Amarjit Kaur And ORS. v. Sikander Singh And ANR.
-1IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Reserved on 08.05.2025 Pronounced on : 29.05.2025 Amarjit Kaur and others ......Appellants Vs.
Sikander Singh and another ......Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA Present :
Mr. Dushyant Godara, Advocate, for Mr. Vivek Suri, Advocate, for the appellants.
Mr. B.S.Taunque, Advocate, for respondent No.2-Insurance Company.
**** SUDEEPTI SHARMA J.
1.
The present appeal has been preferred for setting aside the award dated 15.02.2006 passed in the claim petition filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ludhiana (for short, 'the Tribunal'), whereby, claim petition filed by the appellants/claimants, was dismissed.
FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE 2.
The brief facts of the case are that on 25.03.1996 at about 9:00 p.m., Baljinder Singh had commenced his journey from Delhi to Ludhiana driving truck bearing registration No. PIC-7883. At about 4/5:00 a.m., on 26.03.1996, when the truck reached near village Jalbera falls under the jurisdiction of Police Station Sirhind, a bus came from the opposite
-2direction. To avoid a collision, Baljinder Singh steered the truck towards kacha portion of the road, but the vehicle went out of control of the driver and fell down from the Jalbera bridge. The truck got damaged and Baljinder Singh succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident. The appellants/claimants, being the legal heirs of the deceased, have claimed compensation on account of the death caused in the accident. 3.
Upon notice of the claim petition, the respondents appeared and filed their separate replies denying the factum of accident/compensation. 4.
From the pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal framed the following issues:- "1.
Whether the petitioners are the legal representatives of deceased Baljinder Singh? OPA 2.
Whether this claim petition is not maintainable? OPR-2. 3.
Whether the claim petition is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties? OPR-2.
4.
Whether Baljinder Singh deceased had no valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident? OPR-2. 5.
Whether the owner of the offending vehicle had no valid documents at the time of alleged accident? OPR-2. 6.
Whether the petitioners are entitled to claim compensation from the respondents. If so, how much and from which of the respondents? OPA.
7.
Relief."
5.
After taking into consideration the pleadings and the evidence on record, the learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition. Hence, the present appeal.
-3SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES 6.
Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants contends as under:- i) That the learned Tribunal has erred in law in dismissing the claim petition only on the ground that the deceasedBaljinder Singh was negligent in driving the offending vehicle. Further that the claim petition was filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, whereas, the income of the deceasedBaljinder Singh, as per affidavit (Ex.A-1) tendered by AW1Amarjit Kaur, was Rs.4,000/- per month, which is exceeding the statutory limit of Rs.40,000/- per annum prescribed under the Second Schedule to Section 163-A of the Act. ii) That since, now Section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is substituted by Section 164 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act 32 of 2019 w.e.f 01.04.2022), therefore, compensation be enhanced as per the substituted statutory provision i.e.
Section 164 of the Act (Act 32 of 2019 w.e.f 01.04.2022). iii) That the present case is covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in FAO No.4301 of 2006, titled as "Akaljit Kaur and Others Vs. Parveen Kumar and Others." wherein the claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was converted to Section 164 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act 32 of 2019 w.e.f 01.04.
-4Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board [2022(4) TAC 738] wherein it was held that Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act 32 of 2019 w.e.f 01.04.2022) provides for payment of compensation in case of death in the amount of Rs.5 lakh and in the case of grievous hurt of Rs.2.5 lakh.
7.
Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2-Insurance Company, however, vehemently argues on the lines of the award dated 15.02.2006 and submits that the claim petition has rightly been dismissed by the learned Tribunal. He further submits that the accident in question occurred due to the negligence on the part of the deceased-Baljinder Singh itself. Therefore, he prays for dismissal of the present appeal. 8.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the whole record of this case.
9.
The relevant portion of the award reads as under:- "ISSUE NO.2 7.
