Sukhnoor Singh v. Haryana Public Service Commission And ANR.
Sr.
No Cut-off General - 388.8 BC-A- 319.2 BC-B- 363.2 DESM- No cutoff SC - 274.4 Marks Obtained by petitioners CWP No.
8510Petition No.
Case Title /Petitioner(s) Objection filed against Questions after publication of Provisional Answer Key Objections filed against question nos. after uploading final Answer Key with final Result Answer in First Provisional Answer Key Finalized by Committee while accepting recommendation of the Expert Panel Sukhnoor Singh Vs Haryana Public Service Commission & Anr.
Sukhnoor Singh Nil B to C changed A to D 383.2 (Gen.) CWP 10051Jayantika Dhull Vs.
HPSC and Ors.
Jayantika Dhull Yes 67,74,119,123 No change No change B to C A to D B to C No change 368 (Gen.) CWP 10180Avinash Yadav Vs HPSC Avinash Yadav Yes 74,87,90,122 No Change No Change No Change No Change B to D B to C 356 (BC-B) CWP 10154Mohini Vs HPSC Mohini Yes Deleted No Change No Change A to D No Change Deleted B to C No Change 364.8 (DESM) CWP 10748Palak VS HPSC & Anr.
Palak Nil No Change No Change B to C A to D No Change No Change 380 (Gen.) CWP 9908Amandeep Sheoran Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.
Amandeep Sheoran Nil A to D 384.8 (Gen.) CWP 10873Amanpreet Kaur Vs.
State of Haryana and Ors.
Amanpreet Kaur Nil Deleted B to C Deleted 385.6 (Gen.) CWP 9174No Change A to D 385.6 (Gen.) 384.8 (Gen.) CWP 9179Aashina Gupta & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana and Others
1. Aashina Gupta 2.Vasudha Aggarwal Yes Mahesh Priya Vs.
HPSC & Ors.
Mahesh Priya Nil No Change A to C No Change A to D No Change Deleted B to C No Change 369.6 (Gen.) CWP 10042Lavita Garg Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.
Lavita Garg Yes Deleted B to C No Change 387.2 (Gen.) CWP 8890A to D Deleted Rohit Vs State of Haryana & Ors.
Nil
Rohit 388 (Gen.) CWP 10795Rahul Gautam Vs.
State of Haryana & Ors.
Rahul Gautam Nil 119............
...............
.....
No Change No Change B to C A to D Deleted B to C 368 (Gen.) CWP 9854Hemant Vs. HPSC & Anr.
Hemant Yes No Change B to C A to D No change .
353.6 (BC-B) 9273Robin Sharma & Ors.
Vs. Vs. HPSC & Anr.
1.Robin Sharma
2. Chinki Rani 3.Ayushi Saxena
4. Amandeep
5. Waris Aggarwal
6. Rohan Mittal
7. Pragya Yadav
8. Aastha Rana
9. Akhilesh Kumar Mishra
10. Mohammad Sultan
11. Sakshi Mangla
12. Gaurav Arya
13. Medha Mishra
14. Sunil
15. Shivam Goyal
16. Ashmin goel
17. Kartik Goyal
18. Prerna
19. Renuka
20. Vibhav Khanna
21. Yeshika Goyal
22. Ustat Kaur
23. Rupali
24. Honey Wadhwa
25. Shivam Malik Yes 63,67,87,123,7 No Change No Change No Change A to D No Change Deleted B to C No Change No Change
1. 384 (Gen.)
2. 381.6 (Gen.)
3. 384 (Gen.)
4. 386.4 (Gen.)
5. 387.2 (Gen.)
6. 386.4 (Gen.)
7. 387.2 (Gen.)
8. 380 (Gen.)
9. 383.2 (Gen.)
10. 384 (Gen.)
11. 386.4 (Gen.)
12. 386.4 (Gen.)
13. 374.4 (Gen.)
14. 386.4 (Gen.)
15. 385.6 (Gen.)
16. 383.2 (Gen.)
17. 388 (Gen.)
18. 379.2 (Gen.)
19. 312 (BC-A)
20. 384 (Gen.)
21. 376.6 (Gen.)
22. 383.2 (Gen.)
23. 384 (Gen.)
24. 370.4 (Gen.)
25. 381.6 (Gen.) CWP 10898 - Shahnaz Bano vs HPSC & Anr.
Shahnaz Bano Yes 76,90 B to D A to C Deleted B to C 360.8 (BC-B) 10992Anu Bala Vs. HPSC & Anr.
Anu Bala Nil No Change No Change Deleted 386.4 (Gen.) 10895Akhil Goyal Vs.
Punjab & Hry High Court & Anr.
Akhil Goyal Yes 64,120,124 No Change No Change A to D Deleted No Change No Change 373.6 (Gen.) CWP 112871. Puneet Gupta & Anr. Vs. HPSC & Anr.
1. Puneet Gupta
2. Gulveer Kaur Yes 74,82,123 No Change B to D No Change A to D No Change Deleted B to C No Change No Change
1. 377.6 (Gen.)
2. 385.6 (Gen.) CWP 11257Mahima Tayal Vs.
HPSC & Ors.
Mahima Tayal Yes 74,94,123 No Change A to D No Change No Change 383.2 (Gen.) CWP 11423A to D Deleted 386.4 (Gen.) CWP 11088Agampartap Singh Vs. HPSC & Ors.
Agampartap Singh Nil Umang Gupta Vs.
HPSC & Anr.
Umang Gupta Yes 72,76 A to C Deleted B to C 382.4 (Gen.) CWP 10902Richa Tayal Vs State of Haryana & Ors.
Richa Tayal Yes 87,123 B to D A to D No Change Deleted No Change 381.6 (Gen.) CWP 13729No Change B to D Amardeep Singh Vs.
Registrar Recruitment Nil
& Anr.
Amardeep Singh 388 (Gen.) CWP 12954Shiv Jindal Vs. HPSC & Anr.
Shiv Jindal Nil Deleted A to D Deleted 386.4 (Gen.) CWP 13376Rahul Verma Vs.
