Parminder Singh And ANR v. State Of U.T, Chd And ANR

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH Date of Decision: January 20, 2015 Parminder Singh and another

...Petitioners

Versus

State of U.T. Chandigarh and another

...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NARESH KUMAR SANGHI

Present:

Mr. H.S. Bhullar, Advocate, for the petitioners.

Mr. Sukant Gupta, Addl. PP, for respondent No. 1-UT, Chandigarh.

Mr. J.S. Mehandiratta, Advocate, for respondent No. 2.

NARESH KUMAR SANGHI, J. (Oral) 1.

Challenge in the present petition, filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C., is for quashing of FIR No. 126, dated 6.5.2011, for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 498-A, IPC, registered at Police Station, Sector 11, Chandigarh. 2.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the allegations levelled against the petitioners are highly

improbable since the complainant has failed to lodge her complaint before any authority with regard to demand of dowry and harassment before leaving India on 5.9.2010; the petitioners being permanently residing at New Zealand, therefore, they could not come to India for joining the investigation; the ratio of the judgment delivered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Bhaskar Lal Sharma and another v. Monica and others, 2014 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 987, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand; the complainant had left India on 5.9.2010 and thereafter she left the house of her husband in New Zealand on 23.9.2010; and that before coming to India, the complainant never lodged any report with any authority at New Zealand with regard to cruelty or harassment allegedly meted out to her at the hands of the petitioners.

3.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that the averments in the FIR would clearly spell out that the petitioners had not only treated the complainant with cruelty, but also harassed her for and on account of demand of dowry after her marriage, which was solemnized at Chandigarh, and before leaving India on 5.9.2010 and, as such, local police had the jurisdiction to register the case and investigate it. He

further contends that from the contents of the FIR and other material available on record it is, prima facie, established that the essential ingredients of Sections 406 and 498-A, IPC, are clearly attracted for proceeding further against the petitioners. He further contends that before coming back to India, the complainant had lodged her protest with regard to her maltreatment at the hands of the petitioners before the authorities at New Zealand. The said material is also available on police record.

4.

Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent No. 2 submits that the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the basis of the ratio of the judgment delivered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Lal Sharma (supra). The powers enshrined under Section 482, Cr.P.C., cannot be exercised as matter of routine to interfere with the statutory power of the police to conduct investigation in a cognizable offence. In support of above submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court delivered in the case of State of Karnataka and another v. Pastor P. Raju, (2006) 6 SCC 728. While passing the said judgment, their Lordships of Hon'ble the Supreme Court placed reliance on an earlier decision in the matter of Union of India v.

Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195.

5.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their able assistance gone through the material available on record.

6.

The admitted facts of the case are that the marriage of petitioner No. 1, Parminder Singh, was solemnized with respondent No. 2/complainant, Ravigeet, on 18.7.2010 in a hotel at Chandigarh. Thereafter the petitioners as well as respondent No. 2/complainant went to New Zealand.

7.

Perusal of the FIR reveals that as per the desire of petitioner No. 1, Parminder Singh, and his family members, elaborate arrangements for the marriage party were made at Hotel Park-View, Chandigarh. Dowry articles were handed over to the petitioners during course of the marriage. The list of such articles has been appended with the FIR.

8.

After the marriage, not only the petitioners but the brothers of petitioner No. 1 had also demanded money from father of respondent No. 2/complainant in lieu of furniture, which was not given at the time of marriage and, as such, a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/- was paid to the petitioners by her father. Immediately after the marriage, the attitude of the petitioners towards respondent No. 2/complainant had changed and they

started taunting her. The jewellery of the complainant was forcibly taken from her by petitioner No. 2. On 20.7.2010, the petitioners alongwith their co-accused asked the complainant to tell her father that a car which was below their standard was given at the time of marriage. In fact, they were expecting a Honda City car. It was also told that if the said car was not given to them, then she would not be allowed to live in the house. In spite of the fact that the complainant told the petitioners that her father had already spent a lot of money on the marriage, therefore, he was not in a position to further fulfil their demands, yet the petitioners did not listen to her rather threatened her that if Honda City car was not arranged, then they would throw her out of the house. When she (complainant) narrated the said facts to her father, then he assured to pay some more amount instead of the car.

9.

On 23.7.2010, father of the complainant alongwith one Harinder Kumar, went to the house of the in-laws of the complainant and handed over Rs. 2,00,000/- to the petitioners. At that time, father of the complainant assured the petitioners that he would try to arrange more money, however, it was requested that the petitioners should not say anything to the complainant.

10.

On 1.8.2010, father of the complainant once again visited the house of the in-laws of the complainant and paid Rs. 1,00,000/- to petitioner No. 2 (mother-in-law) and requested not to demand more amount.

11.

On hearing the said things, petitioner No. 2 got annoyed and told father of the complainant that if she (complainant) wanted to settle down at New Zealand, then he (father of the complainant) had to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- more. 12.

In spite of the requests of the complainant and her father, the petitioners remained adamant on their demands. On 3.8.2010, petitioner No. 2 went to New Zealand and took away all the jewellery of the complainant with her. In the FIR, the complainant has also narrated her subsequent miseries at the hands of petitioner No. 1 and his brothers.

13.

The allegations levelled in the FIR would clearly spell out that within a short span of time during which respondent No. 2/complainant lived with petitioner No. 1, she was not only treated with cruelty but was also harassed for and on account of dowry by her husband and his family members. The case is at the stage of investigation.

14.

The argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the allegations levelled against the petitioners

are highly improbable, is not justified.

15.

In para 10 of the judgment in the case of Bhaskar Lal Sharma (supra), while discussing the scope and ambit of the Court's power to quash a criminal proceeding, it was held as under:- "10.

The facts, as alleged, therefore will have to be proved which only be done in the course of a regular trial. It is wholly unnecessary for us to embark upon a discourse as regards the scope and ambit of the Court's power to quash a criminal proceeding. Appreciation, even in a summary manner, of the averments made in a complaint petition or FIR would not be permissible at the stage of quashing and the facts stated will have to be accepted as they appear on the very face of it. This is the core test that has to be applied before summoning the accused. Once the aforesaid stage is overcome, the facts alleged have to be proved by the complainant/prosecution on the basis of legal evidence in order to establish the penal liability of the person charged with the offence." (emphasis added) 16.

In para 15 of the judgment in the case of Pastor P. Raju (supra), with regard to the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C., it was held as under:- "15.

......Section 482 CrPC saves inherent

powers of the High Court and such a power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This power can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings pending in any court but the power cannot be exercised to interfere with the statutory power of the police to conduct investigation in a cognizable offence. This question has been examined in detail in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195, where after referring to King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18, H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196, State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak, AIR 1963 SC 447, Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117, and State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 554, it was observed as under in para 20 of the Report (SCC): (Prakash P. Hinduja case, SCC p. 209) "20.

Thus the legal position is absolutely clear and also settled by judicial authorities that the court would not interfere with the investigation or during the course of investigation which would mean from the time of the lodging of the first information report till the submission of the report by the officer in charge of the police station in court under Section 173(2) CrPC, this field being exclusively reserved for the investigating agency."

This being the settled legal position, the High Court ought not to have interfered with and quashed the entire proceedings in exercise of power conferred by Section 482 CrPC when the matter was still at the investigation stage." (emphasis added) 17.

After taking into consideration the overall facts of the case and the ratio of the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the cases of Bhaskar Lal Sharma (supra) and Pastor P. Raju (supra), no ground for quashing of the impugned FIR is made out, at this stage.

18.

Dismissed.

(NARESH KUMAR SANGHI) January 20, 2015 JUDGE Pkapoor