Bhagwant Singh Grewal And Others v. State Of Punjab And Another

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-18138-2024 (O&M)

Reserved on: 02.12.2024

Pronounced on: 13.12.2024 Bhagwant Singh Grewal and others ... PeƟƟoners

Versus

State of Punjab and another

...Respondents

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA Present:- Mr. S.P.S. Sidhu, Advocate for the peƟƟoners.

Mr. Akshay Kumar, A.A.G., Punjab.

Mr. Shubham Gupta, Advocate for respondent no.2.

*** ANOOP CHITKARA, J.

FIR No.

Dated Police StaƟon SecƟons 10.03.2024 Punjab Agriculture University, District Police Commissionerate, Ludhiana 447, 448, 506, 511, 149, 379, 427, 411 IPC The peƟƟoners, arraigned as accused in the above capƟoned FIR, have come up before this Court under SecƟon 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequenƟal proceedings.

2.

PeƟƟoner(s) came up before this Court to quash the FIR, impleading the aggrieved persons as respondent no.2.

3.

During the pendency of the criminal proceedings and present peƟƟon, the accused and the aggrieved person(s) have compromised the maƩer and filed CRM No.23832 and 23833 of 2024 for placing on record compromise Annexure P-9 and permiƫng the parƟes to appear before the trial Court for recording their statements, and its copy is annexed with this peƟƟon as Annexure P-9. 4.

Pursuant to order of this Court dated 18.07.2024, the aggrieved person(s) (Respondent no.2), appeared before the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ludhiana and stated that there would be no objecƟon if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 21.11.2024, the parƟes consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings without any threat or coercion.

ANALYSIS & REASONING:

5.

Despite the severe opposiƟon of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this peƟƟon: - a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably seƩled the maƩer between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court;

b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the seƩlement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boycoƩs, bribes, or other dubious means;

c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullificaƟon of criminal proceedings;

d) There is no objecƟon from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed;

e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maƩers concerning public policy;

f) The rejecƟon of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness;

g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender; h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society; i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequenƟal proceedings is jusƟfied to secure the ends of jusƟce. 6.

In the present case, the offences under secƟons 511, 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, (IPC) are not compoundable under SecƟon 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecuƟon qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.

7.

In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under SecƟon 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under SecƟon 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a convicƟon against the accused and the enƟre exercise of a trial is desƟned to be an exercise in fuƟlity. There

is a subtle disƟncƟon between compounding of offences by the parƟes before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecuƟon under SecƟon 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against convicƟon, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a seƩlement arrived at between the parƟes in cases where the offences are not compoundable under SecƟon 320, the High Court may quash the prosecuƟon even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable.

The inherent powers of the High Court under SecƟon 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose controlled by SecƟon 320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under SecƟon 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and cauƟon. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that conƟnuance of the prosecuƟon would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situaƟons in which the exercise of power under SecƟon 482 may be jusƟfied.

All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jusƟce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be jusƟfied in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a peƟƟon under SecƟon 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.

8.

In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003 [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: - [16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following proposiƟons:

16 (i) SecƟon 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of jusƟce. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16 (ii) The invocaƟon of the jurisdicƟon of the High Court to quash a First InformaƟon Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a seƩlement has been arrived at between the offender and the vicƟm is not the same as the invocaƟon of jurisdicƟon for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of secƟon 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under SecƟon 482 is aƩracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdicƟon under SecƟon 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of jusƟce would jusƟfy the exercise of the inherent power;

16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of jusƟce or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First InformaƟon Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and vicƟm have seƩled the dispute, revolves ulƟmately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhausƟve elaboraƟon of principles can be formulated; 16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under SecƟon 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been seƩled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the vicƟm or the family of the vicƟm have seƩled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to conƟnue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

16 (vii) As disƟnguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a disƟnct fooƟng in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercanƟle, partnership or similar transacƟons with an essenƟally civil flavour may in appropriate situaƟons fall for quashing where parƟes have seƩled the dispute;

16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a convicƟon is remote and the conƟnuaƟon of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16 (x) There is yet an excepƟon to the principle set out in proposiƟons (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implicaƟons which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be jusƟfied in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an acƟvity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

9.

In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on 29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported

exercise of its powers under SecƟon 320 Cr.P.C. Any such aƩempt by the court would amount to alteraƟon, addiƟon and modificaƟon of SecƟon 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of SecƟon 320 Cr.P.C., which may jusƟfy its wider interpretaƟon and include such offences in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdicƟon to compound an offence within the framework of SecƟon 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under SecƟon 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for jusƟfiable reasons can press SecƟon 482 Cr.P.C.

in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of jusƟce. [12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parƟes have amicably seƩled their dispute and the vicƟm has willingly consented to the nullificaƟon of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under SecƟon 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequenƟal effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereaŌer adopt a pragmaƟc approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not Ɵnker with or paralyze the very object of the administraƟon of criminal jusƟce system. [13].

It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving nonheinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespecƟve of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convicƟon. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering jusƟce. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful excepƟons. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck postconvicƟon, the High Court ought to exercise such discreƟon with recƟtude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and aŌer the incidence.

The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under SecƟon 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of jusƟce. There can be no hard and fast line constricƟng the power of the High Court to do substanƟal jusƟce. A restricƟve construcƟon of inherent powers under SecƟon 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious jusƟce, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injusƟce. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cauƟously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, 15].

[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maƩers concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two

individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potenƟal to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a 'seƩlement' through duress, threats, social boycoƩs, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."

10.

In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of JusƟce arises propiƟously when parƟes, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion. 11.

In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of parƟes, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objecƟves point towards its acceptance. 12.

In Himachal Pradesh Cricket AssociaƟon v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ PeƟƟon (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that maƩer was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave PeƟƟons against the order of the High Court rejecƟng their peƟƟon for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ peƟƟon has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automaƟcally stand viƟated."

13.

Considering the enƟre facts, compromise, and in the light of the abovemenƟoned judicial precedents, I believe that conƟnuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiƞul purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdicƟon under secƟon 482 CrPC/528 BNSS, 2023 and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the peƟƟoner(s). The bail bonds of the peƟƟoner(s) are accordingly discharged. PeƟƟon allowed in the terms menƟoned above. All pending applicaƟon(s), if any, stand closed.

(ANOOP CHITKARA) JUDGE 13.12.2024 JyoƟ Sharma Whether speaking/reasoned :

Yes Whether reportable :

No