Gurmail Kaur v. Gurnam Singh And ORS

[1]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Date of decision: 10.12.2025 Gurmail Kaur ...Appellant

Versus

Gurnam Singh and others

...Respondents

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present:

Mr. L.S. Sidhu, Advocate for the appellant.

DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The present appeal arises out of the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. The plain4ff, Gurmail Kaur (appellant herein), filed a suit for a decree of permanent injunc4on, which the Trial Court dismissed on 2.2.2016. The plain4ff's first appeal was dismissed by the First Appellate Court on 13.7.2017. The appellant has challenged those concurrent orders before this Court.

2.

The present appeal is accompanied by an applica4on (CM-8223C-2019) under Sec4on 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking condona4on of a delay of 485 days in refiling the appeal. It is stated in the applica4on that the appeal was ini4ally filed on 24.10.2017 but was returned by the Registry on account of certain objec4ons. One objec4on was the absence of an affidavit. It is pleaded that a le@er from the counsel was sent to the appellant but did not reach her; there was an alleged communica4on gap between the appellant and her counsel, which according to the appellant, caused the delay in refiling. The applica4on is supported by the appellant's affidavit.

3.

The legal ques4on on the preliminary issue is whether the applica4on to condone the delay should be allowed. The power of the Court under Sec4on 151 CPC to condone delay is not unfe@ered, as an applicant must sa4sfy the Court that the delay was due to sufficient cause or circumstances warran4ng exercise of the extraordinary jurisdic4on. The length of

[2] delay, the reasons offered, the conduct of the li4gant and of the counsel, and the prejudice to the opposite party are relevant factors to be weighed in the balance.

3.

Applying these well-se@led yards4cks to the facts disclosed in the present applica4on, the Court finds the explana4on to be wholly unsa4sfactory. AEer the Registry returned the appeal on account of defects/objec4ons, it was incumbent upon the counsel to inform the appellant promptly and to take steps for curing the defects. Equally, a li4gant who places her cause in the hands of counsel must exercise ordinary vigilance and maintain communica4on on an important ma@er like filing an appeal against an adverse decree. Neither is there any explana4on of steps taken by the appellant during the 485 days to ascertain why the appeal had not been filed nor is there contemporaneous documentary proof like postal records, courier receipts or dated correspondence to substan4ate a con4nuous effort to cure the defect. The affidavit filed in support is, in the Court's assessment, an ex post facto a@empt to explain an inordinate delay. 4.

The delay of 485 days is not a trivial interregnum. Courts have consistently held that long unexplained delays a@ract strict scru4ny and, absent cogent, proximate and credible reasons, must be rejected. Here, the explana4on boils down to a communica4on lacuna between the advocate and the appellant and a general asser4on that the counsel sent a le@er which "did not reach" the appellant. Such bald averments are not of a nature to jus4fy condona4on of such a protracted delay. On the material before this Court, there is no due diligence shown by the appellant nor any demonstrable derelic4on by the opposite party or the Registry that would give rise to equitable relief.

5.

For these reasons, the Court is not persuaded to exercise the residual power under Sec4on 151 CPC in favour of the appellant. The applica4on (CM-8223-C-2019) to condone the delay of 485 days in re-filing is therefore dismissed. Consequent thereto, the appeal is barred by limita4on and is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.

[3] 6.

Main Case: I shall nonetheless proceed to consider the appeal on merits.

7.

The core disputed ques4ons on merits are (a) whether the plain4ff/appellant was in possession of the suit property and en4tled to protec4on by injunc4on; and (b) whether the plain4ff had proved 4tle to the suit property.

8.

The plain4ff's case, in brief, is that she is the wife of the deceased Gian Singh; that her father-in-law, Bachan Singh, had divided his holdings such that each of his four sons (Gurnam Singh, Gurdev Singh, Dhian Singh and Gian Singh) received 2 biswa; that the land in dispute was part of the share that fell to Gian Singh. It is the plain4ff's case that Gian Singh purchased four marla from Bhola Singh in 1975 and another four marla from Gurdev Singh in 1979 and thereon constructed a house, which was used for tethering animals and storing fodder. It was alleged that the defendants interfered with the plain4ff's possession and a@empted forcible dispossession. 9.

The defendants controverted this claim and asserted that defendant No.1 had purchased the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 4.12.1995 (Ex.D-1) executed by the previous owner Kartar Kaur and that the defendant has been owner in possession ever since. 10.

The Trial Court, aEer scru4nising the oral and documentary evidence, concluded that the plain4ff had failed to prove either possession of the suit property or 4tle thereto. The Trial Court accepted the defendants' plea that defendant No.1 was the owner in possession based upon Ex.D-1. Notably, a witness for the plain4ff (PW-4 Avtar Singh) admi@ed in cross-examina4on that the house in which the plain4ff resided was situated at a distance of about 100 yards from the property in dispute; when pressed, the plain4ff sought to explain that she lived in two houses. The Trial Court found these explana4ons neither convincing nor supported by reliable evidence.

[4] 11.

The First Appellate Court re-appraised the evidence and concurred with the findings of the Trial Court. The Appellate Court recorded its reasons and found no misapprecia4on of material evidence. 12.

The appellant's sole substan4ve grievance before this Court is that the evidence was not properly appreciated. When concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court, interference by this Court is permissible only if there is a manifest perversity or misreading of evidence. Appellate re-examina4on is not a roving commission to retry ques4ons of fact unless the conclusions are demonstrably perverse or founded on no evidence. 13.

A careful reading of the judgments of Courts below shows that the courts considered the documentary exhibits and the oral tes4mony; the presence of a registered sale deed (Ex.D-1) in favour of defendant No.1 was specifically no4ced and accepted. The plain4ff's oral tes4mony and her witnesses did not furnish par4culars or corrobora4ve material to displace the presump4on of 4tle and possession arising from the sale deed relied upon by the defendants. The admi@ed fact that the house in which the plain4ff lived was some distance away from the disputed property nega4vely impacts the plain4ff's claim of exclusive possession of the suit land. The attempt to explain the discrepancy by asser4ng occupancy of two houses is unsupported by independent evidence.

14.

In the circumstances, this Court finds no reason to disturb the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. 15.

Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed on both counts - firstly, because it is barred by limita4on and the applica4on to condone the delay is rejected; and secondly, on merits for lack of proof of possession and 4tle by the plain4ff. No order as to costs.

10.12.2025 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No