Ammi v. Dalmeer

[1]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Date of decision: 29.04.2026 Ammi ...Appellant

Versus

Dalmeer

...Respondent

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present:

Mr. Mohammad Arshad, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The present appeal has been preferred by the plain0ff assailing the judgment and decree dated 19.04.2007 passed by the learned Addi0onal District Judge, Gurgaon, whereby the appeal filed by the defendant (respondent herein) was accepted and the judgment of the trial Court was set aside.

2.

A perusal of the record reveals that the plain0ff-Ammi (appellant herein) had ins0tuted a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 06.06.2002 along with consequen0al relief of permanent injunc0on. The suit was contested by the defendant. The learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 19.12.2006, declined the relief of specific performance but partly decreed the suit by gran0ng recovery of ₹1,50,000/- along with pendente lite and future interest. 3.

Aggrieved against the said judgment, the defendant preferred an appeal, which came to be allowed by the learned First Appellate Court on 19.04.2007, resul0ng in dismissal of the plain0ff's suit in toto. 4.

The present Regular Second Appeal has been filed along with an applica0on bearing CM-4537-C-2024 under Sec0on 5 of the Limita0on Act, seeking condona0on of delay of 6215 days, i.e., more than 17 years, in

[2] filing the appeal.

5.

In the applica0on, it has been averred that aEer obtaining cer0fied copies of the impugned judgment and decree, the appellant had entrusted the maFer to his earlier counsel, Mr. Naveen Kaushik, who allegedly assured that a Regular Second Appeal would be filed. It is further pleaded that the said counsel con0nued to mislead the appellant for several years by furnishing incorrect dates of hearing, thereby crea0ng an impression that the appeal was pending adjudica0on, whereas in fact no appeal had been ins0tuted. It is claimed that only later did the appellant discover that no appeal had been filed, which has resulted in the present delay.

6.

Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the delay is neither deliberate nor inten0onal, but occurred due to bona fide reliance upon the previous counsel, and therefore deserves to be condoned in the interest of jus0ce.

7.

This Court has considered the submissions made and perused the record with due care. The applica0on, however, does not merit acceptance.

8.

At the outset, it is to be noted that the delay involved is extraordinarily inordinate, spanning more than 17 years. The law under Sec0on 5 of the Limita0on Act mandates that the applicant must show "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. The expression "sufficient cause" has been consistently interpreted to mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the provision and which prevented him from taking 0mely steps with reasonable diligence.

9.

In the present case, the explana0on furnished by the appellant

[3] is wholly vague and lacking in material par0culars. Despite a specific query put by this Court, learned counsel for the appellant was unable to state as to when the appellant actually came to know that no appeal had been filed. This omission strikes at the root of the explana0on, as the date of knowledge is a crucial factor in assessing whether the appellant acted with due diligence thereaEer.

10.

Equally significant is the admiFed posi0on that no ac0on whatsoever has been taken by the appellant against the previous counsel, either before the Bar Council or before any other competent forum. If indeed the appellant had been misled for such an extraordinarily long period, the absence of any complaint or remedial ac0on renders the explana0on highly doubOul and unworthy of acceptance. 11.

It is well seFled that negligence or inac0on on the part of a li0gant cannot be condoned under the guise of liberal interpreta0on of "sufficient cause." While courts do adopt a pragma0c approach in condoning delay, par0cularly to advance substan0al jus0ce, such la0tude cannot be extended in cases of gross negligence, lack of bona fides, or absence of due diligence. The law of limita0on is founded upon public policy to ensure finality in li0ga0on, and cannot be rendered o0ose by entertaining stale claims aEer decades.

12.

Law of limita0on has to be applied with all its rigour and courts have no power to extend limita0on on equitable grounds where no sufficient cause is shown. A party cannot claim condona0on of delay as a maFer of right and must sa0sfactorily explain the en0re period of delay. 13.

In the present case, the appellant has uFerly failed to explain the delay of 6215 days in a cogent, convincing and sa0sfactory manner. The explana0on offered is not only deficient but also lacks credibility. The

[4] conduct of the appellant reflects a complete absence of due diligence. 14.

In view of the aforesaid facts and seFled legal posi0on, this Court is not inclined to condone the inordinate delay of more than 17 years in filing the present appeal.

15.

Consequently, the applica0on under Sec0on 5 of the Limita0on Act for condona0on of delay is dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the Regular Second Appeal is also dismissed as being barred by limita0on. 29.04.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No