Ram Chander Etc. v. Ghisa Ram Etc.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH Ram Chander and Others . . . . Appellants Vs.

Ghisa Ram and Another . . . . Respondents ****

Reserved on: 10.04.2026

Pronounced on: 17.04.2026 Pronounced fully/opera2ve part: Fully ****

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by:- Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta, Advocate with Mr. G.S. Bidlan, Advocate for the appellant.

Mr. Ajay Jain, Advocate for the respondents.

**** DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

The present appeal is directed against the judgment & decree dated 03.03.2001 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, whereby the judgment of the trial Court dated 14.12.1996 was set aside, and the suit filed by the plain1ffs for declara1on, was decreed.

2.

With the assistance of learned counsel for the par1es, the record of the Courts below has been carefully perused. For the sake of convenience, the par1es are referred to as per their status before the trial Court. 3.

The controversy arises out of a joint khewat measuring 70 Kanal 6 Marla, in which one Gordhan owned 1/3rd share. Upon his demise, his share devolved upon his three sons, namely Ram Chander (defendant No.2), Kishori Lal and Ram Narain, each to the extent of 1/9th share. It is an admi>ed posi1on on record that defendant No.2, despite being owner only to the extent of 1/9

share i.e., 7 Kanal 16 Marla, executed a sale deed dated 28.09.1965 in favour of defendant No.1 for 8 Kanal 15 Marla of land, thereby purpor1ng to transfer land in excess of his lawful share. The remaining co-sharers Kishori Lal and Ram Narain subsequently sold their 2/9 shares in 1966 to Kanhi Ram, predecessor-ininterest of the plain1ffs, whose legal heirs ins1tuted the present suit in March 1992 seeking a declara1on to the effect that the aforesaid sale deed, to the extent it exceeded the share of defendant No.2, was illegal and not binding. 4.

Defendant No.2 was proceeded against ex parte. Defendant No.1 contested the suit, asser1ng ownership over 8 Kanal 15 Marla on the basis of the sale deed dated 28.09.1965. He further claimed that his long, con1nuous possession since 1965 had matured into ownership by adverse possession. Addi1onally, he raised objec1ons that the suit was barred by limita1on, and was bad for non-joinder of necessary par1es, namely other co-sharers, and accordingly sought dismissal of the suit.

5.

The trial Court aDer apprecia1ng evidence led by the par1es, dismissed the suit, inter alia, holding that defendant No.1 was a bona fide purchaser in possession since 1965; that the suit was barred by limita1on; that the plain1ffs lacked locus standi, and further that defendant No.1 had perfected his 1tle by way of adverse possession.

6.

However, in appeal, the learned First Appellate Court reversed these findings and decreed the suit by holding that a co-sharer cannot transfer more than his own share; that such a transfer to the extent of excess is a nullity; that the suit was not barred by limita1on in the case of joint property, and that the plea of adverse possession was not available to defendant No.1 being a cosharer. 7.

Assailing the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that defendant No.1 has remained in open, con1nuous and exclusive possession of the suit land since the date of purchase in the year 1965 and that such possession, being hos1le to the knowledge of other co-sharers,

has ripened into ownership by adverse possession. It has further been argued that the suit having been filed aDer more than 26 years from the date of sale deed is hopelessly barred by limita1on.

8.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has supported the judgment of the First Appellate Court by contending that the par1es are co-sharers in a joint khewat, that possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be possession on behalf of all, and that in the absence of proof of ouster, no plea of adverse possession can be sustained.

9.

Having considered the rival submissions, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal.

10.

It is a se>led principle of law that no person can convey a be>er 1tle than what he himself possesses. Defendant No.2, being admi>edly owner only to the extent of 1/9th share, had no authority to transfer land beyond his share. In the context of joint property, a co-sharer may transfer his undivided share, but he cannot convey a specific por1on in excess of his en1tlement so as to prejudice the rights of other co-sharers. Any such transfer is necessarily subject to adjustment at the 1me of par11on and cannot confer an indefeasible right upon the vendee. The First Appellate Court has, therefore, rightly held that the sale deed dated 28.09.1965, to the extent it exceeds the share of defendant No.2, is ineffec1ve and liable to be ignored. 11.

The conten1on regarding limita1on is equally devoid of any merit. In a case of joint holding, each co-sharer is deemed in law to be in possession of every inch of the joint property, irrespec1ve of actual physical possession. Mere exclusive possession by one co-sharer does not amount to exclusion of others unless there is clear and unequivocal evidence of ouster. Consequently, a transac1on whereby a co-sharer transfers more than his share does not necessarily give rise to an immediate cause of ac1on requiring challenge within a fixed period, par1cularly when the property remains joint and unpar11oned. Such a transac1on can be ques1oned or ignored at the 1me of par11on. The finding of

the First Appellate Court that the suit is not barred by limita1on thus calls for no interference.

12.

Equally untenable is the plea of adverse possession raised by defendant No.1. It is well se>led that a person, who claims 1tle under a lawful transac1on cannot simultaneously assert hos1le possession against the true owner. The plea of adverse possession presupposes that the possession is hos1le to the 1tle of another, which is inconsistent with a claim based on a sale deed. Furthermore, as between co-sharers, the law requires strict proof of ouster, namely, an open and hos1le asser1on of exclusive 1tle to the knowledge of other co-sharers. Mere long or exclusive possession is not sufficient. 13.

In the present case, defendant No.1 entered into possession on the basis of a sale deed and has failed to establish any overt act demonstra1ng denial of the rights of other co-sharers. In the absence of such evidence, the plea of adverse possession must fail.

14.

The judgments 1tled "Kumehli and ors. vs. Mo and ors." 1995(3) RRR 389 and "Nanak Chand and ors. vs. Sononnu and ors." 1982 PLJ 422, relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants are dis1nguishable on facts. In those cases, there was either clear evidence of ouster or possession of the en1re property under a claim of exclusive ownership. 15.

In the present case, however, defendant No.1 is in possession only of a part of the joint holding and con1nues to be a co-sharer. Therefore, the said precedents do not advance the case of the appellants. 16.

On an overall considera1on of the ma>er, it is evident that the learned First Appellate Court has correctly appreciated both the facts and the law governing the rights of co-sharers, the doctrine of adverse possession, and the ques1on of limita1on in the context of joint property. The findings recorded by it are neither perverse nor contrary to law so as to warrant interference by this Court.

17.

On account of en1re discussion as above, it is held that there is no merit in the present appeal. There is no reason to interfere in the well-reasoned findings recorded by the first Appellate Court, which are hereby upheld. The present appeal is hereby dismissed.

(DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE 17.04.2026 Neeka Tuteja Whether speaking/reasoned?

Yes/No Whether reportable?

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