High Court of Punjab and HaryanaCWP/12989/2025dismissed

Ranjeet Singh Sidhu And ORS v. The Managing Director, Punjab Agri Export Corporation Ltd And ORS

2025-08-13Mr. Justice Harpreet Singh Brar14 pages

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$)$) # # - "Learned counsel for applicantspetitioners seeks permission to withdraw the instant application with liberty to applicants petitioners to raise the plea that applicantspetitioners are entitled to interest on outstanding dues with monthly rest by filing representation before the respondents as per order dated 07.11.2019 passed in main petition and on decision of the same to avail other legal remedy, if required.

Dismissed as withdrawn with liberty, as aforesaid"

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! "#"$% & # # "16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles or of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence sitters cannot be allowed to barge into Courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala, this Court observed thus:

"17. It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". .... It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment "" + .

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# G9. It may be conceded in favour of Mr Trivedi that the rule of constructive res judicata which is pleaded against him in the present appeal is in a sense a somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. This rule

) postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a proceeding between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even this view is founded on the same considerations of public policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent with considerations of public policy to which we have just referred.H + .

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= ( # ! "3. The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council [(1939) 2 KB 426 at p. 437], it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action". This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the

finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata.

4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) All ER 255 at p. 257]:

$ "I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subjectmatter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them."

This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has some times been referred to as constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle." (emphasis supplied) /

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"32. In all matters for which no provision is made by these rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, shall apply

: mutatis mutandis, in so far as they are not inconsistent with these rules."

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