High Court of Punjab and HaryanaCWP/11390/2024dismissed

M/S Saptagiri Restaurant Pvt Ltd v. Airports Authority Of India And ORS

2024-12-19Mr. Justice Arun Palli,Mr. Justice Vikram Aggarwal44 pages

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH Reserved on : 04.11.2024 Pronounced on : 19.12.2024 M/s Saptagiri Restaurant Private Limited ...... Petitioner

Versus

Airports Authority of India and others ...... Respondents CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN PALLI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM AGGARWAL *** Present :

Mr. Gurminder Singh, Senior Advocate with Mr. Karmanbir Singh Kharbanda, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate with Ms. Shubhra Singh, Advocate Mr. Nitin Kumar Sharma, Advocate Mr. Avichal Sharma, Advocate Mr. Vivek Singla, Advocate for the respondents.

*** VIKRAM AGGARWAL , J

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Eventually, the impugned order dated 02.05.2024 was passed before which a detailed representation dated 23.04.2024 (Annexure P-26) alongwith a number of documents was submitted by the petitioner before respondent No.3. Certain other communications (Annexures P-27 to P-29) also ensued between the parties and finally the order dated 02.05.2024 was passed by respondent No.3. A bare perusal of this order shows that the same is a detailed order wherein the allegations, the previous proceedings, the orders passed by different High Courts, the validity of the orders dated 08.08.2023 and all other aspects were duly gone into and eventually the orders dated 08.08.2023 were upheld. The order runs into 09 pages and is an

* extremely detailed order dealing with all relevant aspects. In the considered opinion of this Court, after the passing of this order, it would not at all be open for the petitioner to submit that there was violation of the principles of natural justice. It becomes manifestly clear that this argument is being raised since there appears to be no argument on merits. The impugned order shows a clear cut modus operandi adopted by the petitioner while participating in the tenders thereby committing fraud and corrupt practices and also having a conflict of interest as stated under Clauses 9 and 10 of the DNIET referred to in the preceding paragraphs. The petitioner committed gross illegalities and misrepresentations while participating in the tenders thereby leading to the termination of the agreement and its debarment.

When one goes through the show cause notices placed on record, the response submitted by the petitioner, the orders of termination and debarment and finally the impugned order dated 02.05.2024 passed by respondent No.3, there remains not even an iota of doubt in the mind of this Court that the orders dated 08.08.2023 and the order dated 02.05.2024 are perfectly legal and valid and do no call for any interference. Though, as has been observed previously, the order dated 02.05.2024 is a detailed order running into 09 pages, it would be essential to refer to certain parts of the same.

"M/s SRPL challenged the decision taken by the Committee by filing writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana by filing a Writ Petition numbered as CWP No.3041 of 2024. The Hon'ble High Court vide its order dated: 20.04.2024 disposed of the writ petition by directing the Committee (DRC) to pass a fresh order on or before 02.05.2024. M/s SRPL was directed to appear before the Committee (DRC) on 23.04.2024. M/s SRPL appeared

) before the Committee (DRC) on 23.04.2024 and submitted the following documents.

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It was held by the DRC that the debarment and annulment orders passed by the Airport Director, Amritsar had been passed after taking approval from the competent authority and, therefore, the same would be considered as orders passed by the Airports Authority of India. The

submissions as regards the share holding in M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Private Limited was also noticed;

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As regards the issue of Karan Singh being an employee of the petitioner and M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Private Limited as also the involvement of M/s Syona Spa, respondent No.3 held as under:- 9#$C8A9+9*($4D 7 3!

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As regards the share holding of Bikram Singh, etc. and the conflict of interest issue, it was held as under:- "OBSERVATIONS OF DRC:

1) No documentary evidence on shareholding of Sh. Bikram Singh in M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. was submitted on the date of reply of show cause was provided. As per documents submitted by the party in the DRC process, it can be seen that there has been major change in the distribution of shares in M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in respect of shares of Sh. Bikram Singh. It is the responsibility of party /Director Sh. Bikram Singh to have presented the documents related to Gift deed at the time of show- cause notice. Mere submission of statement that "it is a matter of record" cannot be taken into consideration as per records submitted at later stage the party had a major change in shareholding pattern in the months of May to July 2022.