HPSC & Anr.
Rahul Verma Yes No Change A to C No Change B to C No Change 372.8 (Gen.) CWP 13552Aanchal Verma Vs.
HPSC & Anr.
Aanchal Verma Nil A to C A to D No Change 316 (BC-A) CWP 12874No change Deleted 384.8 (Gen.) CWP 12790Vijay Vs. HPSC Vijay Yes 63,74,76,90,12 Prerna Goel Vs.
Punjab and Haryana High Court & Ors.
Prerna Goel Yes B to C Deleted No Change 387.2 (Gen.) CWP 14992Varun Girdhar Vs.
State of Haryana & Ors.
Varun Girdhar Nil B to D B to C No Change No Change 372 (Gen.) CWP 13223Veerpal Kaur & Ors.
Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.
1. Veerpal Kaur
2. Simran
3. Shubhit Trehan Nil No Change Deleted
1. 386.4 (Gen.)
2. 388 (Gen.)
3. 386.4 (Gen.) CWP 11984Vishawanath Partap Singh Vs.HPSC & Anr.
Vishawanath Partap Singh Nil Deleted No change No change B to D A to D No change No change Deleted B to C 381.6 (Gen.) CWP 9772 of Abhinandan Sagar Vs. HPSC & Anr.
Abhinandan Sagar Nil B to D A to D Deleted 387.2 (Gen.) Sr.
No.
Questions in dispute (As per master copy) Petitioners Claim Consideration by Panel (Initial Answer Key) Recommendation of the Expert Panel Decision of the Recruitment Committee
24. Which Section of IPC was struck down by the Supreme Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 ? A) Section 497 IPC B) Section 377 IPC C) Section 124A IPC D) None of the above CWP No. 10895 of Petitioner mentioned that answer of Q.No. 24 was changed in the Final Answer Key, whereas, petitioner marked correct answer as per provisional answer key. Challenged on the ground that position nominee Hindu Succession Act is not covered and cited the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court The petitioner has not challenged this Question. In fact this question is appearing in the Master Copy of Question Paper at Sr. No. 69. The Question has been dealt with at relevant Sr. No. the relevant place.
Thus, there is no objection or challenge to the aforesaid question.
Hon'ble Committee not changed the answer at any stage and remained 'A'.
titled as "Shakti Yajdani Vs Jayanand Salgaonkar and Anr."
37. Which out of the following cases is not / related with LGBTQ + Rights or Same Sex Marriage?
A) Nabam Rebia Case (2016) B) K. S. Puttaswamy Case (2017) C) Navjet Singh Johar Case (2018) D) Shafin Jahan vs Ashokan K. M. Case (2018) CWP Nos.
10154, 10873, 12954 and 11984of Claim :
1. Both the options A and B should be correct as neither the case relates to same sex marriage nor LGBTQ rights.
Option D also is the correct answer.
2. The question strictly asks which of the following case is not related to LGBTQ + Rights or Same Sex Marriage, Shafin jahan v Ashokan K.M case (2018) is primarily a case dealing with the issue of right to marry a person of one's own choice and right to chose religion. Not even for a single time, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has touched the aspects of same sex marriage nor LGBTQ+ Rights in this particular case.
Therefore, option D also is the correct answer.
The perusal of the judgments shows the following:
A) Nabam Rebia Case (2016) relates to the power of Governor to summon, dissolve and advance a Session.
B) K. S. Puttaswamy Case (2017) relates to validity of Aadhar Card and right to privacy including sexual orientation but does not talk about LGBTQ or same sex marriage.
C) Navjet Singh Johar Case (2018) relates to LGBTQ+ rights.
D) Shafin Jahan vs Ashokan K.M.
Case (2018) relates to inter-faith marriage.
Only option C deals with rights of LGBTQ and the answer could be A or B or D. Therefore, the objection is tenable and the official answer key is incorrect.
Accordingly, the Panel recommends the deletion of this question.
Hon'ble Committee after deliberating the recommendatio ns of the Expert Panel and objections, resolved to delete the question being ambiguous.
52. Identify the first Indian to be appointed as a permanent judge at the International Court of Justice at Hague:
A) Nagendra Singh B) Justice Dalvir Bhandari C) Benegal Narsing Rau D) Justice P.N. Bhagvati CWP No.
11088 of Claim:
The official website of ICJ as well as the website of Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India shows that Sir Benegal Nursing Rau was the first Indian who became permanent Judge of ICJ In the year 1952-53, whereas Sri Nagendra Singh was the first Indian to be the president of ICJ from 1985-1988.
The official website of ICJ as well as the website of Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India shows that Sir Benegal Nursing Rau (18871953) was the first Indian who became permanent Judge of ICJ in the year 1952-53, whereas Sri Nagendra Singh (1914-1988) was the first Indian to be the president of ICJ from 1985-1988, though he remained judge from 1973-1988.
The perusal of the factual information from the official website clearly indicates that the objection is tenable and the panel recommends the correction of the answer key from Option 'A' to option 'C'.
Thus, the correct Answer should be option C.
Hon'ble Committee examined the entire report of the Expert Panel and objections and recommended the answer option of this question from option 'A' to 'C'
63. Which out of the following Sections of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 mentions about the order of succession among heirs in the schedule?
A) Section 6 B) Section 8 C) Section 7 D) Section 12 CWP Nos.
9179, 10795, 9854, 9273, 11287, 13376, 12874 and 11984 of Claim:
1. This question should be deleted since none of the option is correct. The question is about 'Order of succession among heirs in the schedule' and the same is provided under section 9 of Hindu Succession Act 1956. The head note of Section 9 of Hindu Succession Act 1956 clearly refers to the other Order of Succession among heirs in the Schedule. At the most, the answer should be option D i.e. section 12 because this is much more similar to section 9.
2. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 mentions about the order of succession among heirs in the schedule under Section 9 of the Act. However, Section 6 is close to the framing of question The perusal of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, provides the following:
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, deals with general rules of succession in the case of male Hindu dying intestate and provides for the devolution of his property on Class 1 and Class II heirs specified in the Schedule. Thus it specifically mentions the succession among heirs in the Schedule.
