Yugraj Singh Alias Chhottu Alias Jugraj Singh v. State Of Punjab
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"1. The petitioner seeks leave to challenge the judgment and order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM%M No.33633%2024(O&M) whereby the petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
2. The petitioner has been in custody for a period of one year and four months in connection with FIR SLP (Crl.) No.3502/2025 No.29/2023 dated 26.03.2023 registered at P.S. Kalanaur, Dis% trict Gurdaspur under Sections 21, 23, 27(A), 29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, Section 66(F) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 25 of Arms Act, 1959.
3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the material placed on record, we are of the considered view that the
P a g e | 3 petitioner has made out case for interference with the impugned order dated 25.11.2024.
4. Considering the totality of circumstances and also the fact that the petitioner is in custody for a period of one year and four months, we are inclined to grant bail to the petitioner on such terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Trial Court. Ordered accordingly.
5. To comply with the order, the petitioner shall be produced be% fore the Trial Court forthwith.
6. The special leave petition is, accordingly, disposed of. 7 Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of." ' <
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The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above%referred to Supreme Court's judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution.
The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court%dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain.
However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre%trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself.
It goes without saying that the consequences of pre%trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail%life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family. There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985.
P a g e | 6 commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36%A of the Act.
However, this Court cannot turn Nelson's eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty%bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual's fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre%trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.
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(SUMEET GOEL) JUDGE 19.05.2026 jatin Whether speaking/reasoned:
Yes/No Whether reportable:
Yes/No