2) Considering the fact that a mistake was done by official of M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in depositing EPF and ESI of Sh. Karan Singh for near about 10 months i.e. from the month of termination of services prior to August 2022 till the month of June 2023 cannot be considered a mere mistake but a pre-conceived after-thought to come out of the grounds of conflict of interest.

3) Further, the statement provided by M/s SRPL that "it appears from the response dated 12.04.2023 of Sh. Karan Singh, as received now through your office that ... as M/s

3 Syona Spa or Sh. Karan Singh cannot be said to be bidder..." false as per bid procedure of CPP portal (e-tenders), the bidders get the information automatically regarding the bids submitted along with details of bidders when the bid manager opens the technical bids of the tenders.

4) Also, only after submitting of tender fees, EMD, documents of technical bid and financial bid BOQ (rate quote), the bid gets completed and the system accepts the bids and then the further process is carried out.

5) DRC has also observed that M/s Syona Spa has opted for similar process in tenders for Raipur and Pune wherein M/s SRPL was also one of the bidder. As the information regarding bidders become visible on CPP portal instantly after opening of technical bids by bid managers, the reason that M/s SRPL has not highlighted to AAI the malafide intentions of M/s Syona Spa to affect the bidding process can be considered as the fact that both the bidders were working closely in the bid processes having the access of each other's information in respect to the bid submission. The DRC has also observed that the address of all the three firms in question is same i.e. L-322 MAHIPALPUR EXTENS, NEW DELHI 110037. It has also come to light that the address of M/s Syona SPA (L-73/L-322, Mahipalpur Extension, New Delhi) and M/s Saptagiri Restaurant Pvt. Ltd. (L-322, Mahipalpur Extension, New Delhi) are in the same premises. In this regard, the reference has been taken into the account from the letter dated 06.05.2016 issued by M/s SRPL confirming the address L-73 and L-322, Ist Floor,

Hotel Saptagiri, Mahipalpur Extn. National Highway No.08, New Delhi-110034 (unit of Satpagiri Restaurant Pvt. Ltd.)." 40.

Finally it was concluded by respondent No.3-DRC as under:- "Thus in the light of facts discussed above, it can be reasonably inferred that M/s SRPL (one bidder) has relationship with M/s Syona Spa (Sh. Karan SinghProp.) (another bidder) directly or indirectly or through M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (a common third party) that puts either or both of tghem in a position to have access to each other's information, or to influence the bid of either or each other which means conflict of interest as per tender conditions. DRC is of the view that the documents submitted by the party were created after participation in the tender and were presented before this forum for the purpose of misleading and to obtain a favourable order. Thus, DRC comes to the conclusion that the orders dated 08.08.2023 passed by Airport Director, Amritsar Airport by which M/s SRPL was debarred and license was annulled, would remain valid."

41.

It is, therefore, clear that respondent No.3 examined the matter from all angles after giving due opportunity of hearing to all stake holders and thereafter passed the order under challenge. 42.

Let us now examine to what extent, in exercise of the power of judicial review, this Court would interfere in the impugned order/s.

43.

It would be essential to bear in mind that challenge to policy decisions, administrative action, issuance of tenders, holding of auctions, sale of plots, resumption proceedings have all been raked up before the Courts on various occasions. The question which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court of India and various high Courts in these kind of litigations was as to whether policy decisions, administrative actions etc. can be interfered with exercising the power of judicial review or as to whether the Courts were to refrain from doing so. Though there are a catena of judgments on the subject, reference to few of them would be noteworthy.

In the case of Jagdish Mandal versus State of Orissa and others 2007 (14) SCC 517, the Supreme Court of India was seized of a challenge to the award of construction contracts to one Jagdish Mandal and Laxmi Sharma. The High Court of Orissa had allowed the writ petition filed by the unsuccessful bidder after which the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of India examined the scope of interference in judicial review of tender processes and award of contracts. While referring to various judgments on the subject, the Supreme Court of India held that judicial review of administration action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. It was held that its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made lawfully and not to check whether choice or decision is sound.