Section 12 deals with Order of Succession among agnates and cognates and does not fit in the answer.
Section 6 deals with Devolution of Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is B.
interest in coparcenary property and does not provide for the order of succession, whereas Section 7 deals with devolution of interest in the property of a tarward, tavazhi, kutumba, kavaru or illom and is not applicable Section 9 of the Act provides 'Order of succession' 'among heirs in the Schedule'.
Sections 6, 7 and 12 don't refer to the Schedule at all. The analytical skills, reasoning and aptitude of the candidate are to be tested. The best option out of the available options was to be opted for. All other options do not deal with the question posed.
Therefore, the objection is not tenable and the official answer key is correct.
64. What is the effect of impotency developed during subsistence of a Hindu marriage?
A) The marriage would remain valid B) The marriage would be void C) The marriage would be voidable D) The marriage shall stand annulled CWP No.
10895 of dealing with general rule of succession among males as well as females, after the amendment of 2005, so they are also heirs now in the coparcenary property. So the answer is A.
Claim:
1. Section 12, prior to its amendment in 1976, stated that for a marriage to be voidable the respondent had to be impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the Institution of proceeding. But By the Amending Act of 1976 the substituted clause emphasizes the element of non-consummation of the marriage owing to the impotence of the respondent. Now this ground can be taken irrespective of time whether he was impotent at the time, before or after Marriage. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 makes it clear that a marriage solemnized is voidable at the instance of either party on the ground of non-consummation of the marriage due to the Impotence of the other party to the marriage and may be annulled by a decree of nullity of marriage. Hence, now after 1976 Amendment, even if a husband has turned impotent during the subsistence of marriage, It would render the marriage voidable as marriage now cannot be consummated owing to impotency.
2. The effect of impotency developed "During Subsistence of Hindu Marriage.
Impotency is of two types 1) mental and
2) physical. Barrenness and sterility will not come under the purview of impotency. Impotency means incapacity to have normal sexual intercourse. So if a person refuses to have sex, does not means he or she is impotent but if he or she constantly refuses "during subsistence" of marriage to have sexual intercourse, then as per the Supreme Court verdict in Urmila Devi vs.
Narinder Singh AIR 2007, the said party is psychologically impotent and the marriage has not been consummated.
"During subsistence" in question does not shows how long and at what extent.
Therefore, the option (C) voidable as per section 12(1)(a) and option (A) is valid. Both the options (c) as well as (a) are correct.
3. The answer is given in section 12 of "The Hindu Marriage Act 1955", and also in the book of "Modern Hindu law written" by Dr. U.P.D. Kesari, Central Law Publication on page no. 108.
4. As per Supreme Court Judgments, Impotency will be considered as Cruelty The analysis by the Panel is as follows:
1. Before 1976, Section 12 (1) (a) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 reads as:
"12(1) any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds namely:- (a) that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceeding;"
2.
After the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act of 1976, Section 12 (1) (a) of HMA reads as follows:
"12(1) any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds namely:- (a) that the marriage has not consummated owing to impotence of the respondent, or"
3. A large number of citations were put forth by the objectors. The analysis of those citations is as follows- (1)In Citation 'Yuvraj Digvijay Singh v. Yuvrani Pratap Kumari' [AIR 1970 SC 137], the decree of nullity was not granted as Section 12 (1) (a) of HMA was the ground. The citation relates to pre-amended Act i.e.
before 1976.
(ii) The Citation Shakuntala v. Om Prakash (AIR 1981 Del. 53) is also not applicable as the same relates to pre-amended Act i.e. before 1976.
(iii) The Citation Susarla Subhramanya Sastry Vs.
S.
Padmakshi (AP), is also not applicable as impotency under Section 12 was not in question.
However, the ground of impotency was claimed and allowed by the court as one of the forms of 'cruelty'
as envisaged under Section 13 (1) Hon'ble Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'A'.
to the other party, so, it also makes a new ground for taking a divorce under section-13 of the Act. If Marriage is not consummated because of Impotency then the other party have right to claim Decree of Nullity under Section-12(1)(a) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The PDF is taken from "legalserviceindia.com" which shows cases where Impotency is ground of nullity of Marriage and nowhere restricts it only to the "at the time of Marriage"
and it also nowhere given in the statute.
The marriage consummated is at any time of marriage, even impotency developed at the later stage of Marriage and parties are now not able to consummate the marriage. It was dealt in cases of Susarla Subhramanya Sastry Vs. S. Padmakshi, and, Yuvraj Digvijay Singh v. Yuvrani Pratap Kumari [3] on 2 May, 1969 and Samar Roy Chowdhary Vs. Sm. Snigdha Roy.
5. The impotency is not to be checked at the time of marriage, but at the time of consummation of the marriage. This has been held in the cases of Shakuntala v. Om Prakash (AIR 1981 Del. 53) and in the case of P. V. K. (AIR 1982 Bom. 400).
6. According to Law Commission Report No. 59 of 1974, para 6.3, a crucial recommendation was made regarding the amendment of Clause 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, concerning impotence.
The Commission highlighted a significant gap in the law: cases where an individual wasn't impotent at the time of marriage but became so when attempting consummation for the first time. Citing the precedent of Ravanna v. Susheelamma, AIR 1967 Mys 165, the Commission advocated for a revision of Section 12(1)(a) to encompass situations where impotence arises after marriage. Thus, it was proposed that the clause "at the time of marriage" be revised to "the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent. This recommendation found resonance in the 1976 amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act through Act 68 of 1976, specifically under Sub-section (6) (effective from 27-5-1976).
Consequently, the amendment substituted Section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as the "marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent" which aligned with the Law Commission's proposal, making impotence developed after marriage, leading to nonconsummation, a ground for voidability.
Therefore, the answer to this question unequivocally stands as option C.
