← Library
High Court of Punjab and HaryanaFAO/3431/2022disposed of

Mangal Singh And ORS v. Competent Authority Cum Dro Land Acquisitoin Collector And ANR.

2023-01-25Mr. Justice Avneesh Jhingan3 pages

  

          

 !"!#$%$&'( )&*+,- 







!

"#$!#%& &



  '  ./

 010 ' ( &!) * +,$ 

   ,-+,$ 

  ....

10- +2 '

/0 # 11

       !   

$+    !  

2%" 

 $   3  

 ,  !

 45$ 

$$  46 $$+ //7  +9$9:4"% $;+4, 



 34 $ 

42  2

 434 $ $!2 

 

<1 

22 $

= 

<1$!

$2 ,  $ 8: $+

$ " 22    

=

< 2$2 $,

=

<345$

$2  <<

< >$  

 4! 

  % $; !

45$

$$   $ !4 2 2""

 >$  

     

 $,

=

< -  $!!$+ 45$

$2 2""

  $      

 +"$$  $4, 45$ 

$$  $2 2""

 $  $ "2+% $; 

 



 !

45$

$$   $ !4 !   !

+ $! 

$2  !

 !44 !!!

!2 $!!  101  )3/2)&" !4)+5&" )!+%- 6  06- ! ( We, however, feel disinclined to go into the merits of the controversy, as we are of the opinion that the Division Bench ought to have confined its decision only to the question dealt with by the learned Single Judge viz. the question of limitation. The Division Bench has dealt with the issue of limitation in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the impugned judgment and from a reading thereof, we observe that Application Nos. 1106-1108/2000 filed by the assignees in which notice had been issued on 19.4.1999 for 10.6.1999 by the Master were dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 3.7.2000 without notice to the applicants i.e. the assignees.

In this situation, the Division Bench was justified in holding that the order of the learned Single Judge was not sustainable. The learned counsel for the appellant, has, however, urged that no particulars had been spelt out in the application justifying the condonation of a delay of 971 days.

 delay and we accordingly endorse the observations of the Division Bench on this aspect. As noted above, the learned Single Judge had dismissed the applications by order dated 3.7.2000 wholly on the ground of limitation. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench has not only condoned the delay but taken a decision on merits as well. We are of the opinion that the second exercise was not justified as the only issue before the Division Bench was the question of limitation. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench to the extent that it goes on to the merits of the controversy but maintain it in so far that it deals with the question of limitation. Ipso facto the matters are restored to a re-hearing on merits."

If the objection application was dismissed on the ground of limitation, there was no occasion for the court concerned to consider the matter on merits.

In view of the above, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the court concerned to decide the objection application under Section 34 of the Act on merits. Needless to say that the matter would be considered without being influenced by the observations made on the merits of the matter in the impugned order.

The parties are directed to appear before the court concerned on 21.2.2023.

The appeal is disposed of.

7108   ( )&*+,- !-

?

-@  ( A @

? 4 ( A @