It was held that when the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. It was held that a contract is a commercial transaction and evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions.

the principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance and that if the decision relating to the award of a contract is bona fide and is in public interest, Courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural abberation or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer is made out. It was held that the power of judicial review would not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest or to decide contractual disputes. It was held that attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade Courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review should be resisted.

It was held that such interferences, whether interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. It was held that under the circumstances, before interfering in such matters in exercise of the power of judicial review, a Court should pose to itself the questions whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or is intended to favour someone and that whether the public interest is affected; "19. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and malafides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made 'lawfully' and not to check whether choice or decision is 'sound'.

When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction.

contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of Page 0102 power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.

The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions : i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone.

OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say : 'the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached.'

* ii) Whether public interest is affected.

If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving black-listing or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of state largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.

19. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court in all the aforesaid decisions has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction.

No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The Courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause.

) contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. As laid down in the judgments cited above the courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give "fair play in the joints" to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer.

20. The essence of the law laid down in the judgments referred to above is the exercise of restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the state instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable; the court does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court must realise that the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, the court's interference should be minimal. The authority which floats the contract or tender, and has authored the tender documents is the best judge as to how the documents have to be interpreted. If two interpretations are possible then the interpretation of the author must be accepted. The courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity. With this approach in mind we shall deal with the present case.

The Supreme Court of India, therefore, held that the Courts, being the guardian of fundamental rights would be duty bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. It was held that in all the

judgments referred to by the Supreme Court of India, the Courts had been cautioned time and again that they should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters and that the Courts are normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. It was held that the Courts must realize their limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. It was held that in matters involving technical issues, the Courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain.

It was held that the Courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. It was held that infact, the Courts must give 'fair play in the joints' to the Government and public undertakings in matters of contract and must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. It was held that the essence of the law laid down in the judgments which had been rendered from time to time is the exercise of restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the State instrumentalities; the Courts should give way to the opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable.

It was held that the Court does not sit like a Court of appeal over the appropriate authority and must realize that the authority concerned is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, interference of the Courts should be minimal.

;

accepted and that the Courts will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity. 45.

Very recently, the Supreme Court of India took a similar view in the case of State of Punjab and others versus Mehardin 2022 (5) SCC 648 and while referring to the cases of Jagdish Mandal versus State of Orissa and others and Silppi Constructions Contractors versus Union of India and Anr. Etc. Etc. (supra) as also the judgment in the case of TATA Cellular versus Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 reiterated the view. 46.

Most recently, while examining the challenge to the central vista project in the case of Rajeev Suri Versus Delhi Development Authority 2022

(11) SCC 1, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India examined the scope of judicial review of an Administrative or so to say quasi legislative action. It was held that the rule of law as accepted and settled in India, with regard to judicial interference in administrative and executive or policy matters is no more res integra. It was held that the duty enjoined upon the judiciary is to ensure checks and balances and to place itself between the Government and citizens when they come face to face in a Court of law and that it is meant to act as an equalizer and ensure that the flow of decisions from executive to citizens is overseen through the prism of well-established principles, as and when called upon to do so. It was held that the judicial organ is not meant to impose the citizens' or even its own version of good governance upon the Government in the name of Rule of Law in exercise of its power of judicial review.

47.

The Apex Court examined the issue threadbare starting from observations made by Lord Brightman in the case of Chief Constable of the

North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 to the observations of the Supreme Court of India in the case of TATA Cellular versus Union of India (supra), the observations made by Graham Aldus and John Alder in their book 'Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice' and while examining the need for heightened judicial review, the Supreme Court of India declined to interfere in the Central Vista Project and held as under:- "167. To sum up the above discussion, it may be noted that judicial review primarily involves a review of State action - legislative, executive, administrative and policy. The primary examination in a review of a legislative action is the existence of power with the legislature to legislate on a particular subject matter.