7. Additionally, in the case before the Gujarat High Court in Jyotsnaben Ratilal vs Pravinchandra Tulsidas (AIR 2003 GUJ 222) provides that impotency developed after marriage is voidable, at Para 25, quotes as follows:
"25. S.12, prior to its amendment in 1976, stated that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and continued to be so until the institution of proceeding. By the Amending Act of 1976 the substituted clause emphasizes the element of non consummation of the marriage owing to the impotence of the respondent. Medical evidence may establish that the petitioner wife has remained a virgin and the Court may presume that the requirements of the amended clause are satisfied. Clause (i-a).
(iv) The Citation Jyotsnaben Ratilal vs Pravinchandra Tulsidas (AIR 2003 GUJ 222), is also not applicable as impotency under Section 12 was in question but not during the subsistence of marriage.
The Impotency of wife was pleaded as the same resulted into nonconsummation of marriage since the solemnization of the marriage.
(v) The Citation P. v. K. (AIR 1982 Bom. 400), is also not applicable as the same relates to pre-amended Act i.e. before 1976.
(vi) The Citation Samar Roy Chowdhary Vs. Sm, Snigdha Roy.
(Cal), is also not applicable as the same relates to pre-amended Act i.e. before 1976.
(vii) The Citation 'Urmila Devi v Narinder Singh' AIR 2007 (HP), Is also not applicable as impotency under Section 12 was in question but not during the subsistence of marriage. The impotency of wife was pleaded as the same resulted into non-consummation of marriage since the solemnization of the marriage.
Section 12 specifically deals with the grounds of voidable marriage and no ground can be added therein.
Even otherwise, the authorities cited above are distinguishable as the same do not hold impotency developed during the subsistence of a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 to be a ground for voidability of a Hindu marriage.
Thus, the objections are not tenable and the official answer key is correct.
(a) of Sub-section (1) makes it abundantly clear that a marriage solemnized whether before or after the commencement of the Act is voidable at the instance of either party on the ground of non consummation of the same due to the impotence of the other party to the marriage and may be annulled by a decree of nullity of marriage. The marriage of a female with a male who was impotent and who had not been able to consummate the marriage is a nullity." C.
67. When a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and no appeal has been preferred, the divorced persons may marry again:
A) After expiry of 1 month from the decree of divorce B) Immediately after passing of the decree of divorce C) After expiry of 2 months from the decree of divorce D) After expiry of 90 days from the decree of divorce CWP Nos.
10154, 9273, 13729 and 11984 of Claim:
1. In Anurag Mittal v. Shally Mittal (2018 SC) the Hon'ble SC held that the party can get married even when the time of appeal has not expired provided the parties have an intention that no proceedings should be continued in appeal and in the question it is written no appeal is preferred that shows that party is not intending to continue with the proceedings. Hence the parties can remarry immediately after the divorce decree.
As per Para 19 of the same, it is clearly mentioned that no appeal has been preferred after decree of divorce, which means the proposition is covered by the above cited precedent. The court also referred to the judgment of Leela Gupta versus Lakshmi Narayan. The question is not clear and therefore both the answers B and D are correct.
2 Section 15, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, prescribes "no fixed period" which has to be observed or waited by the parties.
If no appeal is preferred, the parties to the marriage may re-marry "any time"
after the pronouncement of decree of divorce.
3. When decree has been passed and no appeal has been preferred then marriage can be solemnized immediately after divorce as held in the latest case of Seema Devi v. Ranjit Kumar Bhagat (2023 SC) para 29 which states in terms of section 15 HMA, either party to marriage is well within his or her right to marry when the time for filing appeal has expired without an appeal, having been preferred, or an appeal has been presented, but the same has been dismissed. The bar or Impediment to contract a second marriage operates during the pendency of appeal only if an appeal is preferred within the limitation period not otherwise.
4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India clearly reiterated in Chandra Mohini Srivastava v. Avinashi P. Srivastava case that it may not be unlawful for the spouse to marry Immediately after passing of decree If no appeal has been preferred.
1.Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, "HMA") deals with appeals from decree and orders passed under this Act.
Section 28(4) provides that every appeal under the section shall be preferred within a period of 90 days from the date of decree or order.
This period of 90 days was substituted by Act 50 of 2003, in place of period of 30 days to prefer appeal;
2. Section 15 of HMA provides as to when the divorced persons may marry again but does not mention any time period which is clearly mentioned in section 28(4);
3.
There is no option as 'immediately after the lapse of the period of appeal';
4. The citations particularly Anurag Mittal vs Shaily Mishra Mittal (2018) (SC), dealt with a rare situation in which one party entered into second marriage, after the compromise was effected between both the parties regarding withdrawal of appeal which was fixed for hearing/listing in the subsequent month, without factual withdrawal of appeal, though application for withdrawal on the basis of a written settlement, was already filed. In this case, the appeal was filed and was pending, but the question relates to a case in which no appeal has been preferred. So the judgement is not applicable.
5. So far as the authorities Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain and Ors.
[(1978) 3 SCC 258], Chandra Mohini Srivastava v. Avinashi P.
Srivastava, Seema Devi v. Ranjit Kumar Bhagat (2023 SC) are concerned, they have never held that the parties can re-marry immediately after the passing of decree of divorce without waiting for the appeal to be filed and decided or for the lapse of period granted for filing appeal under Section 28.
In fact, the objectors failed to comprehend the ratio of the judgments. The Judgments never intended to destroy or dilute the plain wording and the legislative intent behind the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. If the reasoning of the objectors is considered on its face value, it will lead to wiping out Section 15 from the enactment. Moreover, in the problem in hand, no appeal was preferred, whereas, in the cited Hon'ble Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'D'.
authority (Anurag Mittal), the appeal was pending at the time of contracting of second marriage by the husband.
Thus, the objections are not tenable and the official answer key is correct.
69. What is the position of a nominee under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?
A) Nominee retains the amount or property received under nomination and is thus entitled to it B) Nominee is entitled to receive the amount or property but holds it as a trustee C) A nominee is equivalent to the heir or legatee with regard to the property or amount under nomination D) None of the above CWP Nos.