Mr. J.K. Tiwari, Advocate, counsel for the Insurance Company has strenuously urged before me that the accident is stated to have taken place way back in the year 1996 and as per averments in the claim petition as well as affidavit Ex.A1 income of the deceased was Rs.4,000/- per month meaning thereby annual income of the deceased was more than Rs. 40,000/- and that being so this claim petition is not maintainable. He has further pointed out that as transpires from the evidence tendered by A.W. 2 Bhupinder Singh as well as the alleged inquest report Ex. A1/A, the deceased himself was responsible for the accident and that being so in view of the observations
-5made in re:- Appaji Versus M. Krishna II (2005) Accident and Compensation Cases, 591 (DB) no liability would arise against insured nor can any such liability be enforced under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereafter to be referred as the Act).
8.
To over come these submissions Mr. Bector contended that as observed by our own Hon'ble High Court in re:- New India Assurance Company Limited Versus Shyamo Chauhan and others I (2005) Accident and Compensation Cases 856 (DB) even if the deceased was driver of motor vehicle in question the owner and the insurance company of said motor vehicle was liable to pay compensation to legal heirs of deceased and in view of these observations the Insurance Company is liable to compensate the legal heirs of the deceased. He has further submitted that of course, the accident took place in the year 1996, but the bar of limitation stands removed by the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in re:- New India Assurance Company Limited Versus C. Padma and another 2003 ACJ 1999.
9.
I have well considered the rival contentions, Bhupinder Singh A.W. 2 has stated in the following terms:
"On 25.03.1996 I along with Baljinder Singh son of Mukand Singh loaded our trucks from Delhi and started journey from Delhi to Ludhiana at about 9.00 P.M. Baljinder Singh was driving truck No.PIC-7883. On 26.03.1996 at about 5.00 a.m. when we reached near village Jalbera then a bus came from opposite direction. Baljinder Singh diverted his truck to the kacha portion of the road. His truck went out of control and fell down from Jalbera bridge. The truck was badly damaged. Baljinder
-6Singh suffered multiple grievous injuries and died at the spot due to the injuries suffered in the accident. I informed the police and identified his dead body before the police. The accident took place while Baljinder Singh was driving truck No. PIC-7883 and died during the journey from Delhi to Ludhiana. He was earning Rs. 4,000/- or 5,000/- per month. Sikander Singh was the owner of his truck."
10.
In Ex. A1/A the attested copy of the inquest report it has been merely mentioned that the matter was reported to the police and the dead body was identified by this witness Bhupinder Singh and others. The brief summary contained in this inquest proceedings absolutely silent about the fact that Bupinder Singh was also travelling in the same truck, which was being driven by Bhupinder Singh deceased or he was travelling in the other truck. This witness Bhupinder Singh in his cross examination has stated in categories terms that he was coming in his separate truck, which is not mentioned in the claim petition. Had he really witnessed the accident, firstly it had been so mentioned in the inquest proceedings and secondly in the claim petition itself.
Obviously according to this witness when they reached near Village Jalbera then the bus came from opposite direction and Bhupinder Singh diverted his truck to the kacha portion of the road and the truck went out of control and fell down from Jalbera bridge. In the opening sentence of his cross examination, he has regretted his inability to tell the number of the bus. Further he has categorically stated that no FIR was got registered against any body.
-7travelling in the separate truck. So, his own evidence speaks volumes of the fact that Baljinder Singh deceased himself was responsible for this accident as he had diverted the truck to Kacha portion of the road without being hit by the alleged bus. Palpably it is not Bhupinder Singh's version that the truck had fallen down or control of the same was lost by Baljinder Singh deceased on its being hit by the bus. In re:- Appaji Versus M. Krishna (supra) the Division Bench of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court was pleased to observe that in case of accident where person killed or injured is himself responsible for accident, no liability would arise against insured nor can any such liability be enforced under Section 163-A of the Act. So, if the matter is viewed in the sight of these observations, this claim petition do not maintainable.
