Anoop Kumar & ORS v. State Of Punjab & ORS

-1IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (1) Anoop Kumar and others

...Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and others ..Respondents (2) Ramkishan

...Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and others ..Respondents Date of decision: - 28.01.2015 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

Present:

Mr. B.D. Sharma, Advocate for the petitioners. Mr. R.P.S. Sidhu, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab for the State.

**** M ehinder S ingh S ullar, J. (Oral) As identical questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to decide indicated petitions bearing CRM No. M-39576 of 2014 titled as Anoop Kumar and others Vs. State of Punjab and others (for brevity "the 1st case) and CRM No. M-380 of 2015 titled as Ramkishan Vs. State of Punjab and others (for short "the 2nd case"),

-2arising out of the same case/FIR, by means of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition.

2.

The contour of the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of the instant petitions and emanating from the record, is that, initially in the wake of complaint of complainant Shekh Jabal @ Shekh Jabar son of Shekh Nandanirespondent No.2 (for brevity "the complainant"), a criminal case was registered against petitioners-accused Anoop Kumar son of Kuber and others, vide FIR No.375 dated 01.10.2014 (Annexure P-1), on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324 and 148 read with Section 149 IPC, by the police of Police Station A-Division, Amritsar City.

3.

During the course of investigation of the criminal case, good sense prevailed and the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by means of compromise deed dated 22.10.2014 (Annexure P-2). 4.

Having compromised the matter, the petitioners have preferred the present petitions, to quash the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC, inter-alia, pleading that now with the intervention of the respectable and relatives, the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by virtue of pointed compromise deed (Annexure P-2). They have redressed their grievances. They want to live in peace and harmony in future in the society. The complainant and injured persons (respondent Nos.2 to 4) have no objection, if the criminal case registered against the petitioners, by way of impugned FIR is quashed. On the

-3strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioners-accused sought to quash the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, in the manner described hereinabove. 5.

During the course of preliminary hearing, the Magistrate, was directed to record the statements of all the concerned parties, with regard to the genuineness and validity or otherwise of the compromise deed (Annexure P-2), by means of orders dated 19.11.2014 (in 1st case) and 15.01.2015 (in 2nd case), by this Court.

6.

In compliance thereof, the concerned Magistrate, having recorded the statements of all the concerned parties in both the cases, has concluded vide her reports dated 09.12.2014 (in 1st case) and 27.01.2015 (in 2nd case) that they have amicably settled their disputes. The compromise arrived between them is voluntarily, genuine, without any pressure or coercion.

7.

Meaning thereby, it stands proved on record that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by virtue of compromise deed dated 22.10.2014 (Annexure P-2). The factum of compromise is also reiterated in the indicated reports of the Magistrate.

8.

What cannot possibly be disputed here is that, the law with regard to the settlement of such criminal disputes, by means of amicable settlement between the parties is no more res integra and is now wellsettled. 9.

An identical question came to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another. 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 543. Having interpreted the relevant provisions

-4and considered a line of the judgments on the pointed points, it was ruled (para 57) as under:- "57.

The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed.

However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.

But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personnel in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute.

In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.

In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." Sequelly, the same view was again (recently) reiterated by Hon'ble the Apex Court in case Narinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2014(2) RCR (Criminal) 482.

-510.

Such thus being the legal position and the material on record, now the short and significant question, though important, that arises for determination in these petitions are, as to whether the present criminal prosecution against the petitioners deserves to be quashed in view of the compromise or not?

11.

Having regard to the contentions of the learned counsel, to my mind, it would be in the interest and justice would be sub-served, if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter. Moreover, the learned counsel are ad idem that, in view of the settlement of disputes between the parties, the instant petitions deserve to be accepted in this context. 12.

As is evident from the record that, now with the intervention of the respectable and relatives, the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by virtue of pointed compromise deed (Annexure P-2). They have redressed their grievances. They want to live in peace and harmony in future in the society. The compromise is stated to be in the benefit, welfare and larger interest of the parties. The complainant and injured persons (respondent Nos.2 to 4) have no objection, if the criminal case registered against the petitioners, by way of impugned FIR is quashed. The factum of compromise is also reiterated in the indicated reports of the Magistrate.

13.

Therefore, it would be seen that since, the compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties, so, there is no impediment in translating their wishes into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest, to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner. Hence, to me, the ratio of the law

-6laid down and the bench-mark set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh's and Narinder Singh's and others cases (supra), "mutatis mutandis" is attracted to the facts of the present cases and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Likewise, the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1) and all other consequent proceedings arising therefrom, deserve to be quashed in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 14.

In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the instant petitions are accepted. Consequently, the impugned FIR No.375 dated 01.10.2014 (Annexure P-1) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed. The petitioners-accused (in both the cases) are accordingly discharged, from the indicated criminal cases, on the basis of compromise, subject to all just exceptions.

January 28, 2015 (Mehinder Singh Sullar) naresh.k Judge