State Of Punjab v. Yoginder Sharma

[1]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

The State of Punjab and others ...Appellants

Versus

Yoginder Sharma (Now deceased) Through LRs ...Respondent *****

Reserved on: 04.02.2026

Pronounced on: 06.02.2026 Pronounced fully/opera2ve part: Fully

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by: Mr. Puru Jarewal, DAG, Punjab for the appellants. Mr. Aayush Gupta, Advocate and Mr. Abhishek Chaudhary, Advocate for the respondent(s).

**** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The defendants are before this Court by way of the present Regular Second Appeal, assailing the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. The suit for permanent injunc5on ins5tuted by the plain5ff Yoginder Sharma was decreed by the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 16.01.1990, and the appeal preferred by the defendants was dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court on 03.02.1995, thereby affirming the findings of the Trial Court.

2.

For the sake of convenience, the par5es shall be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.

3.1 The case set up by the plain5ff is that he has been running a country-made liquor business under the name and style of M/s Yoginder Sharma Onkar Rai & Company since the year 1981. He was a successful bidder for a country liquor vend (L-14 category) on 19.03.1984 in respect of Old Sabzi Mandi, Khanna, and was granted Licence No.9/84-85. The auc5on for country

[2] liquor vends preceded the auc5on for L-2 vends. The plain5ff duly deposited all dues pertaining to his licence for the year 1984-85. 3.2 Subsequently, the plain5ff received a memorandum dated 30.05.1985 from the Assistant Excise and Taxa5on Commissioner, Ludhiana, alleging that the plain5ff had made a bid for L-2 vends Group No.2 (Malerkotla Road and Anaj Mandi, Khanna) at an annual licence fee of ₹24,20,000/-, failed to deposit the requisite amount, and thereby caused a loss of ₹2,83,333/- to the Excise Department. The plain5ff was called upon to deposit the said amount failing which recovery was threatened as arrears of land revenue. 3.3 The plain5ff challenged the said memorandum as null, illegal and void, primarily on the ground that he had never par5cipated in the auc5on for L-2 vends, and was in any case statutorily barred from doing so, having already obtained an L-14 licence. Consequently, he sought a decree of permanent injunc5on restraining the defendants from effec5ng recovery on the basis of the impugned memorandum.

4.

In the wriJen statement, the defendants pleaded that the plain5ff had in fact made a bid for L-2 vends on behalf of M/s Rajender Sharma & Co., Khanna, and that the name of Rajender Sharma appeared in the knockdown slip. It was further alleged that the plain5ff failed to deposit the mandatory 10% amount at the fall of the hammer, resul5ng in re-auc5on and consequen5al loss to the Department. Certain preliminary objec5ons including maintainability and want of no5ce under Sec5on 80 CPC were also raised.

5.

Upon framing of issues and appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit, holding that the defendants had miserably failed to establish that the plain5ff ever par5cipated in the auc5on for L-2 vends, or had any authority to bid on behalf of M/s Rajender Sharma & Co. The appeal preferred by the defendants was dismissed by the First Appellate Court, which upheld the findings of fact. 6.

Learned State counsel for the appellants has assailed the

[3] concurrent findings by contending that the plain5ff had indeed made the bid for L-2 vends on behalf of Rajender Sharma & Co., and therefore, was liable to compensate the loss caused to the Excise Department. 7.

This Court has heard learned counsel for the par5es and perused the record carefully. No merit is found in the conten5on raised. 8.

The learned First Appellate Court, while re-apprecia5ng the en5re evidence, has recorded detailed and well-reasoned findings, which deserve to be no5ced. It has been categorically found that under Rule 36(6) read with Rule 14 of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956, a person holding an L-14 or L-14A licence is debarred from bidding for an L-2 licence. It stands admiJed on record that the plain5ff had already obtained an L-14 licence prior to the auc5on of L-2 vends. There is no evidence of any exemp5on or special permission granted to the plain5ff to par5cipate in the L-2 auc5on. 9.

It has further been held that the defendants failed to produce any evidence to show that the plain5ff had any pecuniary interest, business connec5on, or valid power of aJorney authorising him to bid on behalf of M/s Rajender Sharma & Co., as mandated by Rule 36(7) of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules. In the absence of a duly executed power of aJorney, the plain5ff could not legally bid for another person or firm. 10.

The knockdown slip Ex.D-1, which is a document emana5ng from the custody of the defendants themselves, records the name of Rajender Sharma as the successful bidder. Significantly, the name or signature of the plain5ff does not figure therein. There is also no endorsement indica5ng that the bid was made through or by the plain5ff. This document, by itself, demolishes the case set up by the defendants. 11.

The First Appellate Court has also no5ced serious procedural lapses on the part of the Excise Department, including failure to prepare mandatory documents such as bid sheets and Form M-14, as required under Rule 36(14) and Rule 36(22) of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules. The departmental witnesses admiJed that these documents were mandatory, yet

[4] failed to explain their non-prepara5on. Such omissions lend further credence to the plain5ff's case that he never par5cipated in the auc5on. 12.

Addi5onal contradic5ons were no5ced between the loca5ons of vends men5oned in the impugned memorandum and those reflected in the knockdown slip, sugges5ng an aJempt by the authori5es to cover up their own lapses. It was also found that no no5ce or show cause was ever issued to the plain5ff prior to re-auc5on or issuance of the impugned memorandum, in viola5on of basic principles of fairness.

13.

The cumula5ve effect of the evidence led the Courts below to an unequivocal conclusion that the plain5ff never joined the auc5on, was statutorily incompetent to do so, and was sought to be fastened with liability merely to cover up the defaults of the Department. These findings are based on a proper apprecia5on of evidence and correct applica5on of statutory provisions.

14.

It is well seJled that in a second appeal under Sec5on 100 CPC, interference is permissible only when the case involves a substan5al ques5on of law. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless shown to be perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or contrary to law. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any such perversity or illegality. 15.

The present appeal essen5ally seeks a re-apprecia5on of evidence, which is impermissible in second appellate jurisdic5on. No substan5al ques5on of law arises for considera5on. 16.

Consequently, finding no merit, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed.

06.02.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No Uploaded on: 06.02.2026