There is also no evidence to the effect that Baljinder Singh deceased was driver by profession. Had he been so, his driving license might had been placed on the record. As observed in re:- United India Insurance Company Limited Versus Kavita Chhabra and others III (2005) Accident and Compensation Cases, 885 the deceased as earning more than Rs. 40,000/-per annum and that being so, petition under Section 163-A of the Act was not maintainable. Here in this case, it is own plea of the claimants that the annual income of the deceased was more than Rs.40,000/- and even on this score too this petition is not maintainable.
11.
In view of the preceding discussion, it is held that this petition is not maintainable and this issue is decided against the claimants.
-8ISSUE NO.3 12.
The respondent Insurance Company has not adduced any evidence to prove as to how this petition is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties and consequently, this issue is decided against the respondent Insurance Company.
ISSUE NO. 4 & 5 13.
The respondent Insurance Company has not let in evidence to discharge the onus of these issues. Psychol, these issues are decided against the respondent Insurance Company.
ISSUE NO.6 14.
On this issue Amarjit Kaur applicant as A.W. 1 has solemnly affirmed in her affidavit Ex. A1 that her husband was drawing salary of Rs. 4000/- per month. As observed earlier in the course of discussion held on issue no. 2 if the income of the deceased exceeds Rs.40,000/- per annum any claim petition lodged under Section 163A of the Act is not maintained? However, in re:- Guruanna Vedi and another Versus General Manager Karnataka State Road Transport Corporationand Another III (2002) Accident and Compensation Cases 350 (Full Bench) it has been observed that in case the person with the higher income notionally brings down his income to Rs.40,000/- in order to present his claim under Section 163-A of the Act the same can be permitted. But in the current, case the claimants have over and over again asserted that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs.4,000/- per month meaning thereby it exceeded Rs.40,000/-per annum and that being so, compensation can not be awarded in this case under Section 163-A of the Act. It is worth pointing out here that a glance
-9through Ex.A1/A the attested copy of the inquest report would reveal that therein initially the truck number was mentioned as POL-7883 and later on alphabets were converted into PIC-7883. May be that the accident would have occurred with some other truck bearing No.POL7883. 15.
In view of the above discussion, it is held that the petitioners are not entitled to claim compensation from the respondent and sequelly, this issue is decided against the petitioners."
10.
A perusal of the impugned award reveals that the learned Tribunal has committed an error in dismissing the claim petition on the grounds that the deceased was negligent in the driving of the offending vehicle and the income of the deceased exceeded Rs.40,000 per annum, thereby rendering the petition non-maintainable under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
11.
It is pertinent to note that claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is no-fault liability provision. The only essential requirement under this Section is the use of a motor vehicle resulting in death or permanent disablement, without any obligation to prove wrongful act, neglect or default of the driver. Reference at this stage can be made to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in United India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Sunil Kumar and another, 2017 INSC 1143, wherein it is held as under:- 8.
From the above discussion, it is clear that grant of compensation under Section 163-A of the Act on the basis of the
-10structured formula is in the nature of a final award and the adjudication thereunder is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by Section 163A(2).
Though the aforesaid section of the Act does not specifically exclude a possible defence of the Insurer based on the negligence of the claimant as contemplated by Section 140(4), to permit such defence to be introduced by the Insurer and/or to 10 understand the provisions of Section 163A of the Act to be contemplating any such situation would go contrary to the very legislative object behind introduction of Section 163A of the Act, namely, final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time.
In fact, to understand Section 163A of the Act to permit the Insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be selfcontradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question arising by holding that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act it is not open for the Insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim.
The learned Tribunal, in overlooking this settled position of law, has erroneously introduced considerations of negligence and contributory fault, which are extraneous to a claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
-1112.
A careful appreciation of the evidence on record, particularly the testimony of AW-2 Bhupinder Singh, establishes the occurrence of the accident involving truck bearing registration No.PIC-7883, which was being driven by the deceased, Baljinder Singh. The said witness, who accompanied the deceased on the journey from Delhi to Ludhiana (albeit in a separate truck), categorically deposed that a bus approaching from the opposite direction caused the deceased to swerve onto the kacha portion of the road, resulting in the truck losing control and falling from the Jalbera bridge. Bhupinder Singh, who also informed the police and identified the body of the deceased, stood firm during a detailed cross-examination and his version remained consistent and unimpeached.
