Sukhwinder Singh And ANR. v. State Of Punjab And Another
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"[14A. Appeals.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of CriminalProcedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal.]
18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act.- Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act."
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"There is no presumption that the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not resorted to by the members of the upper Castes or the members of the elite class. For lodging a false report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. On the other hand, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge even a first information report, much less, a false one. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty investigation or for other various reasons including human failings irrespective of caste factor. There may be certain cases which may be false that can be a ground for interference by the Court, but the law cannot be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can be taken care in proceeding under section 482 of the Cr.PC.
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Concerning the provisions contained in section 18A, suffice it to observe that with respect to preliminary inquiry for registration of FIR, we have already recalled the general directions (iii) and (iv) issued in Dr. Subhash Kashinath's case (supra). A preliminary inquiry is permissible only in the circumstances as per the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, shall hold good as explained in the order passed by this Court in the review petitions on 1.10.2019 and the amended provisions of section 18A have to be interpreted accordingly.
9. The section 18A(i) was inserted owing to the decision of this Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath (supra), which made it necessary to obtain the approval of the appointing authority concerning a public servant and the SSP in the case of arrest of accused persons. This Court has also recalled that direction on Review Petition (Crl.) No.228 of 2018 decided on 1.10.2019. Thus, the provisions which have been made in section 18A are rendered of
academic use as they were enacted to take care of mandate issued in Dr. Subhash Kashinath (supra) which no more prevails. The provisions were already in section 18 of the Act with respect to anticipatory bail.
10. Concerning the applicability of provisions of section 438 Cr.PC, it shall not apply to the cases under Act of 1989. However, if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1989, the bar created by section 18 and 18A (i) shall not apply. We have clarified this aspect while deciding the review petitions."
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"9) The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no Court shall entertain application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. Court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence.
10) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, relying on the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Dr. R.K. Sangwan & Anr. vs. State, 2009 (112) DRJ 473 (DB) and in Crl. M.C. No. 3866/2008 and Crl.M.C. No. 1222/2009 titled M.A. Rashid vs. Gopal Chandra decided on 23.03.2012 and a decision of the Orissa High Court in Ramesh Prasad Bhanja & Ors. vs. State of Orissa, 1996 Cri. L.J. 2743, submitted that in spite of the specific bar under Section 438 of the Code, the Courts have granted
anticipatory bail to the accused who were charged under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act.
11) In view of the specific statutory bar provided under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, the above decisions relied on by the petitioners cannot be taken as a precedent and as discussed above, it depends upon the nature of the averments made in the complaint.
12) In view of the above discussion and in the light of the specific averments in the complaint made by the complainant-respondent No.3 herein, we are of the view that Section 18 of the SC/ST Act is applicable to the case on hand and in view of the same, the petitioners are not entitled to anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed. However, it is made clear that the present conclusion is confined only to the disposal of this petition and the trial Court is free to decide the case on merits."
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"Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to severe consequences, such requirement would be mandatory. It is the cardinal rule of the interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed. Since the requirement, in the instant
) case, of obtaining prior permission is mandatory, therefore, noncompliance of the same must result in canceling the concession made in favour of the grantee-the respondent herein." $
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"12. It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the legislature21. However, the object-oriented approach cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain language used by rewriting the section or structure words in place of the actual words used by the legislature. The logical corollary that flows from the judicial pronouncements and opinion of reputed authors is that the primary rule of construction is literal construction. If there is no ambiguity in the provision which is being construed there is no need to look beyond. Legislative intent which is crucial for understanding the object and purpose of a provision should be gathered from the language. The purpose can be gathered from external sources but any meaning inconsistent with the explicit or implicit language cannot be given."
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# Meenu
1. Whether speaking/ reasoned : Yes /No
2. Whether reportable : Yes /No