For this purpose, we often resort to doctrines of pith and substance, harmonious construction, territorial nexus etc. Once the existence of power is not in dispute, it is essentially an enquiry under Article 13 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to not violate any of the provisions of Part-III in a lawmaking function. The review of executive action would depend upon the precise nature of the action. For, the domain of executive is wide and is generally understood to take within its sweep all residuary functions of the State. Thus, the precise scope of review would depend on the decision and the subject matter. For instance, an action taken under a statute must be in accordance with the statute and would be checked on the anvil of ultra vires the statutory or constitutional parameters.

The enquiry must also ensure that the executive action is within the scope of executive powers earmarked for State Governments and Union Government respectively in the constitutional scheme. The scope of review of a pure administrative action is well settled.

3 absence of bias etc. The enquiry is also informed by the Wednesbury principles of unreasonableness. The review of a policy decision entails a limited enquiry. As noted above, second guessing by the Court or substitution of judicial opinion on what would constitute a better policy is strictly excluded from the purview of this enquiry. Under the constitutional scheme, the government/executive is vested with the resources to undertake necessary research, studies, dialogue and expert consultation and accordingly, a pure policy decision is not interfered with in an ordinary manner. The burden is heavy to demonstrate a manifest illegality or arbitrariness or procedural lapses in the culmination of the policy decision. However, the underlying feature of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution must inform all enquiries of State action by the constitutional Court."

48.

As regards the argument that the debarment order would apply only to the Amritsar International Airport for the same had been issued by the Airport Director of the Amritsar International Airport, it has to be noticed that respondent No.3 in its order has duly observed that the said order was passed after due approval from the competent authority. Be that as it may, we do not wish to go into the issue at this stage for wherever the petitioner is being debarred on the basis of the orders under challenge in this petition, the petitioner is invoking the jurisdiction of the Courts concerned as would be evident from the orders passed by the District Court, Budgam, the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and the High Court of Madras. This Court is essentially concerned with the legality of the orders under challenge. Still further, it has also come on record that an order dated 20.12.2023 had also been passed by the Airports Authority of India debarring the petitioner across

* the country but subsequently a statement was given before the Jammu & Kashmir High Court that the same had been withdrawn and accordingly order dated 22.02.2024 had been passed by the Jammu & Kashmir High Court. However, during the course of arguments, it was stated that a review petition had been filed against the said order dated 22.02.2024 and vide order dated 18.09.2024, the order dated 22.02.2024 had been stayed. As regards the writ petition filed in the Madras High Court, the same was stated to have been dismissed on 30.09.2024. It would be essential to state here that these facts were stated by learned counsel representing the respondents and were not denied by learned counsel representing the petitioner. Even otherwise, once the terms and conditions of the tenders being floated across the country are not before this Court, it would not be possible for this Court to lay down as to whether the petitioner is being rightly debarred at other places or not. 49.

The argument that the impugned order had travelled beyond the purview of the show cause notice dated 08.06.2023 is also devoid of merit because when the parties appeared before respondent No.3, a number of additional documents were submitted before it and respondent No.3 examined the matter threadbare and then decided the same. The petitioner was given due opportunity to present its case and to produce documents and was duly heard. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the impugned order dated 02.05.2024 has travelled beyond the purview of the show cause notice dated 08.06.2023. The argument that no show cause notice for debarment had been issued is also devoid of merit. Firstly, Clause 9(a) of the DNIET duly lays down that an order of debarment can be passed under certain conditions which have also been enumerated therein. Still

* further, as has been observed in the preceding paragraphs, the parties had been relegated to the DRC-respondent No.3 and a detailed order, as has been noticed in the preceding paragraphs also was passed by respondent No.3 after giving due opportunity of hearing and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was no show cause notice before passing of the debarment order. Infact, here, the no prejudice theory would come in and it can safely be held that once the matter was examined threadbare by respondent No.3, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner even if there was no show cause notice before the passing of the initial debarment order dated 08.08.2024.

50.