13.
The reasoning of the learned Tribunal to discredit this testimony on the ground that Bhupinder Singh was travelling in a different truck and this was not mentioned in the inquest proceedings or claim petition is legally untenable.
14.
Firstly, the claim petition was filed by the dependents of the deceased, not by Bhupinder Singh himself. Secondly, that the scope of an inquest report is limited, primarily to ascertain the apparent cause of death, and not to record detailed eyewitness narratives. The presence or absence of specific facts in the inquest report cannot override direct and consistent oral testimony.
15.
Furthermore, the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly those before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, are governed by the principle of
-12preponderance of probabilities rather than the stringent standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, minor inconsistencies or the absence of a complete narrative in ancillary documents like the inquest report should not lead to the wholesale rejection of otherwise credible evidence. Reference at this stage can be made to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court passed in Anita Sharma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2021(1) SCC(Cri) 475, wherein it is held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court that standard of proof in motor accident matters is one of preponderance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt and strict principles of evidence and standards of proof like in criminal trial are inapplicable in the MACT claim cases. The relevant extract of the Anita Sharma's case (supra) is reproduced as under:-
22. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the approach and role of Courts while examining evidence in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with nonexamination of some best eyewitnesses, as may happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyze the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely than not true. A somewhat similar situation arose in Dulcina Fernandes v.Joaquim Xavier Cruz (2013) 10 SCC 646. wherein this Court reiterated that:
"7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pickup van as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101]) (emphasis supplied)"
-1316.
The learned Tribunal also erred in dismissing the petition on the premise that the income of the deceased exceeded Rs.40,000 per annum, based solely on a statement made in the claim petition. It is a wellrecognized judicial principle that claimants, in the absence of documentary proof, may overstate income figures in the hope of higher compensation. However, the duty lies with the Tribunal to assess the actual income on a reasonable basis, such as prevailing minimum wages, in the absence of cogent documentary evidence.
17.
Reference at this stage can be made to Judgment of this Court in FAO-2898-2006 titled as 'Cholamandalam General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Jasbir Singh and another', wherein it is held as under:- "10. A perusal of the above award reveals that the learned Tribunal has duly considered the material on record and rightly held the claimant entitled to compensation. Although the claimant asserted that at the time of accident he was earning Rs.5,000/- per month as an electrician with M/s. Navreet Enterprises, no documentary or corroborative evidence was led to substantiate the claim. In the absence of any salary slip, appointment letter, or testimony from the employer, the learned Tribunal rightly did not rely solely upon the self-serving statement of the claimant and assessed his monthly income @ Rs.2,500/- as of daily wage labourer/unskilled labour. 11.
It is a well-settled principle of law, as held by this Court case titled as Satpal v. Daljit, passed in FAO No. 407 of 2006, that there exists a general tendency on the part of the claimants or their representatives to exaggerate income in order to seek higher compensation. This Court, therefore, emphasized the necessity of basing income assessment on reliable evidence or,
-14in its absence, on notional income derived from minimum wages norms. The relevant extracts of the same is reproduce as under:- "13. The claim petitions are drafted by the Advocates and it is standard practice to state the maximum earnings and amount of compensation in the pleadings. The Court/Tribunal should appreciate the evidence led on oath, rather than strictly adhering to the pleadings. The present claim petition was dismissed solely on the stated earning of Rs.6,000/- in the pleadings, completely discarding the evidence presented. This indicates a manifest failure to apply judicial mind. Therefore, the present appeal is allowed. The appellant/claimant is granted compensation under Section 163-A by taking his income to be Rs.3,000/- per month."
12.
