Charanjit Sharma & ANR v. State Of Punjab & Others
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%7 + "7. While exercising its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged
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therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of court."
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.4##( ' ) ++ ' "9. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 I.P.C.In our view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be malafide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
Superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings."
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(+ ++ ' F107. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
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formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non;cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." (emphasis supplied)
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++(+ ++ ' "27. This Court, in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 24, held:
"... whereas while exercising power under section 482 CrPC, 1973 the High Court has to look at the object and purpose for which such power is conferred on it under the said provision.
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Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court to give effect to any order under CrPC, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under section 482 CrPC, 1973 should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under section 482 CrPC, 1973 to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for which they are conferred."(emphasis supplied) 28.
In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, it was decided:
"6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
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the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." (emphasis supplied) 29.
In Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336, at Para 7 thereof, it was held that when the complaint fails to disclose any criminal offence, the proceeding is liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code:
"In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either under Section 420 or Section 120B IPC and the present case is a case of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies before a civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 Code which it has erroneously refused."(emphasis supplied)
30. The law on the subject was also examined in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641. In Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779, it was opined:
"inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and when and only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the provision itself There is no denial of the fact that the power under section 482 CrPC, 1973 is very wide but it needs no special emphasis to state that conferment of wide power requires the Court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court." (emphasis supplied)
31. In Vinod Natesan v. State of Kerala, (2019) 2 SCC 401, this Court took the position outlined hereunder:
"11. ... Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that there was no criminality on part of the accused and a civil dispute is tried to be converted into a criminal dispute. Thus to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused would be an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers under section 482 CrPC, 1973 and has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. In view of the aforesaid and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed."
< " +3(' @ 4 C E +# Kunti and Another v. State of U.P. Criminal Appeal No. 1380 of 2023
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3A +( ) ++ ' "9. However, we do not find the need to engage with the grounds as urged, because a perusal of the record in no uncertain terms reflects the dispute as being of a civil nature. This court recently, in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr., observed that "A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings."
10. A two judge bench of this Court in ARCI v. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd., while deliberating upon the difference between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating, observed that the distinction depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of the alleged incident. If dishonest intention on part of the accused can be established at the of time of entering into the transaction with the complainant, then criminal liability would be attached.
11. In Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B (2022) 7 SCC 124, one of us, (Krishna Murari J.,) observed in reference to earlier decisions as under:
"24. This Court in G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513] observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when matters are essentially of civil nature.
25. This Court has time and again cautioned about converting purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This Court in Indian Oil Corpn. [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do
not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that : (Indian Oil Corpn. Case [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] , SCC p. 749, para 13) "13. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged."
12. Having regard to the above well established principles and also noting that the present dispute is entirely with respect to property and more particularly buying and selling thereof, it cannot be doubted that a criminal hue has been unjustifiably lent to a civil natured issue.
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State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636(#% 4 4@
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4 ) "It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." ++3(' @ 4 C E +# M/s Indian Oil Corporation v. M/s NEPC India (2006) 6 SCC 736& #% 4 4@
" ") ( ) ++ ' "10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged." #% ;
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