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High Court of Punjab and HaryanaCRM-M/16829/2023disposed of

Bikramjit Singh @ Bikramjeet Singh @ Vicky v. State Of Punjab

2023-05-25Mr. Justice Sandeep Moudgil5 pages



         



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+#/=4   4  4 4 - The scope and ambit of inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., or the extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, now stands well defined by series of judicial pronouncements. Undoubtedly, every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae i.e., to do real and substantial justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The powers being very wide in itself imposes a solemn duty on the Courts, requiring great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power vested in the Court should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. However, the inherent power or the extra ordinary power conferred upon the High Court, entitles the said Court to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be

an abuse of the process of the Court, or the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.

35. The following observations made by this Court in the case of "#

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"The whole some power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent power, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purposes. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice.

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 2, this Court held that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to specify an exhaustive list of the cases, where such power should be exercised. However, by way of illustration, the Court laid down the following categories of cases wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

"(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

38. In the case of %3

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"It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the

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complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." 3         =            4 4 44=#  %?

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 0*   .3 Jyoti     Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No