Further, it is trite law that in the absence of cogent and reliable evidence regarding the income of the claimant, the Court may assess the income based on minimum wages applicable to unskilled or semi-skilled labourer, as the case may be. In the present case, the learned Tribunal, relying on this principle, rightly assessed the monthly income of the claimant as Rs.2,500/-.
18.
In the instant case, although the claimant (AW-1 Amarjit Kaur) deposed in her affidavit (Ex.A1) that her husband was earning Rs.4,000/- per month, but no salary certificate or other documentary proof was furnished. Hence, in line with the above legal precedent and in the absence of conclusive evidence, the income of the deceased ought to have been assessed on the basis of prevailing minimum wages. As such, the conclusion
-15of the learned Tribunal that the petition is not maintainable under Section 163-A on this ground is clearly unsustainable. 19.
Moreover, the condition previously stipulated under the Second Schedule to Section 163-A, which restricted its applicability to cases where the annual income of the deceased or injured exceeded Rs.40,000/-, has been expressly omitted under the new Section 164. The legislative objective behind this change appears to be the removal of income-based limitations in order to ensure broader and more equitable access to compensation under the no-fault liability framework, thereby simplifying the claims process and ensuring uniformity in the award of compensation. 20.
In light of the foregoing analysis and the settled principles of law, the impugned findings of the learned Tribunal dismissing the claim petition are legally unsustainable and are accordingly set aside. 21.
Further, this Court in FAO No.4301 of 2006, titled as "Akaljit Kaur and Others Vs. Parveen Kumar and Others" held as under:- "11.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Murti and others Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board [2022(4) TAC 738] held that the appellants therein to be granted the benefit of beneficial provision enacted by the Parliament under Chapter 11 of which Section 164 provides for payment of compensation in the case of death in the amount of Rs.5 lakhs and in the case grievous hurt of Rs.2.5 lakhs.
12.
This Court in FAO-195-2006 titled as Mamta and Others Vs. Happy and Others, decided on 29.05.2024, held that since Motor Vehicle statute is a beneficial legislation, the Judge should not go into the technicalities of the provisions, under which the application or petition is moved but should apply his judicial mind, as these are only the irregularities and not illegalities which cannot be cured. It has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the loss caused to the claimants or the relationship or to the victim of the limb cannot be compensated. Still the Court should make every effort by
-16exercising its discretion empathetically. Further, Justice should actually be shown to be delivered by application of judicial mind with intelligence, prudence, care and caution and by showing empathy. The Court decision should be such that they strengthen the trust and confidence of public and litigants in judicial system and judiciary."
22.
In view of the above referred to judgments, this Court is now converting the claim petition filed under Sections 163-A (pre-amendment i.e 2019 amendment w.e.f 01.04.2022) to Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (amended by the Act 32 of 2019).
CONCLUSION 23.
In view of the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the above referred to judgments, the present appeal is allowed. The award dated 15.02.2006 is hereby set aside and the appellants/claimants are held entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/-. 24.
So far as the interest part is concerned, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dara Singh @ Dhara Banjara Vs. Shyam Singh Varma 2019 ACJ 3176 and R.Valli and Others VS. Tamil Nandu State Transport Corporation (2022) 5 Supreme Court Cases 107, the appellants/claimants are granted the interest @ 9% per annum on the compensation amount from the date of filing of claim petition till the date of its realization.
25.
The respondent No.2-Insurance Company is directed to deposit the amount of compensation along with interest with the learned Tribunal within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The Tribunal is directed to disburse the amount of compensation
-17along with interest in the accounts of the appellants/claimants in equal share. The appellants/claimants are directed to furnish their bank accounts details to the learned Tribunal.
26.
Respondent No.2-Insurance Company is hereby directed to disburse the current scheduled fee to Mr. B.S.Taunque, Advocate, within a period of 20 days from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment, in view of the order dated 18.07.2024 passed in FAO No.1682 of 2007 by this Court.
27.
Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (SUDEEPTI SHARMA) JUDGE 29.05.2025 Virrendra Whether speaking/non-speaking : Yes Whether reportable : Yes/No