Dilbagh Singh v. Prahlad Rai Sharma
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&3 32.
The imposition of punishment is a refined judicial function that demands a careful harmonization of its underlying purposes namely, retribution, deterrence, and reformation. This balance must reflect not only the reasoning of the Court but also the ethical standards and social context in which justice is administered. As societal values and circumstances evolve, the prominence accorded to each of these aims necessarily varies,
7
requiring the Court to adapt its emphasis in response to the changing demands of justice. The aforesaid principle found early articulation in the writings of Justice Caldwell, who, in his authoritative work "Criminology," observed that: "If the infliction of pain is to have its greatest effect upon the behavior of a person, it must follow soon after the act for which it is given. But punishment always takes place weeks or even months after the offense has been committed, since the offender must first be apprehended, tried, and convicted. Such delay tends to disconnect the punishment from the offense in the mind of the offender, and it may well be considered as merely another painful experience in an unjust world." 33.
Moreover, Italian criminologist and jurist Cesare Beccaria, in his seminal treatise "On Crimes and Punishments," propounded the doctrine of penal parsimony, emphasizing that the justification of any criminal justice system rests upon its capacity to inflict the least possible evil necessary to achieve its ends. The underlying premise is that punishment, being in itself a necessary evil and devoid of inherent virtue, must be confined strictly within the bounds of necessity. The imposition of suffering or restriction upon an offender cannot extend beyond what is indispensable for the preservation of social order.
34.
While 'retributive' object of sentencing is seen regressive, in modern day sentencing jurisprudence for its focus on punishing proportionally for the harm done and caters to the negative senses of spite and anger against a wrongful act, the rehabilitative/reformative approach examines the circumstances surrounding the offender on social, economical, physical and psychological level so as to reintegrate the
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offender in the social mainstream. The law extends the benefit of good and perceives a probability and possibility of reform. It aims at capitalising a perceived social liability. The expectation of law is based on the surrounding circumstances to distinguish between a 'criminal' and an 'offender'.
35.
While the pre-requisites of crime do not distinguish two persons, on the legal scale, this aspect is significant for sentencing. A mere involvement of a person in crime may not necessarily mark a person as a 'criminal.' 'Criminality' in mind and action has to be determined from the totality of circumstances including the mode and manner in committing an offence, the conduct pre and post the offence, the criminal antecedents, nature of involvement, influence of peers etc. and not just from an isolatory consideration of commission of an offence. A Court of law would not assume every offender to be beyond reform and differentiate in punishment on considering whether the offences arise due to human error or that stem from actions propelled by mens rea.
36.
The case in hand is yet another where interest of justice would warrant a reformative approach in precedence to a punitive or retributive approach. It is not the function of the judges to seek the transformation of human nature itself, but rather to shape the framework within which individuals perceive that adherence to the law aligns with their own best interests.
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