10898, 11287, 10902, 13729, 14992, 11984 and 9772 of Claim:
The petitioners/objectors contend that the concept of "nominee" has not been dealt with under the Hindu Succession Act 1956, and his position is governed by other laws. Some of the objector equate nominee to an heir or legatee The objectors have proposed option D or C to be correct answer. In so far as Option C is concerned, it is totally incorrect and is accordingly ruled out. The Panel has, however, examined the stand of the objectors proposing Option D. The common stand adopted by the objectors is that there is no provision under the Hindu Succession Act, regarding nominee and it is dealt with under the general principle, whereas the frame of question is to find out the position of the nominee under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The Panel is of the considered view that the objection of the objectors is tenable. The position of the nominee is not dealt with at all under the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and is governed by provisions in other laws. Since the frame of question is such that Option D is the best option.
Hon'ble Committee examined the entire report of the Expert Panel and objections and recommended the answer option of this question from option 'B' to 'D'
72. The 'Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939' is based on the following school of Muslim Law:
A) Hanafi School B) Shafi School C) Maliki School D) Zaidi School CWP Nos.
9179, 10898, 13376, 13552 of Claim:
The petitioners/objectors by relying on the statement of objects and reasons of 'Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939' contend that it is based on Maliki School.
Almost all the objectors have relied upon the statement of objects and reasons appended to Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 which is being reproduced herein:- "There is no provision in the Hanafi code of Muslim Law enabling a married Muslim Woman to obtain a decree from the Court dissolving her marriage in case the husband neglects to main her, makes her life miserable by deserting or persistently maltreating her or absconds leaving her unprovided fro and under certain other circumstances. The absence of such a provision has entailed unspeakable misery of innumerable Muslim women in British India.
The Hanafi Jursists, however, have clearly laid down that in cases in which the application of Hanafi Law causes Hardship, it is permissible to apply the provisions of the "Maliki, Shafi's of Hambali Law" Acting on this principle the Ulemas have issued fatwas to the effect that in cases enumerated in clause 3 Part A of this Bill (now see Section 2 of the Act) a married Muslim woman may obtain a decree dissolving her marriage. A lucid exposition of this principle can be found in the book called "Heelatun Najeza" published by Maulana Ashraf Ali Sahib who has made an exhaustive study of the provisions of Maliki Law which under the circumstances prevailing in India may be applied to such cases. This has been approved by a large number of Ulemas who have put their seals of approval on the book."
Hon'ble Committee examined the entire report of the Expert Panel and objections and recommended the answer option of this question from option 'A' to 'C'
Reading of the statement of objects and reasons indicates that the provision of aforesaid Act are based upon Maliki School in as much as Hanafi School did not provide for dissolution of Muslim marriage at the instance of the wife. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the official answer key is incorrect.
Thus the Panel recommends the change in the official answer key from Option A to Option C.
73. In which of the following cases, a firm is compulsorily dissolved?
A) By the happening of any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the firm to be carried on B) By the death of a partner C) By the adjudication of a partner as an insolvent D) All of the above CWP No.
10748 of Claim:
The petitioner/objectors propose option D to be the correct answer. The objectors have relied upon Section 41 (a) and Section 42 (c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 in support of their objection.
The Panel finds the objections to be untenable. Section 41(a) has been omitted by Act 31 of 2016 and Section 42(c) of the Act operates subject to contrary contract between the partners. The question is based on Section 41 asking the candidate to identify the situation in which the firm is compulsorily dissolved.
Section 41(b) covers the situation and out of the given options, option A is the correct answer. In view of the above the Panel rejects the objections to the aforesaid question.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'A'.
74. The provisions of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 are applicable to the land given on lease for:
A) Residential purpose B) Business or trade purpose C) Both A) and B) D) None of the above CWP Nos.
10180, 10154, 10748, 9174, 9179, 10795, 9854, 9273, 10092, 11287, 11257, 13376, 12874 and 13223 of Claim:
The petitioners/ objectors propose Option C to be the correct answer by relying on the definitional clause and Section 13 of the 'Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973'. The official answer is B.
The reading of the question indicates that candidate was required to identify the purpose of the land given on lease for the applicability of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The question is based upon Section 2 (f) of the Act which defines 'rented land' to mean any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade. Mere omission of word 'rented' prior to land does not change the nature of the question, as is being contended by the objectors, because land given on lease is mentioned in the question.
Moreover, the thrust of the question is to Identify the purpose of leasing out the land for being governed by the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The reliance being placed upon Section 2(d) which defines 'non-residential building by the objectors, is fallacious. The panel finds the objections to be not tenable.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'B'.
76. Can a tenant who sublets a building or rented land be considered a landlord under the Act, 1973? A) No, only the primary property owner qualifies as a landlord B) Yes, a tenant who sublets is considered a landlord for the sub tenant C) Only if the tenant has the explicit consent of the original landlord D) Only if the tenant has ownership rights in the property CWP Nos.
8510, 10051, 10748, 10873, 10795, Hon'ble Committee examined the entire report of the Expert Panel and Claim:
The petitioner/objectors propose option C to be the correct answer. They have relied upon the definitional clause of The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 and the Division The question is as to whether a tenant who sublets a building or rented land can be considered as a landlord. The definition of landlord under Section 2(c) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction)
9854, 14992, 12874 & 12790 of Bench judgment rendered in the case Paramjit Singh Walia versus Jagdish Mittar etc. Civil Revision No. 2521 of (O&M) Date of decision 19.09.2015.
Act, 1973 includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter provided.
The question as to whether a tenant who sublets any building or rented land without the written consent of the landlord can be considered as a landlord within the ambit of Section 2 (c) has been considered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case holding that a tenant who sublets any building or rented land without the consent of the landlord, is not a landlord within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. It further lays down that where a sub tenant to whom the tenant has sublet any building or a rented land without any written consent of the landlord, does not fall within the meaning of tenant in Section 2 (h) and accordingly, such a tenant cannot maintain an action for eviction under Section 13 of the Act. Thus the panel finds the objection to be worthy of acceptance. Option C is the most appropriate/best option to the question Accordingly, the panel recommends the change in the official answer key from option B to option C.
objections and recommended the answer option of this question from option 'B' to 'C'
82. Under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, which of the following situations does not fall within the ambit of "barred by law"?
