Jai Bhagwan v. Presiding Officer And Another

LPA-1084-20 025 (O&M) IN TH HE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB B AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH AN Decided on: 09.07.2025 JAI BHAGWA ....Appellant t versus PRESIDING O OFFICER & ANR.

....Respondents s CORAM: H Present:- M HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALO DHIR SINGH OK JAIN Mr. Robert Kanwar, Advocate for r the appellant.

***** NGH, J.

SUDHIR SIN CM-2673-LPA A-2025 For the reasons given in the appl lication the same is allowed and d the delay of 147 days in filing the appeal i is condoned, subject to all just t exceptions.

LPA-1084-20 Challenge in the present intra Co ourt appeal is to the order dated d 09.09.2024 pa assed by the learned Single Ju udge, whereby the writ petition n filed by the ap ppellant was dismissed.

2.

Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant had laid challenge e to the award dated 08.03.2022 passed by th he Labour Court, whereby the e reference was answered against the appellant o on the ground of limitation.

3.

It t is an admitted position on re ecord that a claim petition was s preferred by th he appellant on 01.04.2019. The e services of the appellant were e

terminated on 05.12.2015. As per the provisions of Section 2-A(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'), the claim petition could be filed within 3 years from the date of the dismissal of the service of an employee/workman.

4.

It is settled law that the delay is genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. It is further settled that the delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If a litigant keeps sleeping over his rights for a long period and wakes up when he does have an impetus either from the judicial verdict of the Court or otherwise, such litigant is not entitled to any relief. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 has held as under:- "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20.

The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

Laches

21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness".

It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires

while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.

23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence.

Acquiescence

24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.

25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may

become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis." 5.

We find that the appellant cannot plead the ground of him being the poor person for not having preferred the claim petition within the period of limitation. The claim petition was filed beyond the period of limitation which has been provided under Section 2-A(3) of the Act. It appears that the appellant kept sleeping over his right and once, he chose not to file the claim petition within the period of limitation, we find no ground to interfere with the findings recorded by the Labour Court and upheld by the learned Single Judge.

6.

Consequently, finding no merit in the present appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.

7.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (SUDHIR SINGH) JUDGE (ALOK JAIN) JUDGE 09.07.2025 himanshu Whether speaking/reasoned:

Yes/No Whether reportable:

Yes/No