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs..." (emphasis supplied)
  

                        

   

      

 

       

         

        



       

      

       

 

  

   

 

    



      

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-3-          

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  Bare perusal of the provision reveals two-fold mandate, viz., (1) span of life of the proceedings is determined as six months; and (2) the consequence of non-compliance of provisions is laid. The use of expression "shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated" leaves no room for doubt that in the event of the inquiry not having been completed within the stipulated period, the proceedings automatically come to an end, as the Magistrate becomes functus officio as has no seisin of the case.

By operation of law, the proceedings are automatically terminated for all intents and purposes and cannot be revived even in revisional jurisdiction, though Magistrate could have made them to continue but only before the elapsing of the period, that too after recording of special reasons in writing, which can also be scrutinized by the higher Court. Aforesaid is fortified from Sub-section (7) of Section 116 which empowers the Sessions Judge to vacate a direction made by the Magistrate under Sub-section (6) permitting the continuance of the proceedings, if he is satisfied that it was not based on any special reason or was perverse.

Evidently, the legislature in its wisdom has not only circumscribed the power of the Magistrate to extend the life of inquiry, by mandating recording of special reasons in writing but has also put an embargo on the exercise of such power by subjecting it to scrutiny by a higher court. The power of a revisional Court to direct continuance of proceedings after it has automatically come to an end is also excluded, there being in existence no corresponding provision in the Code, empowering the Sessions Judge in that regard.

-4Since in the present case, the enquiry as contemplated by the provision has admittedly not been conducted within the requisite period and nothing has been shown that any order for continuation of the said proceedings was passed with the permissible period, which could have been by giving specific reasons, as is the mandate which is manifestly clear from the provision. Thus, as a natural corollary, the proceedings automatically came to an end, there being no necessity of passing of a specific order of termination, as was held in Shrimati Vinod and others vs. Dr.Ram Parshad Chopra and another, 1985(1) RCR (Crl.) 182(Del) In view of the above discussion, no further orders are required to be passed in the present case and as such, the same is disposed of as such. (AMAN CHAUDHARY) JUDGE January 10, 2023 M.Kamra/S.Sharma(syr) Whether speaking/reasoned :

Yes/No Whether reportable :

Yes/No