A) Order II Rule 2 and Res Judicata B) Jurisdiction C) Limitation D) All of the above CWP Nos.
9854, 9273, 10895, 11287, 11257, 10902, 12954, 11423, 11984, 8510, 10051, 10154, 10748, 9908, 9174, 9197, 8890, 9772, 10795 and 13552 of Claim:
The petitioners/ objectors have proposed option D to be the correct answer. Principally they contend that the questions of limitation and resjudicata are mixed questions of fact and law. They have relied on certain judgments in support of their contentions holding that the questions of limitation and Res Judicata are mixed question of fact and law and plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC. They further contend that plaint can be rejected being barred by law only if it appears from the reading of the plaint. Some of the objectors contend that the question carries more than one correct answers and thus, it should be deleted.
The panel examined the objections.
Reading of the question indicates that a candidate is required to identify the situations which are not covered by VII Rule 11 (d) CPC.
The official answer is option A.
However, on examination of the cited judicial precedents by the objectors as well as other material, a question of limitation and res judicata in many situations is a mixed question of fact and law requiring adjudication and the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC. In respect of option B, the plaint is required to be returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. Thus, the best option out of the given options is Option D i.e. all of the above. The Panel does not subscribe to the demand of some of the objectors to delete the question in as much as option D appears to be most appropriate answer. It is not a case where more than two answers or none is possible In view of the above, the panel recommends the change of official answer key from Option A to Option D.
Hon'ble Committee examined the entire report of the Expert Panel and objections and recommended the answer option of this question from option 'A' to 'D'.
87. The expression 'Cause of action' denotes : A) A bundle of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove B) An important subject of litigation C) A point in question D) All of the above CWP Nos.
10180, 10154, 9179, 9273, 10992, 11287, 10902, 14992 and 11984 of Claim:
The petitioners/objectors propose Option-D to be the correct answer. They have also relied on certain judgments which are as follows:- ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. V. A.P Agence 1989 2 SCC 163, Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706, Rajiv Modi v. Sanjay Jain and ors. 2009 SC, Para21 and Shanti Devi v. Union of India, 2020 SC, Para 13 in support of their reasoning.
The Panel has examined the objections. The frame of the question indicates that it asks about the meaning of expression 'cause of action'. The Panel has examined the judgments relied on by the objectors as well as the authoritative commentaries on the subject wherein it is defined as 'the bundle of the essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove'. Out of the given options, the most appropriate/best option is Option-A which is also the official answer to the question.
The reasoning adopted by the objectors is based Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'A'.
on extrapolation which is impermissible. It is further trite to state that judgements cannot be read like statutes. Option C is completely ruled out as cause of action is not a point in question. It at the most approximates to the issue in a suit. Similarly Option B' an important subject of litigation', does not tantamount to 'cause of action'.
In the aforesaid view of the matter the objections are found to be untenable and accordingly rejected.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
90. Which of the following statements relating to CPC is incorrect?
A) The Code deals with procedures relating to Courts of Civil Judicature B) The Code deals with some substantive rights C) The Code is also a penal enactment dealing with punishments and penalties D) None of the above is incorrect CWP Nos.
10180, 12874 and 11984 of Claim:
The Petitioners/objectors propose option D to be the correct answer. The main plank of their reasoning is that CPC provides penalties in certain provisions. In this context they have relied upon Section 32, Section 58, Section 74, Order 39 Rule 2-A of CPC.
They contend that the statements given in Option-B and C are also correct and therefore Option-D should be the correct answer.
The Panel has examined the objections and found those to be untenable. The CPC enacted in 1908 consolidated and amended the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of civil judicature. The preamble of the code proclaims its object. It in essence is a procedural law for civil cases. It is also not a penal enactment dealing with punishments and penalties. The objectors are reading the statement given in Option C out of context by co-relating it with the cited provisions. The statement given in Option C declares CPC to be a penal enactment which is patently incorrect. In the aforesaid view of the matter the objections raised to the question are rejected.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'C'.
94. Where any property is ordered to be sold by public auction in execution of a decree, which of the following is false regarding the proclamation of the intended sale?
A) Such proclamation can be drawn up without giving notice to the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor B) Such proclamation shall state the lime and place of sale C) Such proclamation shall specify any encumbrance to which the property is liable D) Such proclamation shall state whether the property to be sold would be sufficient to satisfy the decree CWP No.
11257 of Claim:
The petitioner/objectors rely on Order 21 Rule 66 (2) (a) contending that the words 'such part' are omitted in the statement given in Option D.
The Panel has examined the objections and found those to be untenable. The question is covered by Order 21 Rule 66 CPC. The reading of the question indicates that a candidate is required to find out false statement given in the four options. Out of the given options only the statement given in Option-A is false in as much as it is in contradiction to Order 21 rule 66(2) of CPC.
It stipulates that proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the decree holder and the judgment debtor Statements given in all other options i.e. B, C and D are correct in terms of Order 21 rule 66(2) of CPC. In view of the above, the objections are untenable.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'A'.
95. "A" is charged with travelling in a train without a ticket:
A) The burden of proving that he did not have the ticket is on the prosecution B) The burden of proving that he did not have the ticket is on the party who asserts it C) The burden of proof is on railway authorities D) The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him CWP No.
12874 of Hon'ble Committee examined the entire report of Claim:
The petitioner/objectors have relied upon illustration (b) to section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The Panel has examined the objections raised to the question.
Reading of the question indicates that the statement has been given
and a candidate is required to find out on whom the burden of proof lies.
On examination of the statement given in the question, the Panel finds it to be directly covered by illustration-(b) appended to Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the burden of proof that he had a ticket with him lies on him.
The official answer key provide Option-B to be the correct answer which stipulates that burden of proving that he did not have the ticket is on the party who asserts it.
If it is a case of criminal charge, in that case Option A, B and C are on the same line; Le. the burden of proving that he did not have the ticket will be on the prosecution or complainant Le Railway authorities.