The argument that since the licence had been granted to the petitioner after reply to the complaints had been filed meaning thereby that the complaints had not been found to be having merit by the respondents is devoid of merit and is rejected. Merely because the licence had been awarded to the petitioner does not mean that the respondents had consigned the complaints to record having found them to be devoid of merit. This argument is too far fetched to be even considered and is accordingly rejected. 51.

We have gone through the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the parties.

52.

As regards the judgments, reliance upon which was placed by learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, the judgment in Rajender Contractor versus State of Haryana and others (supra) would not apply for in that case no show cause notice had been issued prior to the issuance of a debarment order whereas the said issue has been discussed in detail with regard to the facts of this case which are totally different. For the same

* reasons, the judgments in Kulja Industries Ltd. versus Chief General Manager W.P. Proj. BSNL and others and Gorkha Security Services versus Government (NCT of Delhi) and others (supra) would not apply. The judgment in the case of Isolaters and Isolaters versus Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. & Anr. (supra) wherein it was held that it would not be enough to put the contractor concerned only on notice of debarment without specifically putting it on notice on the issue of penalty would also not come to the aid of the petitioner for in Clause 9 of the DNIET itself, the provision of debarment has been laid down and it has been provided that the minimum debarment would be for a period of three years. In the present case, the debarment is for the minimum period of 03 years and, therefore, no prejudice can be stated to have been caused to the petitioner. 53.

As regards the judgments relied upon by learned counsel representing the respondents, in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy versus State of Madhya Pradesh and others (supra), the Supreme Court of India, while referring to the judgment in Ashok Kumar Sonkar versus Union of India (2007) 4 SCC 54 held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula and that its application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was held that to sustain a complaint of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice one must establish that he had been prejudiced thereby for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice.

54.

The Supreme Court then referred to the theory of prejudice as had been considered in the case of Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392 whereafter, the principles on the issue of prejudice and the

* violation of the principles of natural justice were laid down. One of the principles was that while applying the rule of audi alteram partem, the Court concerned must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. Ultimately it was held that even though the appellants before the Supreme Court had not been joined at the initial stage, an opportunity to controvert the findings of the Authorities was duly afforded lateron and under the circumstances, no prejudice was said to have been caused to them. The Supreme Court held as under:- "44. In the narration of the facts as discussed above, it is clear that the appellants have emphasized on their nonjoinder at the initial stage before the Collector.

A bare perusal of the order passed by the Collector reflects that it is based on the counter-affidavit filed by the Janpad Panchayat whereby it is established that the appellants were related to the members of the selection committee. Subsequently, the collector held the process to be vitiated by bias by applying the test of reasonable likelihood of bias. Once again, upon challenge being made by the appellants before the revisional authority, their relationship with the members of the selection committee was not disputed yet violation of doctrine of audi altrem partem was alleged merely due to non-joinder. After hearing them, the plea of nonimpleadment did not find force before the revisional authority and the challenge did not succeed.

Aggrieved appellants moved a writ petition before the High Court where ample opportunity was given by learned Single Judge and they were allowed to inspect the records.

** afforded. After sufficient opportunities given by the Ld. Single Judge, the appellants neither denied their relationship with the members of the selection committee nor demonstrated that how the findings are perverse or contrary to record, causing any prejudice to them.

45. In the sequel of above factual narration, first limb of natural justice that is 'rule against bias' was proved as reasonable likelihood of bias was fully established irrefutably. The violation of another limb i.e. audi alteram partem, which is procedural, has been prayed by the appellants on the pretext of their non-joinder at the initial stage; in my opinion, without showing prejudice mere nonjoinder even at initial stage does not violate the natural justice doctrine in the case at hand."

55.

A similar view was taken by a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on India in the case of Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah vs. Reserve Bank of India and Others (supra) and the High Court of Delhi in the case of Aneuser Busch Inbev India Limited versus Commissioner (Excise), Entertainment and Luxury Tax) and others. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, we find the writ petition to be devoid of merit and accordingly the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of accordingly. (ARUN PALLI) (VIKRAM AGGARWAL) JUDGE JUDGE Reserved on : 04.11.2024 Pronounced on : 19.12.2024 Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether Reportable Yes/No