Lal Chand Sharma v. Gulshan Vir Singh

[1]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Date of decision: 24.03.2026 Lal Chand Sharma ...Appellant

Versus

Gulshan Vir Singh

...Respondent

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present:

Mr. Kamal Joshi, Advocate for the appellant.

**** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) CM-3992-C of 2026 :

Allowed. Annexures P-14 & P-15 are taken on record. Main Case :

The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-defendant assailing the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, whereby the suit filed by respondent-plain9ff for permanent injunc9on has been decreed on 30.10.2024, and the appeal preferred by the appellant has been dismissed on 14.02.2025. 2.

The factual matrix, in brief, is that the respondent-plain9ff ins9tuted a suit for permanent injunc9on pleading that he is owner in possession of a residen9al plot measuring 4 biswas comprised in khasra No.98, situated at Village Dharampur, Tehsil Kalka, District Panchkula, having purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 03.01.2006, followed by muta9on sanc9oned in his favour. It was further averred that he had raised construc9on over the suit property and was in se@led possession thereof, but the appellant-defendant, who is a stranger to the property, started interfering in his peaceful possession, thereby necessita9ng the filing of the suit.

[2] 3.

The suit was contested by the appellant-defendant, who set up a rival claim by asser9ng that his wife was owner in possession of land measuring 4 biswas comprised in khasra No.100, purchased vide sale deed dated 11.12.1996, and that the construc9on and boundary wall exis9ng at the site had been raised by him and his wife. It was further pleaded that the plain9ff was a@emp9ng to encroach upon their property under the guise of the present suit.

4.

On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed the necessary issues and, aAer apprecia9on of oral as well as documentary evidence, decreed the suit of the plain9ff. The Trial Court, relying upon the demarca9on report submi@ed by the Local Commissioner, held that the suit property falls in khasra No.98 and not in khasra No.100, as claimed by the defendant, and consequently restrained the defendant from interfering in the possession of the plain9ff.

5.

Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the appellant-defendant preferred an appeal, which also came to be dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court.

6.

The Appellate Court, upon re-appraisal of the en9re evidence, affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and held that the demarca9on conducted through DGPS method clearly established that the suit property is comprised in khasra No.98 (and partly in khasra No.99), whereas the appellant claims ownership over khasra No.100, thereby having no concern with the suit property. The Appellate Court further held that the demarca9on report could not be discarded merely on the ground that it was conducted through DGPS method, especially in view of judicial recogni9on of such method.

7.

Assailing the concurrent findings, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that both the Courts below have misread and misappreciated the evidence on record. It is argued that the demarca9on report relied upon by the Courts below is not reliable as the same was

[3] conducted through DGPS method, which according to the appellant, is not in accordance with the prescribed procedure. It is further contended that, in fact, some other property was demarcated instead of the suit property. It is also contended that the evidence led by the appellant regarding possession and construc9on has not been properly appreciated. 8.

Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record, this Court finds that no substan9al ques9on of law arises for considera9on.

9.

The principal controversy revolves around iden9fica9on of the suit property. Both the Courts below have concurrently relied upon the demarca9on report submi@ed by the Local Commissioner, which has clearly established that the suit property falls in khasra No.98 and not in khasra No.100. The said finding is based on apprecia9on of evidence and does not suffer from perversity.

10.

The conten9on of the appellant that the demarca9on conducted through DGPS method is unreliable has already been considered and rightly rejected by the First Appellate Court by placing reliance upon judicial precedents recognizing such method of demarca9on, par9cularly in situa9ons, where tradi9onal reference points are not available. 11.

As regards the further conten9on that some other property was demarcated instead of the suit property, the same is found to be wholly untenable. The record reveals that the Local Commissioner conducted the demarca9on in the presence of both the par9es at the spot. No contemporaneous objec9on has been shown to have been raised by the appellant at the 9me of demarca9on regarding iden9fica9on of the property. Once the par9es/counsels were present during the demarca9on proceedings and par9cipated therein, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to subsequently contend that an altogether different property was demarcated. Such a plea is clearly an aAerthought and deserve to be outrightly rejected.

[4] 12.

Moreover, the demarca9on report is based on revenue records and reference points, and there is nothing on record to show that the Local Commissioner exceeded his mandate or demarcated any property other than the one in dispute.

13.

Further, once it stands established that the appellant claims ownership over khasra No.100, whereas the suit property falls in khasra No.98 (and partly in khasra No.99), the appellant has no right, 9tle or interest in the suit property so as to interfere in the possession of the plain9ff.

14.

The findings recorded by both the Courts below are pure findings of fact based on proper apprecia9on of evidence and se@led principles of law. The present appeal essen9ally seeks reapprecia9on of evidence, which is impermissible within the limited scope of jurisdic9on under Sec9on 100 CPC. No substan9al ques9on of law arises for considera9on.

15.

Consequently, the present Regular Second Appeal is dismissed, being devoid of merit. No order as to costs.

24.03.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned :

Yes/No Whether reportable :

Yes/No