Thus Options A, B and C appear to be incorrect and the most appropriate/best option is Option-D which is proposed by the objectors.
In view of the above, the Panel recommends the change of answer key from Option B to Option D.
the Expert Panel and objections and recommended the answer option of this question from option 'B' to 'D'.
107. What does Section 93 of the Indian Evidence Act primarily addresses in relation to documents? A) Admission of extrinsic evidence to explain any type of ambiguity B) Exclusion of evidence to explain or amend ambiguous documents C) Admission of evidence to interpret all types of ambiguities D) Exclusion of evidence for any document with defects CWP Nos.
10873, 9179, 10042, 8890, 10795, 9854, 9273, 10898, 10992, 10895, 11287, 11088, 10902, 12954, 9772, 12790 and 13223 of Claim:
The petitioners/ objectors propose option-D to be also the correct answer.
The reasoning adopted by the objectors is that Section 93 Evidence Act deals with both ambiguous as well as defective documents and therefore options B and D are correct.
The Panel has examined the objection.
Section of the Evidence Act stipulates that where the language used in documents is ex-facie ambiguous or defective, extrinsic evidence is not permitted to supply its defects or indicate/supply its meaning.
Reading of the question indicates that a candidate is required to find out the application of Section 93 in the relation to documents. It has already been noticed above that it excludes giving of extrinsic evidence to explain or amend ambiguous and defective documents. The Options-B and D co-incide/concur with the principle laid down in Section 93 of the Evidence Act. Even though the statement given in Option-D does not indicate the purpose for exclusion of evidence yet it is not wholly incorrect in the context of Section 93 of Evidence Act, 1873. In view of the above, the Panel finds the objection to be tenable. The Panel is of the view that both Options B and D are correct.
It, accordingly, recommends that Options B and D be taken to be correct answer of the question.
Hon'ble Committee after deliberating the recommendatio ns of the Expert Panel and objections, resolved to delete the question being ambiguous.
119. 'X' sends an insured parcel to 'Y'. The parcel is not delivered. 'Y' :
A) cannot claim the amount from the insurance company because there is no privity of contract B) can enforce as a constructive trust is created in his favour C) can enforce only if there is an express provision in the contract that he can enforce it D) none of the above is correct CWP Nos.
10180, 10154, 9197, 10042, 10795, 9854, 9273, 10898, 11287, 11088, 11984 and 13376 of Hon'ble Committee examined the entire report of the Expert Panel and objections and recommended the answer option of this question from option 'B' to 'C'.
Claim:
The petitioners/ objectors propose option 'D' to be the correct answer. The reasons assigned are that enforcing a constructive trust is typically a legal remedy used in cases where one party holds property, including funds or assets, for the benefit of another party.
Constructive trusts are often invoked in situations where there is a breach of trust or unjust enrichment. In the context of a non-delivered insured parcel, enforcing a constructive trust The Panel has examined the objections. The gist of the reasoning adopted by the objectors is that no constructive trust is created in favour of 'Y/recipient and further on account of operation of principle of privity of contract, 'Y' cannot claim the amount of Insurance from the Insurance Company unless it is specifically provided by the terms of the contract itself. The Panel finds the objections to be tenable.
Reading of the question indicates
that it contains a terse statement without further details. The contract is between X and the Insurance Company. It is not specified for whose benefit it was taken out. The terms of the contract are not specified. It cannot be stated as a general rule that a contract of insurance is an exception to the principle of privity of contract. A lot depends on the terms of the contract. It is doubtful that a constructive trust is created in favour the consignee in an insurance contract Insuring a parcel.
In the context of the question and the given options, the Panel is of the considered view that Option. C is the most appropriate answer. It, accordingly, recommends change in the official answer key from option B to option C.
120. A, who is a minor borrows money from B. After becoming an adult, he repays the amount of the loan and after some days he institutes a suit against B for the recovery of the money so repaid. Which one of the following options is correct as to the result of a suit? A) A will succeed in recovering money B) A will not succeed in recovering money as the minor's contract is illegal C) A will not succeed in recovering money as repayment was valid D) None of the above CWP Nos.
10748 and 10895 of might not be a standard or direct remedy. Constructive trusts are more commonly associated with property and assets, rather than specific goods or parcels. However, the specific legal remedies available to Y may depend on the nature of the transaction, applicable laws, and the terms of the contract. If Y believes that there is a breach of trust or unjust enrichment, they may need to explore legal avenues such as breach of contract, consumer protection laws, or specific provisions related to the delivery of goods in their jurisdiction. In some cases, a court may order specific performance, damages, or other remedies based on the circumstances.
Some of the objectors propose options 'A' and 'C' as well based upon the above reasoning.
Claim:
The petitioners/ objectors have proposed option 'A' to be the correct answer. The gist of the reasoning is that a minor's contract is void ab initio and thus no ratification is possible. They have relied upon the following judgments in support of their objections (i) Mohiri Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose 1903 PC (ii) Suraj Naraian V. Sukhu Aheer (iii) Khan Gul vs Lakha Singh (iv) Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary (2014) AIR SCW 2793 and Krishnaveni v. Μ.Α. Shagul Hameed (2024) arising out of SLP(C) No. 23655/2019, decided on 15th February, 2024.
They further relied upon Sections 68 and 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
The Panel has examined the objections and finds the same to be untenable. The objections are based on misreading of the question.
Perusal of the question Indicates that a minor after attaining the majority has voluntarily repaid the amount of the loan and after some days he instituted a suit against 'B'
for recovery of the money so repaid.
The proposition is squarely covered by the judgment of Tukaram Ramji Shendre v.
Madhorao Manaji Bhange AIR 1948 Ngp 293, holding that in such a situation, the question of ratification does not arise and the payment made must be regarded as a gift.
Further a reference may also be made to page 252 of Pollock and Mulla The Indian Contract Act, 1872'
16th Edition, 2022 Lexis Nexis. As regards the cited precedents, none of the precedent is applicable to the proposition given in the question. It is beyond a pale of controversy that a minor's agreement is void ab initio and it is not capable of ratification even after attaining majority and a fresh consideration is required to support a promise made on attaining majority. However, in the instant case, the question is not of ratification of agreement made during minority. It is a case of voluntary repayment of the money on attaining majority by a minor. In view of the above, the Panel is of the considered opinion that the objections raised by the objectors are liable to be rejected.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
Hon'ble Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'C'.
122. What type of contract is created when one party makes a promise in exchange for the other party's performance?
A) Bilateral contract B) Unilateral contract C) Executed contract D) Void contract CWP Nos.
9273, 11287, 12874 and 10180 of Hon'ble Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question Claim:
The petitioners/ objectors propose option C and 'B' to be the correct answers. They contend that it is a case of executed contract and it is unilateral in nature. They also placed reliance on the following judgments:- The Panel has examined the objections and finds the same to be untenable. Perusal of the question Indicates that the candidate has been asked to identify the type of contract created in the given situation. It states that if one party
1. Union of India Vs. Chaman Lal Loona 1957 AIR 652, 1957 SCR 1039
2. Alka Bose versus Parmatma Devi, 2009(2) SCC 589
3. Sri Krushna Chandra Sahu v. The Managing Director, Oscard Bank Ltd
4. Ram Narain Damodar Dass Malpani vs Trilokidas and Ors. Raj High Court They also relied upon Excerpts from Book "Contract and Specific Relief 12th Edition by Avtar Singh (EBC Publications).
makes a promise in exchange for the performance of other party, then what would be the type of contract created between the parties. The official answer key is option 'A' i.e.
bilateral contract.
In the proposition, the contract is between two parties. It envisages situation when one party makes promise in exchange for the performance of other party. Thus, there is an exchange of promises between both the parties to be performed in future. The proposition does not specify the nature of the promise i.e. act to be performed by either of the parties. Thus options 'B'
and 'C' are ruled out and Option 'A'
is the correct answer. The Panel has also examined the cited judicial precedents and those are inapplicable to the factual situation given in the question. The quoted passage in Chaman Lal's case pertains to executed and executory considerations.
In Alka Bose case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has quoted "The Law of Contract (4th Edition) by John De Calamari and Joseph M Perillo which defines unilateral contracts to be a gratuitous promise, that is where only one party makes promise without a return promise.
However, in the given proposition, there is exchange of promises. In view of the above, the Panel is of the considered opinion that the objections raised by the objectors are liable to be rejected.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
and answer in the final answer key is 'A'.
123. Which of the following propositions is correct as regards a contingent contract?
A) The contract will not be contingent if the happening or non-happening of the contingency depends upon the will of a party B) The condition/contingency must be of a certain nature C) The contingency contemplated by the contract must be collateral to the contract D) All of the above CWP Nos.
10154, 10748, 9179, 10042, 9273, 11287, 11257, 10902, 13376, 12790, 13552 and 14992 of Claim:
The petitioners/objectors propose option D' to be the correct answer. The objectors also place reliance on the judgment P.O Balayya v.
K.V.
Srinivasayya Setty & Sons (AIR 1954 SC 26). They have also relied upon Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Page number 591.
The Panel has examined the objections and finds the same to be untenable. Perusal of the question indicates that the candidate is required to identify the correct proposition in respect of a contingent contract. Options 'A', 'B'
and 'C' contain statement relating to a contingent contract. In this respect, the statement contained in option 'C' is squarely covered by Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which defines contingent contract. The statement made in option 'A' is incorrect for the reason that a condition in a contingent contract may be subject to an event which depends upon the will of the parties to the contract or of a 3rd party. In this respect, a reference may be made to page 547 of Pollock and Mulla "The Indian Contract Act, 1872 16th Edition 2022 Lexis Nexis.
As regards the statement contained in option 'B'
that condition/contingency must be of a certain nature is also incorrect inasmuch as the contingency may be of uncertain nature.
In view of the above, only option 'C'
is correct and options 'A' and 'B' are Incorrect. Thus, option 'D' is ruled out. The objectors are quoting the judicial precedents and authoritative Hon'ble Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'C'.
text out of context. Section 32 of the Indian Act, 1872 itself stipulates that a contingent contract to do or not do anything, if an uncertain event happens, cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened. Similarly, Section 33 relates to enforcement of contingent contract which depends upon the non-happening of uncertain future event. Section 34 visualizes a situation when contingency depends on a future event relating to the act of a person. In view of the above, the Panel finds the objections to be untenable and liable to be rejected.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
124. What is the effect of Section 17 (1A) inserted by The Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 in the Registration Act, 1908? A) Registration of agreement to sell has been made mandatory B) Registration of agreement to sell is mandatory only if it evidences delivery of possession C) Registration of agreement to sell is mandatory, if the proposed purchaser wants to seek protection U/S 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 D) None of the above CWP No.
10895 of Claim:
The petitonter/objectors propose option 'A' to be the correct answer. The reasoning by the objectors is that Section 17 (1A) of the Registration Act which has been incorporated by way amendment makes the registration of an agreement to sell mandatory.
The Panel has examined the objections and finds the same to be untenable. The objections are based upon the misreading of the question as well as the mis-construction of the statutory provision. Section 17 (1A) which has been added by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, stipulates that the documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of S. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 (48 of 2001) and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said S. 53A of Transfer of Property Act.
A reference may be also made to the judgments in the case of Didar Singh vs. Nasib Kaur, 2012 (2) Civ CC (P&H), R.
Palanisubramanian vs.
Trans Medica (India) Ltd. And others, AIR 2009 Mad 110, Ameer Minhaj vs.
Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and Ors. 2018 (7) SCC 639 and R.
Hemalatha vs. Kashthuri, AIR 2023 SC 1895, 2023 (2) CCC 6 holding that only disability attached to such an unregistered document is that it shall not be considered for availing the benefit of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Thus, the Panel is of the considered view the objections raised are untenable and are liable to be rejected.
Thus the official answer key is correct.
Hon'ble Committee Resolved not to change the Official Answer Key in respect of this question and answer in the final answer key is 'C'.